

THE NATIONAL INTEREST

9/11 as Aberration?
John Mueller

Martin Malia

Judging Nazism and Communism

September 11th One Year On:
Power, Purpose and Strategy in U.S. Foreign Policy

*Robert Tucker Michael Howard Pierre Hassner
Gary Schmitt John Mearsheimer Josef Joffe
James Chace Charles Kupchan Wang Gungwu*

Carla Hills & Martin Feldstein

Surveying the Global Economy: A Conversation

Bombs Away

*The New Containment by Graham Allison & Andrei Kokoshin
Waltzing to Armageddon? by Marc Trachtenberg*

Fate and Freedom
in History
John Patrick Diggins

America's Other
Korea Problem
Nicholas Eberstadt

Essays & Comments:

Geoffrey Parker, Harold James, Philip Gordon, Adam Garfinkle and others

Number 69 • Fall 2002 • \$7.00

ON NEWSSTANDS NOW

*"No other magazine has had a comparable effect in keeping
the social sciences honest." — Francis Fukuyama*

THE Public Interest

Fall 2002 • Number 149

Our Secularist Democratic Party

Louis Bolce & Gerald De Maio

The Lost Sense of Honor

James Bowman

How the Terrorists Get In

Steven A. Camarota

The Three Faith Factors

John J. DiIulio, Jr.

Race, Ethnicity, and the Census

Nathan Glazer

Politics After the Internet

Yuval Levin

BOOK REVIEWS by *Jeremy Rabkin, William A. Galston, Robert H. Bork, Irwin M. Stelzer, Kay S. Hymowitz, and Nelson Lund*

Subscribe today! • Call (888) 267-6030

\$25.00 for one year (4 issues) • \$42.50 for two years

Read highlights of our current issue at www.thepublicinterest.com

THE NATIONAL INTEREST

CHAIRMAN OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD

Conrad Black

CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD

Henry A. Kissinger

PUBLISHER

James R. Schlesinger

CO-PUBLISHER

Dimitri K. Simes

EDITORIAL BOARD

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Eliot A. Cohen

Midge Decter

Martin Feldstein

Francis Fukuyama

Samuel P. Huntington

Josef Joffe

Charles Krauthammer

Michael Mandelbaum

Richard Perle

Daniel Pipes

Alexey K. Pushkov

Stephen Sestanovich

Robert W. Tucker

EDITOR

Adam Garfinkle

EXECUTIVE EDITOR

Nikolas K. Gvosdev

MANAGING EDITOR

Daniel T. Kennelly

ASSISTANT MANAGING EDITOR

Damjan de Krnjević-Mišković

ASSISTANT EDITOR

Christian D. Brose

BUSINESS MANAGER

Eleonora Pambrun

ASSISTANT BUSINESS MANAGER

Angela Vetter

HONORARY CHAIRMAN AND FOUNDER

Irving Kristol

EDITOR EMERITUS AND CONSULTING EDITOR

Owen Harries

EDITORIAL OFFICE

The National Interest, 1615 L Street, N.W., Suite 1230, Washington, DC 20036

Telephone (202) 467-4884, Fax (202) 467-0006, Email: editor@nationalinterest.org

Website: www.nationalinterest.org

SUBSCRIPTION OFFICE

Postmaster and subscribers please send address changes and subscription orders to:

The National Interest, P.O. Box 622, Shrub Oak, NY 10588-0622 (914) 962-6297; (800) 893-8944

Rates: \$26/yr.; \$44/2 yrs.; \$59/3 yrs. Please add \$10 outside the United States and Canada.

The National Interest (ISSN 0884-9382) is published quarterly in Spring, Summer, Fall and Winter by The National Interest, Inc., a non-profit partnership of Hollinger International, Inc. and The Nixon Center that has received long-term support from the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation. Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in *P.A.I.S.*, *Historical Abstracts*, *International Political Science Abstracts*, *U.S. Political Science Documents*, *Political Science Abstracts*, and *America: History and Life*; articles are available on microfilm from University Microfilms International. Periodicals postage is paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional mailing offices. © 2002 by The National Interest, Inc. *The National Interest* is printed by Kirby Lithographic Co., Inc. It is distributed in the U.S. and Canada by Ingram Periodicals (1240 Heil Quaker Blvd., La Vergne, TN 37086-7000; 615-793-5522) and Bernhard DeBoer (113 East Centre Street, Nutley, NJ 07110; 973-667-9300) and in the U.K. by Comag Special Services (Tavistock Road, West Drayton, Middlesex UB7 7QX; 44-1895-444055). BPA International Member since 2000.

Articles

5 One Year On: A September 11 Anniversary Symposium

*Robert W. Tucker, Michael Howard, Gary Schmitt, John F. Mearsheimer,
Josef Joffe, James Chace, Wang Gungwu, Charles A. Kupchan & Pierre Hassner*

A distinguished and diversely-minded group of commentators offer their views on the direction of American foreign policy one year after September 11, 2001.

35 The New Containment *by Graham Allison & Andrei Kokoshin*

Forging a U.S.-Russian alliance to prevent nuclear terrorism should be America's top priority in the post-September 11 world; here is a blueprint for one.

45 Harbinger or Aberration? A 9/11 Provocation *by John Mueller*

The attacks on Washington and New York were the first of their kind; they may also be the last. A case against rushing to conclusions.

51 Surveying the Global Economy *a conversation with Carla Hills & Martin Feldstein*

There is no shortage of uncertainty in the global economy; two prominent economists sort through an increasingly tangled mess.

63 Judging Nazism and Communism *by Martin Malia*

Judging between the totalitarian evils of the 20th century need wait for a more balanced historiography; alas, the long farewell is not quite over.

79 Fate and Freedom in History *by John Patrick Diggins*

The historical revisionists of the Sixties have been the last to adapt to the end of the Cold War: case in point, Eric Foner.

91 **Reforging the Atlantic Alliance** *by Philip H. Gordon*

NATO is not dead or doomed, but the Allies should use the Prague Summit to assure its healthy future.

99 **U.S. Asia (and China) Policy Reconceived** *by George Gilboy & Eric Heginbotham*

True realism about Asia transcends the Bush Administration's narrow focus on geopolitics and China.

110 **Our Other Korea Problem** *by Nicholas Eberstadt*

The real threat to America's position in Korea doesn't emanate only from Pyongyang: How the "sunshine policy" could foreshadow the sunset of the U.S.-South Korean alliance.

119 **The Rock Gets Rolled: A Letter from Gibraltar** *by Joe Garcia*

Tony Blair and company seem hell-bent on caving in to Spain over Gibraltar. Unfortunately for Blair, Gibraltarians have other ideas.

Books

127 **Fighting Men** *by Geoffrey Parker*

Eliot Cohen's look at the greatest democratic statesmen of recent centuries affirms Clemenceau's quip that war is too important to be left to the generals—even American generals.

132 **Capital Ideas** *by Harold James*

A look at the poverty of some contending economic fundamentalisms.

140 **Contact: The Politics of Migration** *by Jeremy Black*

Impressive historical scholarship on migration cannot save Professor Hoerder from the miasma of current academic fashions.

144 **Waltzing to Armageddon?** *by Marc Trachtenberg*

A new edition of a well-known book on nuclear proliferation retains its rationalist fallacies.

Quarterly

156 **The Impossible Imperative?** *by Adam Garfinkle*

Arab democracy is no oxymoron, but expecting it in time to remedy our 9/11 problem is unrealistic.

OUTSTANDING JOURNALS ADDRESSING CRITICAL TOPICS FOR TODAY

American Foreign Policy Interests

Editor: *George D. Schwab, National Committee on American Foreign Policy*

"...this journal is consistently lively, objective, and informative."

—*Winston Lord, Former U.S. Ambassador to China*

"...a most rewarding journal in the field of foreign affairs."

—*Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Historian and Author*


As the journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, *American Foreign Policy Interests* has been publishing provocative articles from a nonpartisan perspective for nearly 30 years. Timely and thought-provoking, the journal offers articles written by some of the world's foremost experts and officials on topics of immediate interest and importance.

Each issue of the journal also contains a section entitled "For the Record" offering provocative editorials on national interest issues, in addition to regular book reviews and a foreign policy crossword puzzle.

Special Offer for First-Time Subscribers!

\$39 Personal Rate (Regularly \$71)

Call for Details



Vol. 24, Bimonthly,

ISSN 1080-3920

Institutional \$202 Personal \$71


Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

Editor-in-Chief: *Bruce Hoffman, RAND*

"*Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* provides a comprehensive and intellectually rigorous survey of the most important issues in the field, far surpassing other competing journals."

—*Peter Bergen, CNN Terrorism Analyst and author of Holy War, Inc.*

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism aims to cast new light not only on traditional sources of national and sub-national conflict but also on the range of new and emerging security issues. The journal publishes the best theoretical and empirical studies that contribute to a better understanding of the causes of these conflicts, their escalation, and the measures required to achieve their resolution.



Vol. 25, Bimonthly

ISSN 0149-0389

Institutional \$382 Personal \$150


International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence

Editor-in-Chief: *Richard R. Valcourt, American Military University*

"...an indispensable scholarly journal devoted to intelligence history and policy."—*The New York Review of Books*

Dedicated to the advancement of the academic discipline of intelligence studies, this quarterly journal is an independent, non-partisan forum, publishing articles and book reviews focusing on a broad range of national security matters.

The journal serves as a medium for professionals and scholars to exchange opinions on issues and challenges encountered by both government and business institutions in making contemporary intelligence-related decisions and policy. At the same time, it serves as an invaluable resource for researchers looking to assess previous developments and events in the field of national security.



Vol. 15, Quarterly,

ISSN 1326-987X

Institutional \$163 Personal \$74

For a FREE sample copy or to subscribe:

Taylor & Francis, 325 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19106

Phone: 215-625-8900, ext. 214 Fax: 215-625-8914 Email: veronica.sydnor@taylorandfrancis.com

Visit www.polisci.taylorandfrancis.com to see our other engaging and informative journals on current world affairs

One Year On

Power, Purpose and Strategy in American Foreign Policy

Throughout its existence, *The National Interest* has striven to identify and evaluate the intellectual frameworks that underlie U.S. foreign policymaking. Accordingly, as we approached the anniversary of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks against the United States, the editors asked a group of distinguished analysts to respond to the following questions:

After September 11 of last year, discussion arose over what had (and had not) changed about international politics and U.S. foreign policy because of the terrorist attacks, but that discussion was (often implicitly) grounded in a broader and older debate about the purposes of American power after the Cold War. Seen from a year's distance, how have the attacks, and the response to them, affected that larger debate? What should be the purposes of American power, and how should the war on terrorism be fitted to a strategy to advance those purposes?

We present the results below.

The End of a Contradiction?

Robert W. Tucker

IN 1996, I WROTE a piece in this magazine on what I considered to be the great issue of American foreign policy: the contradiction between the persisting desire to remain the premier global power, with its order-sustaining role, and an ever deepening aversion to bearing the costs of this position.¹ In the decade that followed the end of the Cold War, debate over U.S. foreign policy centered for the most part on the costs. This was

the major issue in the debate over whether to intervene in Bosnia, the debate being marked even on the interventionist side by a disjunction between interests avowed and costs rejected. It was uncommon to hear the point made that the ends of foreign policy must become more modest if the means were to shrink, though the proposition borders on the self-evident. Instead, endless discussion and debate went on over the costs of a role that was largely taken for granted.

¹"The Future of a Contradiction", *The National Interest* (Spring 1996).

Seen from a year's distance, September 11 dramatically narrowed the contradiction between the ends, or purposes, of U.S. foreign policy and the means available to achieve them. What happened on that day refocused the American people's attention on foreign policy as few events could. A crisis had arisen in which we were seriously and directly threatened. By comparison, even the crisis leading to the Gulf War was not in the same category. September 11 has gone a long way toward restoring something resembling the pre-Vietnam consensus over foreign policy, with its deference to the judgment of the president in determining what our vital interests are and when a threat to these interests justifies the use of force. A willingness to approve the means necessary to wage the war on terrorism, as President Bush conceives the meaning of that war, is the visible result. In turn, this result cannot be easily distinguished from a readiness to grant the means necessary to pursue the larger purpose of American power, that of providing order to a fractious world. Indeed, the administration considers the two purposes inseparable, the terrorist threat simply being, in its view, the greatest threat among many to order in the world today.

Moreover, the cost in American casualties of the war on terror has to date appeared to support the optimistic expectation entertained at the time of the Gulf War that a way has been found to avoid bearing the costs normally attending the use of military power. It was this expectation that figured so importantly in the first President Bush's declaration that the nation had "kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all." Many observers argued in the wake of the Gulf War that the circumstances attending that conflict were quite unusual and must account in large part for the low casualties. The campaign in Afghanistan, however, has given added credibility to earlier claims made on

behalf of a new military technology. Thus the anticipation of modest casualties has been joined to what is seen as the compelling purpose of ridding the world of the evil of terrorism.

WHAT WE HAVE today, then, is a foreign policy less beset by contradiction, but that is increasingly militarized as a result of what has become its dominating purpose. Along with this purpose go a number of recognizable traits, above all, a revived sense of mission—in this case, a mission cast in universal terms as the defeat of "every terrorist group of global reach" and a willingness to use the means considered necessary to achieve this mission. It is only in a purely formal sense, however, that the achievement of this mission resembles that of a normal war; that is, the defeat of the enemy. As the President has pointed out on more than one occasion, just because you cannot see the enemy does not mean that he is not there, in any of a number of countries, waiting to strike at you in a multitude of ways. If so, it is, in practice, a war without a readily identifiable end. It is also a war without geographical limits. And it is a war in which the will to strike first is seen as indispensable to effective defense.

All three of these characteristics make multilateral action inherently difficult, if only because they imply an open-ended commitment. It is generally recognized that one effect of September 11 has been to exaggerate this administration's disposition toward unilateralism. Faced with a choice between allies and mission, the administration has to date shown little inclination to sacrifice its view of mission; in the words of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld: "The worst thing you can do is allow a coalition to determine what your mission is." The prospect beckons that the war on terrorism is one we may eventually have to fight alone,

even if, upon reflection, we would prefer to have more active allies than we sought out in the initial stages of the Afghanistan campaign. If we cast a wide enough net, we will almost certainly have to fight it alone.

The present indications are that we will cast a wide net, that the war in Afghanistan against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda will be followed by an attack on Iraq if efforts to trigger an internal insurrection there fail. The President has publicly committed the nation to ousting Saddam Hussein. September 11 has had the more general effect, too, of reactivating tendencies in American foreign and defense policy that were apparent more than a decade ago during the Gulf War. Then a strategy designed to cope with lawless, renegade states in possession not only of conventional weapons but weapons of mass destruction, and dedicated to the pursuit of aggressive ends, was the objective. The war against Iraq, then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney declared at the time, “presages very much the type of conflict we are most likely to confront again in this new era—major regional contingencies against foes well armed with conventional and unconventional weapons.” An interventionist policy of the particular sort that has emerged over the past year was thus foreshadowed a decade ago, a policy whose principal purpose was to keep weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of aggressive and expansionist states.

The “new world order” over which America would preside was not implemented, however. Even if an attempt had been made to carry it out, it would have been hemmed in by those constraints manifest during the period of the Gulf War—a military still haunted by Vietnam, a public still shaken by that same experience, a largely anti-interventionist Congress unwilling to grant the necessary

means but that was nevertheless assertive in foreign policy, and allies whose views had still to be taken into consideration if only because of the Cold War endgame still being played out in Europe. Today, these constraints have all but disappeared, and nothing comparable has arisen in their place. Instead, the war on terror has confirmed American primacy in an altogether compelling manner, while freeing the President of virtually any real constraint on his powers in foreign policy.

HOW WILL the President use his power? To date, the answer has not been reassuring to advocates of multilateralism. It is true that multilateralists have often confused form with substance. American foreign policy has never been quite as multilateral as many of them have imagined. Nevertheless, during the long period of the Cold War, American power was to a substantial degree subordinated to a larger community. This goes a long way in accounting for the degree of trust that power enjoyed. Now, when we are at the plenitude of our power, a president has apparently decided that he can dispense with the sanction of this larger community and go his own way. The new “strike first” military policy is simply the most revealing expression to date of the administration’s determination to follow its own path regardless of the views of long-standing allies.

Too weak to oppose American power, yet fearing its exercise, most other nations may be expected to comply with our wishes. Nevertheless, the world’s loss of confidence in the benign purview of American power might well turn out to be the principal legacy of the war on terror. It could turn out to be a high price to pay for victory. □

Robert W. Tucker is professor emeritus of American foreign policy at The Johns Hopkins University.

What Friends Are For

Michael Howard

ONE OF THE problems that today confront American statesmen in dealing with the rest of the world is that the United States considers itself to be “at war”, but, with the obvious exception of Israel, no one else does: certainly none of its European or Asiatic partners, let alone such states as Russia or the People’s Republic of China. It is not that the rest of us do not understand or under-rate the danger posed by international terrorism. Without having suffered a catastrophe on the scale of September 11, 2001, virtually every state in Europe (not excepting Russia) together with many in Asia, have experienced terrorism for decades, if only as a running sore, and learned to live with it. So far from 9/11 inaugurating a new epoch in world history, it has simply provided terrible evidence of the fragility of the world order in which we have been living for many decades past, something already well known to every intelligence service in the world.

Outside the United States, that revelation has been seen as provoking the need not for a “war”, but for better intelligence, better police work, and closer international cooperation in dealing with the problem. President Bush’s declaration of a “war on terror” was generally seen abroad as a rhetorical device to alert the American people to the dangers facing them, rather than as a statement to be taken seriously or literally in terms of international law. But further statements and actions by the Bush Administration have made it clear that the President’s words *were* intended to be taken literally. The U.S. government has assumed powers inconceivable except in wartime, and shows no sign of relaxing them. The Orwellian implications of the threat to civil liberties posed by the government declaring a state of virtually per-

petual war are certainly alarming if not sinister, but that is a problem for the American people themselves rather than for its allies and associates.

But further clarification, in particular the President’s definition of his “axis of evil”, has certainly caused problems of interest to non-Americans. The connection between, on the one hand, an act perpetrated by mainly Saudi conspirators using box-knives as their main weapon, and on the other the internationally proscribed manufacture of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein, has never been clearly established. Even more remote has been the connection of Iran, Iraq’s deadliest enemy, where a modernizing population is struggling to free itself from the rule of the mullahs; while the citing of North Korea (without any evident consultation with its regional neighbors) as part of this conspiracy bewildered even America’s best friends overseas. Further statements, such as that made on June 1st by President Bush at West Point, suggest that the United States now considers itself to be in a state of war with any foreign state whose policy it deems hostile and whose weapons systems it regards as a threat, and to be entitled to initiate the use of armed force against any of them as an act of legitimate self-defense.

Such a claim, involving as it does the dismantling of the entire structure of international law that has been painfully built up, largely under American leadership, over the last hundred years, has dismayed even America’s closest associates. The situation has been exacerbated by such other unilateral acts by the Bush Administration as the reneging on the Kyoto Agreement, the refusal to ratify the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court, and the imposition of protective tariffs on agricultural products and steel in response to domestic political pressures. For each of these measures

there may be considerable justification, but cumulatively they have given the impression that the United States, having done so much to create and lead the international community, no longer regards itself as part of it. Taken in combination with the hostility of virtually the entire Islamic world resulting from the perceived lack of even-handedness in America's treatment of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, the result has been dramatic: whereas the day after September 11 the entire international community rallied to the support of the United States and nations fell over each other in offering their support, a year later the Americans find themselves in a state of isolation recalling that of the British Empire at the end of the 19th century.

Like the British then, some Americans now regard this isolation as rather "splendid." Militarily they are so strong, economically so wealthy and culturally so dominant that they feel able to ignore allies who contribute nothing but complications to situations that Washington believes itself quite capable of handling on its own. Initially, President George W. Bush showed much of the skill displayed by his father before the Gulf War in using American wealth, economic pressure and diplomatic skill in building up a winning coalition against the Taliban. But in contemplating a follow-up against Iraq, the administration apparently believes that its own military assets will enable it to dispense with allies, apart from the ever-loyal British (though even so, it should not underestimate the fragility of the domestic support enjoyed over this issue by Prime Minister Tony Blair).

And the administration may well be right. The armed forces of the United States are probably capable, on their own, of defeating any enemy or combination of enemies they are likely to encounter. But as was shown, not only in Afghanistan but in the Gulf War itself, winning wars is not

enough. The wars have to stay won. And unless the United States is prepared to undertake the burden of world empire that the British found too heavy for them—to establish its own viceroys, to breed its own governing class, to inure its people to accept a regular drain of casualties on its distant frontiers—it will need assistance from allies and associates to ensure that the victories of its armed forces are not castles in the sand.

This applies not only to the chain of wars that the United States now seems to contemplate fighting against "rogue states", but even more to the "war against terror"—or rather against international terrorists—that presents the real threat, the course of which is unlikely to be much affected by military victory over Iraq or any other state. The brilliantly successful war against Afghanistan certainly disorganized and probably demoralized Al-Qaeda, but did not destroy it. Terrorism is now not only global but independent of the state-system, and has to be countered by measures that lie beyond the range of America's regular armed forces, or indeed those of anyone else. In focusing on the destruction of "rogue states" the Bush Administration may have settled for something within its military capacity, but in dealing with the consequences of that destruction it will need all the help it can get. Nor is there the slightest reason to suppose that such victories would eliminate, or even reduce, the threat posed by international terrorism. Arguably, they could increase it.

IT MAY WELL BE, as has been powerfully argued by Philip Bobbitt in his remarkable work *The Shield of Achilles*, that the existing structure of world order based on co-operation between nation-states has been rendered obsolete by the communications revolution, and that a new template must now be devised appropriate to the new world of

porous frontiers and “market states.” There is also a case to be made for the neo-imperialist theory that “modern” and “post-modern” states have a moral obligation—again as the British believed a century ago—to nurse “pre-modern” societies toward the blessings of modernity, and if necessary to use force in doing so. But those concerned with the American national interest, like the readers of this magazine, have the right to ask what it is that the Bush Administration has in mind as the ultimate object of its “War against Terror.” If it regards the existing framework of world order, established half a century ago after the Second World War, as no longer competent to preserve the peace, with what does it intend to replace it? In the world wars, the object both of the Wilson and the Roosevelt Administrations—if not of the American people as a whole—was to establish a global community of nation-states based on a commonly accepted rule of law embodying the fundamental human rights on which the United States itself had been established. It was a noble endeavor, challenged after 1918 by the rival ideology of fascism, and after 1945 by that of communism. In 1990 it seemed to emerge triumphant. Now this objective is threatened by cultural if not ideological diversity, and it seems doubtful whether, with the decay of the nation-state, it remains viable at all.

The Bush Administration has clearly lost confidence in the capacity of the existing international order to guarantee America’s national security, and with very good reason. At the moment it seems prepared to use American power to take on the job all by itself, like some benevolent dictator moving to clear up the Augean stables of a corrupt and ungovernable democracy. But then what? The record tends to show that once dictators, however benevolent, have assumed that responsibility, they find it very hard to disentangle themselves and retire peacefully to their

farms. America is in danger of unilaterally involving itself in a host of conflicts whose consequences could irrevocably divert it from what it has always held to be its true and best purposes.

The “war against terror” can end only when the United States has either re-established the old world order in a more effective form, or created a new one more appropriate to the global challenges of the 21st century. Neither task can be achieved unilaterally, or can even be contemplated so long as the United States remains isolated, splendidly or not, from world opinion. American unilateral action, whether against Iraq or any other perceived adversary, is unlikely to command international support unless it can be shown to be a necessary step toward the creation of a more viable structure of international order than that which already exists.

Whatever new structure is created, and however long it may take to build, terrorism will continue to feature as a disruptive element in the world order, as crime exists as a feature of the domestic order. That order has to be either re-established or created; that is, or should be, the purpose of American power. The sooner, therefore, that American statesmen can cool down their bellicose rhetoric and think in terms not of apocalyptic crusades against evil, but of humdrum global policing against crime, the easier they will find it to relate the military campaigns they are planning to the constructive activity of building peace, and to enlist the help of the rest of the world in doing so. This might also help the American people to understand the true nature of the long conflict that now confronts them. Wars may end, but police work does not. □

Sir Michael Howard is emeritus Professor of Modern History at Oxford and emeritus Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History at Yale. He is also emeritus president of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

A Case of Continuity

Gary Schmitt

“THE MORE things change, the more they stay the same”, goes the old saying—especially, it seems, when analyzing American statecraft in the wake of September 11, 2001.

The changes before us are, of course, noteworthy. First, the strategic concept of deterrence in all of its MAD manifestations has lost its half-century hold on America’s security posture. As President Bush argued in his June 1 commencement address at West Point, the idea of massive retaliation against nation-states “means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend.” Nor does it hold for states governed by leaders willing to use terrorists to wage war by proxy, or who themselves are so committed to their cause that dire threats of retaliation will not necessarily dissuade them from aggression. And given the potential human costs associated with a failure of deterrence in a world of proliferated chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, it follows logically—if not inevitably—that the United States would add “defense” and “pre-emption” to its strategic vocabulary.

Implicit in this change, now coming to be known as the Bush Doctrine, are others. For one thing, the United States is jettisoning the idea that multilateral regimes and global accords are effective routes to disarmament and nonproliferation. At best, they may slow proliferation but, in the final analysis, they cannot be counted on to put this genie back in the bottle. More significantly, a policy of possible military pre-emption puts the final nail in the coffin of Article 51 of the UN Charter, which allows for self-defense only in response to an armed attack. Although Article 51, strictly construed, has been something of a dead letter in

international law for some time now, the Bush Administration is not letting it die a quiet death. In blunt, black letter fashion, the President has resurrected the concept of “anticipatory self-defense.” But even here the Bush Doctrine pushes well beyond the traditional justifications for its use: to wit, that the threat be imminent, leaving no choice, no moment of deliberation. In effect, the United States is making new law here—or, more precisely, applying an old principle to new circumstances. This is justifiable but it is, nevertheless, a potentially profound change in the law of nations.

Internally, 9/11 and the promulgation of the Bush Doctrine means that the debate between conservative realists and neo-conservatives over the priority given to the character of states (“regimes”) has been settled in favor of the latter. The “axis of evil” consists of regimes that cannot be trusted with weapons of mass destruction; changing them thus becomes a strategic necessity. Conversely, the Bush Doctrine puts a premium on working with liberal democracies and expanding their number. A decade ago, the first Bush Administration decided that leaving Saddam Hussein in power was acceptable. Now, a new Bush Administration insists not only that Saddam’s regime must go, but that, in its place, a decent, tolerant and representative government need arise. Likewise, nearly a decade ago, we began the Oslo process believing that it did not matter whether Yasir Arafat was a corrupt thug and ruled Palestinians despotically; today, these are our chief concerns.

Finally, 9/11 has put an end to the idea that the United States is in a period of “strategic pause”, a phrase coined in the 1990s by those who wanted to believe that the globe’s only superpower could take time out from the world stage without its adversaries noticing. Of course, the United States has been busy,

but the general sense was that each and every case of intervention—Panama, Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans—was *sui generis* and reflected no underlying strategic plan. Moreover, it was hard not to notice that these military efforts were conducted with considerable reluctance and were either begun belatedly or ended abruptly. It was also hard for our adversaries not to notice that U.S. defense spending was dropping rapidly and that Washington was spending more time catering to would-be competitors, like China, than revitalizing its alliances in Europe and Asia to meet post-Cold War realities.

What the “strategic pause” crowd forgot was that a great power is either gaining momentum or it is losing it. There is no stasis when it comes to the ambitions and calculations of friends and enemies—all the more so in a unipolar system. Either the United States is engaged in promoting and protecting its vision of the international order or it becomes the target of those who oppose it. Acting as though we can “sit this one out” only invites challengers to think that we are not up to playing the game. In retrospect, the fact that the United States is now at war should be no surprise given the signals America was sending throughout most of the past decade. It should also be no surprise that the war is a war against terrorism, since we have spent nearly all of the past decade ignoring the growing threat it posed.

ALTHOUGH THE changes in U.S. strategy brought about by September 11 are real and significant, the overarching strategy as articulated by President Bush is not new; it is more or less a continuation of U.S. foreign policy as it has existed since World War II. As that war was coming to a close, American statesmen were determined to create a new international order, one that would

rest on American political and economic principles and, when necessary, the application of American power. The lesson of the 1920s and 1930s was that disengagement was not a viable alternative, and the swift post-World War II rise of the Soviet threat in all its ideological and military facets confirmed it.

The President’s decision to return to this path was not inevitable. He could have confined his administration’s response to September 11 to a “police action.” But to his credit, within a few weeks of the terrorist attack, he began to comprehend and speak to the larger, underlying nature of the threat we face. Central to that understanding is his appreciation of the fact that, in a world in which terrorists have global reach and hostile states weapons of mass destruction, what matters most is the nature of our adversaries’ regimes. The risk is too great to leave some in place; détente is not an option with the likes of Iraq and Iran. Hence, promoting liberal democratic governance in their place is less an idealistic option than a strategic imperative. The United States is back in the business of shaping a world order—with a vengeance.

The immediate theaters of operation for this “business” are the Islamic Middle East and Central Asia. Ten years ago, Francis Fukuyama noted in *The End of History and the Last Man* that the last outpost in which “the liberal *idea*” was not victorious was the world of Islam. Only Islam constituted “a systematic and coherent ideology . . . with its own code of morality and doctrine of political and social justice” that could be said to challenge liberalism’s reign. Not that Islam could compete in fact—but a radicalized form of it, when faced with liberalism’s primacy, could serve as steward of a potent strain of resentment. As a result, the “war on terrorism” has justifiably become in good measure a “war” on those Islamic-dominated regions that History

has left behind. For some sound and some not-so-sound reasons, the United States has previously regarded this area of the world as exempt from the requirements of liberal rule. When President Bush argued that this “need not and must not be its fate”, he in effect committed the United States to unfinished business.

Obviously, the President has set out an ambitious program and no one should think that a quick, clean victory in this larger campaign is likely. In some ways, where we sit today looks strikingly similar to where we sat in 1947 after President Truman’s speech to Congress on providing aid to Greece and Turkey. Truman, like Bush, was not reluctant to put the issue in stark relief: “At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life.” And like the Bush Doctrine, the Truman Doctrine was criticized for its lack of nuance, its failure to appreciate the world’s complexities. And given how choppy and even chaotic the implementation of the Truman Doctrine was in the months that followed, the critics seemed closer to the truth than not. Conservatives like Walter Lippmann also attacked Truman for sending the United States down a strategic path that was not sustainable.

But, of course, it was sustainable. The reasons were many, but a key one was the certainty that the agenda established by President Truman and the other American statesmen of the period was consonant with the universal and revolutionary principles that had defined the country since its inception. Of course, circumstances and prudence have shaped how those principles have undergirded American foreign policy in particular periods. Nevertheless, the underlying continuity between the principles that animated the American Founding, and that gave rise to the “empire of liberty” it now enjoys and fosters throughout the globe, is far more

impressive than the odd periods of U.S. indifference toward the world.

In the early 1990s, the question was raised as to whether the United States could “return” to being a “normal” power once the exceptional requirements of the Cold War were behind it. The truth is that the United States can never be a normal power, and it invites trouble when it tries. It is rather American “exceptionalism” that is normal, and the Bush Doctrine is the most recent manifestation of it. The American response to 9/11 has not deflected U.S. foreign policy from its historic purpose, but only more precisely defined and re-energized it. □

Gary Schmitt is executive director of the Project for the New American Century.

Hearts and Minds

John J. Mearsheimer

THE CENTRAL purpose of American power is to provide security for the United States in a dangerous world. Before September 11, other states, especially other great powers, were perceived to be the main threat to the United States. To maximize its security, American policymakers worked assiduously to ensure that the United States held a favorable position in the global balance of power.

This template for thinking about American security policy has been altered somewhat by September 11. The United States still has to be deeply concerned with great power politics, particularly with the rise of China. But now it also has to confront Al-Qaeda, which has the United States in its gunsight and is determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

President Bush has not yet devised a clear strategy for combating terrorism.

Nevertheless, he has been under intense pressure to view September 11 as a transformative moment that calls for the United States to become much more actively involved around the world. Indeed, some conservatives argue that it is time to create an American empire, where the United States dominates the entire globe and shapes it according to its own interests. Presumably, this ambitious strategy would keep great power rivals at bay as well as eliminate the terrorist threat.

This strategy of empire is unilateralist at its core. It aims to allow the United States to operate as freely as possible on the world stage, unconstrained by allies, multilateral institutions or international law. It also calls for a wide-ranging war on terrorism, which means targeting a broad array of terrorist organizations, host states and states seeking weapons of mass destruction.

The key instrument for winning that war is America's mighty military machine. Proponents of empire believe that if the United States makes clear its willingness to use force and then wins a few victories, other foes will either desist from active opposition or even jump on the American bandwagon. This tendency will be pronounced in the Islamic world, where there is said to be a profound respect for winners. According to Charles Krauthammer, "The way to tame the Arab street is not with appeasement and sweet sensitivity, but with raw power and victory." For sure, there will be incorrigible states like Iraq that refuse to accept the new world order. The United States will invade them, topple their rulers, and transform them into friendly democracies. Such ambitious social engineering would not only eliminate Saddam Hussein, but would also convince the likes of Iran and North Korea that they had better dance to Uncle Sam's tune or be prepared to pay the piper.

There is only one thing wrong with this rosy vision of Pax Americana; it is

not going to work. Instead of creating a benign world of pro-American democracies, such an expansive military campaign is more likely to make the terrorism problem worse. Any strategy that relies heavily on military force to combat terrorism is likely to increase hatred of the United States and complicate the task of defeating Al-Qaeda. One suspects that the Bush team understands this point, since so far it has employed the U.S. military to fight terrorism with great caution and circumspection.

Why is an American empire an unrealistic objective? First, empires are very difficult to build today because of nationalism, which causes peoples and states to fiercely resist domination by others. Palestinian resistance against Israel, Afghan resistance against the Soviets, and Vietnamese resistance against the United States—not to mention the collapse of the British, French and Soviet empires—are prominent examples of this phenomenon at work.

Some argue that the United States is different, because it would create a benign empire. After all, it is a democracy, and most Americans believe that democracies pursue enlightened foreign policies. Unfortunately, large numbers of people outside the United States—even in other democracies—are sharply critical of American foreign policy, which is not always benign toward them. Indeed, for the vast majority of people in the world, benign domination is an oxymoron. Therefore, if the United States pursues empire, even a democratic Pax Americana, it will end up as public enemy number one.

Second, using military force to topple regimes and replace them with pro-American leaders is a daunting task. Sometimes it is easy to eliminate hostile regimes, as the United States showed in Afghanistan. The difficulty, however, comes with the nation-building that follows; i.e., putting a friendly and stable regime in place so that U.S. troops can go

home. This is the problem the Bush Administration now faces in Afghanistan, and surely would confront if it invades Iraq. The United States could eliminate Saddam with relative ease, but then it would be stuck—or have to stick others—with the job of occupying Iraq.

Third, the extensive use of military force is no way to deal with terrorists because they make poor targets for conventional military operations. Terrorists operate in small groups and disappear into cities or the countryside when directly threatened. This is what happened in Afghanistan: when the American military closed in on Al-Qaeda, it melted away. Furthermore, trying to stamp out terrorism with military forces is likely to enrage, not humble, the masses in the Islamic world. That anger will surely translate into resentment against the United States, further complicating efforts to eliminate Al-Qaeda.

The final problem with fighting wars to root out terrorism is that most Americans do not have much appetite for participating in the fight. An example: shortly after the World Trade Center fell, 69 percent of Harvard students favored military action against the perpetrators, but only 38 percent were willing to fight themselves. In a recent survey of college students, 37 percent said they would evade the draft if called today. Also, the American military has shown little enthusiasm for combat when it might involve significant casualties. U.S. commanders were reluctant to directly engage Al-Qaeda at Tora Bora and in Operation Anaconda, and there is much evidence that senior officers in the Pentagon oppose invading Iraq.

RATHER THAN pursue an empire with the sword to defeat Al-Qaeda, the United States should adopt a “hearts and minds” strategy that con-

centrates on reducing Islamic hostility toward it. Instead of building an empire—which will increase anti-American hatred and put U.S. forces on the front lines around the world—the United States should seek to reduce its military footprint and use force sparingly.

A hearts and minds strategy contains four main ingredients. First, the United States should not engage in a global war on all terrorist organizations wherever they might arise, but should focus on destroying Al-Qaeda and its close allies. Otherwise, it will squander resources on secondary threats and create enemies out of terrorist organizations that have no special quarrel with America.

Second, the United States should place the highest priority on locking up the fissile material and nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union, because that is where a terrorist is likely to acquire the ultimate weapon. Some conservatives justify a war on Iraq by claiming that Saddam might give Al-Qaeda or other such groups nuclear weapons if he had them. But this claim is unconvincing, because bin Laden would use them against the United States or Israel, who would almost certainly respond with a nuclear strike against Iraq. Saddam is an aggressive despot, but there is no evidence that he is suicidal. If we are really worried about terrorists getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction (and we should be), we should concentrate on the most likely source (Russia) rather than on far less imminent dangers (Iraq).

Third, America should emphasize intelligence, diplomacy and covert actions over military force in its campaign against Al-Qaeda. Of course, circumstances might arise that call for large-scale military assaults, but they should not be our preferred method of operation.

Fourth, the United States should

adopt policies that ameliorate the rampant anti-Americanism in the Islamic world. If such policies are successful, individuals and states in that region would be less likely to support Al-Qaeda and more willing to cooperate with the United States against terrorism. Furthermore, the pool of potential recruits for Al-Qaeda would shrink substantially.

Some might say that this approach cannot work because the Islamic world hates Western culture, not U.S. policies. In this view, they hate us for who we are, and we cannot change our identity. However, it is clear from recent polls and abundant anecdotal evidence that the root of the problem is not MTV or hip-hop, or even the Western values of freedom and individual liberty. Rather, the problem is specific American policies: U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia; sanctions against Iraq; unqualified backing of Israel; U.S. support of repressive regimes in Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia; and the apparent relish with which the United States uses force against Islamic societies.

Obviously, the United States needs to overhaul its Middle East policies if it hopes to solve the terrorist problem. To start, it should end "dual containment", which requires a major American presence in the region to contain both Iran and Iraq. Instead, the United States should rely on the states in the region to balance each other. Specifically, it should seek to improve relations with Iran, not Iraq, and rely heavily on Iran to contain Iraq (or vice versa if necessary). That strategy would allow the United States to withdraw its forces from Saudi Arabia and act as an offshore balancer in the region, as it did from 1947 until 1990. It follows that Washington should not invade Iraq. Also, sanctions against Iraq should end, as they are costly and ineffective.

The United States should make a

major effort to end the war between Israel and the Palestinians, because that is the only way America can remain close to Israel and still have good relations with the Islamic world. In effect, that means creating a viable Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank, which will require Washington to pressure Israel to remove most of its settlements from those areas. If an agreement is reached, the United States should target aid to Israel so that it can easily defend itself within its new borders. If Israel refuses to end its occupation, America should cut off economic and diplomatic support to Israel. In short, the United States either has to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict or distance itself from Israel. Otherwise, the terrorism problem will never go away, and might even get worse.

Finally, the Bush Administration should tone down its rhetoric about preemptive strikes. It does not make sense to shout from the rooftops that America is committed to striking out of the blue against any group or state it considers evil. Such a policy alienates allies, tips off adversaries, promotes nuclear proliferation and generally makes states less willing to cooperate with the United States. It makes much more sense, as Teddy Roosevelt said, to speak softly and carry a big stick.

The Bush Administration has made progress over the past year in its campaign against Al-Qaeda. But much work lies ahead. The best way to crush Al-Qaeda is not to build a worldwide empire based mainly on military force, but instead to lower America's military profile around the globe while improving its image in the Islamic world. □

John J. Mearsheimer, the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, is the author of *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (W. W. Norton, 2001).

Of Hubs, Spokes and Public Goods

Josef Joffe

WHAT HAS REALLY changed since last September 11? Not very much. Cataclysmic as it was, that event was more like a bolt of lightning that illuminated the essential contours of the international landscape than like an earthquake that reconfigured it. It dramatized, but did not shape, some profound transformations of world politics in the making for at least a decade. These transformations have to do with the nature, distribution and hierarchy of global power. Basically, the aftermath of September 11 has dramatized the centrality of the United States in the international security system.

The real watershed event, in retrospect, was not September 11, 2001 but Christmas Day 1991 when the Russian Empire—a.k.a. the Soviet Union—committed suicide by self-dissolution. Suddenly, the world was no longer bipolar but unipolar, no longer defined by the titanic U.S.-Soviet struggle but by the presence of a virtually unchallenged No. 1: the United States. Because the Soviet collapse unfolded without war and revolution—unlike the cases of the Czarist, Ottoman, Habsburg, Hitlerian and colonial empires throughout the 20th century—the consequences of this drama took some time to sink in. Act One took place in 1990–91 when the United States masterminded the global coalition that laid low Saddam Hussein—unopposed by the Soviet Union, Europe and China. Acts Two and Three followed in 1995 and 1999 when the United States took the lead in bombing campaigns against Serbia—again, virtually unopposed. In the most recent Act, the United States harnessed a global coalition once more, this time against Terror International sited in Afghanistan. The moral of this tale that

stretches from Baghdad to the Balkans to Tora Bora is simple: No. 1 in 1992 has become even more so in 2002.

The war in Afghanistan is in some ways a special case, for it exemplifies a revolution in warfare that has thrust American power into a category all of its own. The war was prosecuted from 7,000 miles away, from Central Command in Florida, in almost “real time.” It dramatized force projection, logistical, and command, control and intelligence capabilities that no nation has ever before come close to deploying. So novel and effective was the campaign that it might have foreshadowed the end of the post-Hiroshima age, which is to say that so powerful were some of the “conventional” weapons deployed there (like thermobaric bombs and the “Daisy Cutter”) that the function of nuclear devices may be relegated to deterrence alone.

Though a new twist in the history of warfare, the war in Afghanistan underscores an old point: the United States is not strong because it has nuclear weapons; it is mighty because it can do without them. Indeed, the power gap between No. 1 and the rest keeps growing. The United States now spends on military capabilities (\$377 billion for this fiscal year) almost as much as the rest of the world combined. If the Bush Administration adds to the defense budget every year as planned so that, by 2007, the United States will allocate \$450 billion, then, *ceteris paribus*, the United States *will* outspend all others combined. Not since the days of the Roman Empire has such a power gap between No. 1 and the rest existed.

This was bound to have consequences, and the best shorthand description of the most important of these is the Rumsfeld Doctrine. That doctrine proclaims that “the mission determines the coalition, and not the other way round”, and its first victim was NATO. Indeed, NATO as we have known it for half a cen-

tury, as an anti-Soviet alliance, is dead. That was NATO I, in essence a unilateral American guarantee binding the United States to the defense of Europe. It has been replaced by NATO II, best defined as a collection of states, now including Russia, from which the United States draws coalition partners *ad hoc*. NATO II, in other words, is a pool, not a pact; accordingly, in NATO II's first war, (some) members acted as chosen handmaidens, not as foreordained beneficiaries, of American might.

THIS REPRESENTS a momentous and still insufficiently appreciated change in Atlantic relations, and to grasp the full scope of American pre-eminence the point must be pushed still further. The aftermath of September 11 has certified America's *global* primacy in terms of both structure and process. No. 1 in the hierarchy of power, the United States is also the foremost impresario of the world's major politico-strategic relationships. America's Cold War alliances with Western Europe and Japan (and briefly CENTO and SEATO) were once the single axis around which American grand strategy revolved. They still play prominent roles, but in a system that is now *tous azimuts*. The proper metaphor is that of "hub and spokes", with America as the hub and players 2, 3, 4, 5 and so on representing the spokes. Who are they?

"Europe" remains a founding member of the system, but as a set of *ad hoc* participants rather than as a single entity, be it NATO or the EU. A privileged European player is Britain, another, though more ambiguously so, is Germany. France is simultaneously an active ally (as in the Balkans or in Afghanistan) and a *quondam* object of containment. Poland—and indeed all the beneficiaries of the American-led enlargement of NATO—as well as Turkey, are useful counterweights against the larger continentals. Europe

itself is a regional version of the American hub-and-spokes system, with the United States ever so subtly playing some against others, or recruiting posers for the intervention *du jour*.

Once the very *raison d'être* of America's Cold War alliances, Russia is the newest spoke in America's global wheel. This does not signify a "reversal of alliances" but it does considerably enlarge America's margin of maneuver. The moment Vladimir Putin dropped Russia's active hostility to missile defense in exchange for drastic nuclear arms control, opposition in Europe and China was all but neutralized. With Putin in the American boat, the war in Afghanistan was enormously facilitated; U.S. bases in Central Asia, the "soft underbelly" of the former Soviet Union, would have remained out of reach if not for Russia's consent. America's bases now stretch around the world: from Norfolk, Virginia via Europe and the Middle East into Central Asia, and from there to the Western and Central Pacific all the way back home to San Diego. By comparison, even imperial Britain at its height looks like a poor second cousin to 21st-century America.

The Middle East is at present a spoke in the making. The United States has not yet imposed peace on the Levant or full discipline on nominal allies like Saudi Arabia, nor yet transformed the regimes of its two major foes, Iran and Iraq. But Ariel Sharon and Yasir Arafat, Riyadh and Cairo, all take their quarrels to Washington and all depend on American might and benevolence. If the United States pulls off its Saddam caper, it will all but complete its quest for dominance over the Middle East initiated with the extrusion of Britain and France after the Suez War of 1956. All that would remain would be the fall of the Islamic regime in Iran.

In the Far East, both large players like Japan and lesser ones like Thailand prefer to huddle under the American umbrella

rather than face China on their own. China, of course, is the long-term strategic challenger but, so far, the subtle American mix of containment and socialization are working much better than did America's all-sticks/no-carrots strategy toward Japan in the 1930s. At any rate, Beijing has not recruited either Russia or the Western Pacific coastal nations into its own orbit. Along with Australia and New Zealand, these remain regional spokes in America's global wheel.

THE HISTORICALLY tutored will notice that this resembles the Bismarckian system on a global scale. Like the Second Reich in Continental Europe then, the United States is No. 1 in the world now—by dint of its strategic centrality, economic dynamism and cultural sway. Yet precisely because of their predominance, each nation has had to find a way to keep numbers 2, 3, 4 *et al.* from ganging up against No. 1. Bismarck limned the solution in his famous *Kissinger Diktat*.² The task, he wrote in 1877—six years after German unification—was to create a “universal political situation in which all the powers except France need us and, by dint of their mutual relations, are kept as much as possible from forming coalitions against us.” Germany thus sought and gained better relations with Britain, Russia and Austria than they might forge among themselves, so to make them “spokes” to Berlin’s “hub.”

The American system today is the Bismarckian one writ large, but will it last longer than Bismarck's? That system endured until 1893, when France and Russia concluded an alliance against Germany—or, interpreted more generously, for almost half a century, until 1914, when Germany had to fight a war against almost all of Europe. The United States can do better than that if its grand strategy amounts to more than just playing one “spoke” against the other. The

aim should be not only to prevent, but to pre-empt, hostile coalitions by undercutting the reasons for their formation. The point is to make other powers *willing* participants in the American system.

This would be nothing so new. American diplomacy during the Cold War executed this task in exemplary fashion by providing the world with essential services. In social science parlance, the United States acted as foremost producer of global public goods. Just to note the acronyms that stand for those goods—UN, IMF, GATT, OEEC/OECD, NATO, WTO, PfP—is to recognize that all were “made in the U.S.A.” These institutions upheld international security and free trade and thus cemented America's preponderance by giving other key players potent reasons for choosing cooperation over ganging up.

Alas, during the Cold War it was obviously in America's interest to deliver the goods and, in a certain sense, to contain itself as well as the Soviet Union. The problem today is that the United States seems to take more out of the system than it invests in it. The clumsy but benign elephant of yore has donned a lion's clothing, and America's response to September 11 has only made the change more obvious. America is no predator going a-conquering like yesterday's hegemons, but by the intermittent growl of his voice and swipe of his mighty paw, this beast tells the rest: “I am the king; go along, or I'll go it alone.”

True leadership, however, is not forged in bouts of petulance and hauteur, and power is most effective when it need not be demonstrated. Nor is true greatness exemplified by transparent domestic

²The “Kissinger Diktat” has nothing to do with either Henry Kissinger or an act of imposition. It refers to the spa, Bad Kissingen, that Bismarck liked to visit; and “diktat” is (also) the German word for “dictation.”

maneuvers like punitive tariffs on steel and grossly expanded farm support payments; such moves do not even improve the welfare of America as a whole, the largest exporting nation with a commensurately large interest in free trade. Good leadership is to lift one's own boat by providing a rising tide for others. The quest for relative gains, as always, risks degeneration into zero-sum politics.

These are not outlandish insights. They occur to any would-be leader whilst still in kindergarten. At a minimum, acting with others is more economical than acting alone, even if the costs of co-operation exacted by lesser players with more parochial interests sometimes seem too high. Those who drop most of the ordnance on Kosovo or Afghanistan do not acquire thereby a license to withdraw from the more mundane, but also more important, task of maintaining postwar order. After all, the reward of war is not military but *political* victory—as the United States demonstrated in Western Europe and Japan after V-E and V-J Day.

But these observations, obvious as they may be, do not abound in contemporary Washington. They are overshadowed by a heady sense of America as Gulliver Unbound who must slap away those pestering Lilliputians. But why wait until they seek to match or constrain his strength? “Take care of others in order to take care of yourself” is the proper course for the “indispensable nation” that wants to do better than Bismarck. To lead is to heed—that is not a counsel of wimpishness, but of wisdom. It may be harder for American leaders to accept such discipline after September 11, but not to do so risks the twin peril of overstretch and countercontainment. □

Josef Joffe is publisher and editor of *Die Zeit* in Hamburg and Associate of the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University.

Avoiding Empire

James Chace

IT GOES AGAINST the American grain to admit that the United States is now an imperial power, but the magnitude of the American economy (twice as large as its sometime rival Japan), its military budget (greater than the next twenty biggest spenders combined), and its new willingness to intervene unilaterally and massively across the globe all mark a decisive turning point in American history. Although the Founders contemplated an American “empire of liberty”, in Jefferson’s words, and although imperialist strategists such as Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge and Alfred Thayer Mahan insisted that the United States have a worldwide reach, Americans have been reluctant to accept an overtly imperial role for the nation. That is still the case. But after September 11, 2001, given the nature of the American response to what happened on that day, other nations increasingly perceive America to be an empire—an informal one, to be sure—in a world where nation-states still retain a mandate to provide for the security of their people. So the question arises: Is there a strategy suited to the current situation—in which the main threat to the nation comes from terrorists who may or may not be protected by the states from whose territory they operate—that would incline America *away* from an imperial vocation?

Strategies generally come about when political leaders are faced with a situation that they were not expecting. The achievement of the immediate post-World War II architects, led by Secretaries of State George Marshall and Dean Acheson, followed a breakdown of the wartime alliance, which led to a mortal rivalry that neither Roosevelt nor Truman had anticipated. The Bretton Woods agreements

that produced the IMF and the World Bank, the Truman Doctrine to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union in the Eastern Mediterranean, the economic rebuilding of Europe spurred on by the Marshall Plan, and the creation of NATO were the result. These institutions became the essential building blocks for a Western (read: American-led) economic, military and political system that not only halted any possibility of successful Soviet aggression, but that also became a broad strategic framework able to incorporate countries outside the Soviet orbit. Its success cannot be denied.

There is no way to predict the structures that will emerge in response to the unexpected post-9/11 world of American supremacy coupled with American vulnerability, or whether these structures will be as sturdy, appropriate and successful as those of the Cold War. But we can examine the landscape in which we are condemned to live. We can try to indicate the roads that should not be taken, as well as the paths that might promise an America that would continue to work for the betterment of its own society and, as the Founders hoped, would show “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.”

THE NEED TO provide for the security of its citizens in such a world as we inhabit is now likely to mean that a power of the magnitude of the United States will act unilaterally far more often than not. This would be nothing new. For much of its history, America has sought to secure its political and territorial integrity without the assistance of other powers. This solitary—or unilateral—approach to security has carried with it an implicitly absolute goal: to prevent America’s security from being undermined by the constraints of other powers. Such an approach has brought with it a strong disposition to respond militarily to any perceived threat, for the nation that

chooses to treat any danger—real or potential—as less than vital runs the risk of allowing other powers to seize geographic or political positions of perilous influence. Because of this danger, Americans have never shied away from employing force unilaterally—either in defense of their own borders or on behalf of foreign regimes viewed as vital—as a way of grappling with perceived threats to the nation’s security.

In both world wars, the United States joined the conflict late and intended to leave its entanglements as soon as possible. The alliance it entered into with France and Britain in 1917 was quickly discarded at the end of the war; similarly, at the conclusion of World War II, the United States did not expect to maintain any peacetime military alliances. But the advent of the Cold War changed everything: the formation of NATO in 1949 became America’s first formal peacetime military pact since the French Alliance of 1778. Although NATO still remains in place after the end of the Cold War, its mission is cloudy, and for Washington it serves mainly to allow the United States to have some control over European affairs.

The war against terrorism tends to pull America back toward its oldest traditions. Such a war knows no borders. Nor is there any likelihood of a formal alliance to rid the world of terrorists. As America continues to ferret out and destroy terrorists who aim to attack the United States itself, its bases, its embassies and its possessions overseas, it will do so alone or with “coalitions of the willing.” This implies a permanent garrison state, with American troops acting as international policemen, prepared to attack and destroy any perceived danger to the state—with or without allies. This could mean a kind of endless war, accompanied by pre-emptive strikes (as in likely with Iraq) and selective long-term efforts at “nation-

building” (as in Afghanistan).

If so, the U.S. government will have to bring into balance its commitments and its capabilities to guard against what historian Paul Kennedy has called “imperial overstretch.” It will have to allot a considerable portion of its budget to military spending, and make sure that it can afford to do so over many years. Today, it can. (Again, as Professor Kennedy has pointed out, “being Number One at great cost is one thing; being the world’s single superpower on the cheap is astonishing.”) As long as the terrorist threat is palpable—and as long as the American people are willing to put up with inadequate health and child care, poor schooling and a decaying infrastructure—public expenditures on defense will go unchallenged.

Are there external forces that could prevent this policy from being carried out? Historically, the response to a hegemonic or imperial power’s behavior, if it appears threatening to other powers, is to coalesce against it. This is what happened in modern times as other powers acted to curb the ambitions of the Habsburg and the Napoleonic empires. But it did not always happen. When the British empire reached its apogee in the late 19th century, there were rising powers—the United States and imperial Germany—that challenged British supremacy; but since Britain did not directly threaten these powers, or other great powers such as France or Russia, no coalition formed against it. On the contrary, in the case of the United States, an informal entente came into being; Germany was left alone to mount a naval threat to British control of the seas—which, of course, led to a confrontation that Germany lost for lack of powerful allies.

The task for the United States is therefore to see that it does not threaten the safety and well-being of other great powers. China is the state most likely to

challenge U.S. hegemony, though it cannot do so for at least a generation without allies to help it. The European Union may well challenge the United States economically, as America did Britain, but that need not lead to military conflict. In short, the likelihood of a balance of power—military, economic or political—directed against the United States depends on the skills and intelligence of American statecraft. Our behavior will determine whether the great powers and weak states will see the United States as a non-threatening, if not a wholly benevolent, power. If they do, then no balancing against America will take place. If they do not, then the United States will be faced with far greater disorder and eventual threats to its well-being than now appear plausible.

HOW SHOULD the United States act, then, to be perceived as non-threatening? One way is to accept some of the constraints that international agreements require—for example, adhering to the rules of the International Criminal Court, signing a comprehensive test-ban treaty, joining with other nations to curb environmental damage—which will mean that the United States surrenders some degree of its sovereignty. A more daring policy, however, would be for America to *lead* the world into a new internationalism. An international police force, for example, need not be an American one, but it would require American backing to be useful; and the United States alone has the technology and the resources to make such a force effective. An International Criminal Court will almost surely be ineffective without American participation, but an engaged American leadership could make it effective and, at the same time, incorporate Washington’s justifiable concern about vendettas aimed at U.S. citizens as a

result of American predominance.

To lead in this would require a sophisticated foreign policy, one that would preserve U.S. hegemony while allaying fears that its ambitions threaten others. Even from a realist perspective, America cannot pursue a successful foreign policy over the long term without a moral component—something both Roosevelts understood—and nowadays that moral component at least implies a range of ongoing international engagements.

In essence, the United States has to accept a far greater degree of vulnerability than it has in the past. Paradoxically, this comes at a time when American power is regnant. Living with this paradox and devising policies that reflect it is the great challenge to America in the 21st century. The challenge resides in learning how to use American power in such a way that the United States is rendered less, not more vulnerable. And all this when “the City on a Hill” that Americans have always hoped would prove a beacon and model for others is still itself under construction and, in some places, badly in need of repair. □

James Chace, former editor of *World Policy Journal*, is the Paul W. Williams Professor of Government and Public Law at Bard College and director of the Bard/New York Program on Globalization and International Affairs.

City, and Citadel, on the Hill

Wang Gungwu

THE CONSPIRATORS who attacked the World Trade Center chose it as a symbol of American wealth and power, and of the supposed helplessness of the poor and the weak

before that power. What they did not intend was to expose the inner struggles of the American soul; they could not have foreseen that the collapse of the two towers threatened how Americans see their country as the City on the Hill.

The idea of the City on the Hill, in Governor Winthrop’s famous locution, expresses a national messianism close to the hearts of most Americans. But, until roughly a half-century ago, Americans lacked the power to project that light upon the world. Since then, however, American leaders have striven to use U.S. power for good, for humanity, for civilization—at least as they have seen it. For most people outside, including in Asia, that is not America’s only heritage, however. Consciously or not, the United States became the successor to diminished European empires, particularly to the great but short-lived empire the British had erected around the globe. Some of the remnants of this heritage, notably in Asia, were placed in American care after the end of World War II. America is thus both exemplar and empire, both a City on a Hill and a citadel that dispatches gunboats and loans with strings attached.

The Cold War was a secular civil war whose origins were established long before World War II by European ambitions to dominate the world; when those ambitions failed, the United States and the Soviet Union, two self-appointed interpreters of the Enlightenment, sparred over the wreckage. Thanks to the Cold War’s Manichean characteristics, however, the United States could emphasize the light that its people stood for against the darkness of godless communism. Accusations of American imperialism or neo-colonialism, and a host of other unflattering images, were brushed aside. This was made easier by the fact that the Communist opposition could not disguise its ruthlessness, was poor in marketing its ideological wares and was ulti-

mately a failure in economic performance. With the end of the Soviet Union, however, the second side of the American metropolis came into clear view; in glaring light, the imperial side of the City, its citadel, could not be hidden. Without a zone of darkness in opposition, the double American heritage of civilizing mission and informal empire stood more sharply exposed than ever before.

September 11, and the understandably forceful response to that tragedy, have together brought America's dual international personality to the global center stage. America's actions now, more than ever, will affect which side of its character will predominate. Above all, the actions that matter most fall into two categories: how America sees its allies and friends, and how it sees its adversaries and challengers.

Let me take up these two categories in turn, but it must be said that, so far, great uncertainty shrouds our understanding of American intentions. At its core, U.S. power exists to protect its national interest; and if the United States were an ordinary country, it would be obvious that it has much more power than is necessary for that purpose. The United States can, if it wishes, destroy any regime that stands in its way. But the question is: What *is* its way? The war on terrorism may be narrowly focused on certain groups of terrorists, or widened into a crusade against all those ill-disposed toward the United States and its allies. In declaring a state of war, it is not clear to many national leaders in Asia whether the United States is genuinely debating the scope of retaliation—or whether it is practicing a form of strategic ambiguity that will allow it to pick and choose whom, when and where to support or destroy. If the former, debate may be portrayed as the City agonizing over how best to gather all good people to a great cause. If the latter, it suggests that the

United States is determined to expand its power to achieve absolute security against all comers, the seed of the will to empire. Inevitably, this uncertainty will be interpreted around the world against the evidence forthcoming as to how America conceives of and acts toward its friends and enemies.

As to its friends, does America want its many friends and allies simply to stand to be counted, but otherwise just wait for the telephone to ring; or does the United States wish them genuinely to share in seeking a long-term answer to protect what they all believe in? This depends on the purposes to which American power is applied. It is one thing for that power to be used to protect modern civilization, another to seek absolute national security at all costs. The former task requires genuine partners; the latter would drive them away.

In practical terms, of course, it is understandable that decisive retaliatory action needed to be taken quickly after September 11; there was not time for Washington to assemble both a civilizational and military coalition. But it would be wise to remember how habitual and infectious such actions can become. Think of all the bold men who extended the borders of the Spanish and British empires and were rewarded for their heroism, but whose actions led to manifold imperial burdens and to the ultimate repudiation of what that power wrought. Many Americans still prefer that the ideals of the City on the Hill triumph through good practice, by example rather than by imposition. The more the American people can still share these ideals with the rest of the world, the stronger the values would become embedded among all those who feel they have experienced them. The American social experience itself—a genuine multiculturalism—is the best proof of that proposition. There is nevertheless the danger that this aspect of American lead-

ership will be seen as weakness and vacillation by those who see no alternative to taking on the burdens of empire.

The second question, whether the United States should try to win new friends or draw a new zone of darkness, is an easier one to answer. Since the end of the Cold War, there are no godless threats to humanity's spiritual needs—at least no armed ones. Most Americans believe that Cold War victory came because they were on the side of the angels. But increasingly large numbers of people around the world, not least in Asia, see other spiritual sanctuaries on offer, such as some new expressions of old religions like Christianity, Islam and Buddhism or strict normative practices wrung out of secular ideals. There are renewed rival claims for the right to offer the light of decency and self-respect. For such people, the only potential descent to darkness lies now in the economic globalization represented by unceasing capitalist expansion.

Until now, that potential was checked by calls for freedom, equality and fraternity, and the finer points of individual rights and legal institutions that reflect universal human needs. For many, even in Asia, Western Europe and the United States have argued persuasively that they should provide the leadership to underline those calls. Thus, it is up to them to go forth together to win converts to their point of view. But the temptation is great in the United States to identify a new zone of darkness as a cluster of recalcitrant dictatorships or a murderously distorted medieval faith, and to tie its national interest to the elimination of such a zone. Thus the divisions among Americans, and among American friends and allies, about who the enemy is today and who it will be tomorrow, also get to the heart of the purposes of American power. This is why the “with us or against us” rhetoric of the Bush Administration is

bound to be misunderstood, especially in Asia. Asians can be against terrorism but also against the unbridled, unregulated expansion of American-based global capitalism at the same time.

CHINESE IMPERIAL history may provide some guidance in this regard. For its first two hundred years (3rd to 1st century B.C.E.), imperial China created wealth and power beyond its dreams. By the middle of the Han dynasty (end of the 2nd century B.C.E.), its frontiers reached the ocean and the heart of Eurasia, covering all it needed for its long-term security. At the same time, it developed a rationale for power and the rhetoric of a universal civilization. Thus, the Han polity “all under Heaven”, “the Middle Kingdom”, became the dominant reality for most of Asia. Its continuance under successor dynasties led Chinese elites to believe that the purposes of power were to ensure not only imperial viability (largely regime maintenance for each dynasty), but also the defense of civilization. Toward this end, realistic appraisals of the enemy were necessary. There was also need for dependents, allies and friends, the more the better, especially if they could be accommodated within the institution of tribute-bearing as a system for diplomacy and defense.

The results were impressive, even if imperfect. The system was supported by forward defense along the land borders to the north and west, but enemies did nevertheless break through from time to time. Ultimately, power was needed to protect civilization, but the moral and political ideals with which the Confucian mandarins shaped that civilization mattered more in converting enemies and restoring power into Chinese hands again and again. In the end, during the 19th century, their complacency and their unwillingness to adapt to new realities brought the whole edifice down, but the

hegemony that China enjoyed was never maintained through physical power alone.

It comes down to the purposes of power. American power surpasses all others in ways not dissimilar to that enjoyed by the Chinese, albeit in a smaller world, for 2,000 years. Although China finally made the mistake of underestimating its enemy, and paid dearly for it, the formula that worked for them so well and for so long was to erect a system to collect the greatest number of dependents, friends and allies, share with them the best products of its wealth and power, and avoid projecting zones of darkness that they were then committed to destroy.

Will America's enormous power make it easier or harder for the United States to endure as a great power in a much larger world? The United States is not a bit like the closed world of mystery and authority that China sought to project. Today, there is so much openness, shared knowledge and interdependence, and the power of the United States is awesome in ways unknown in history. Clearly, the United States will not follow the footsteps of Alexander, Genghis Khan, Napoleon or Hitler, by depending on aggressive power. But just as clearly, it still feels insecure about its power and would surely guard against the self-satisfied attitude of the Emperor Qianlong in 1793 when he said that his empire needed nothing from the outside world. What would best sustain the United States as a superpower is its ability to convince others that the purposes of its power are not directed against any country, any religion or any other civilization but that those purposes have been, and will continue to be, honed in support of a "Middle Kingdom" whose spiritual capital is a City on the Hill. □

Wang Gungwu is Director of the East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore.

Misreading September 11th

Charles A. Kupchan

THE EVENTS of September 11 produced evident changes in U.S. foreign policy, immediately elevating to a top priority efforts to enhance the security of the homeland and to combat foreign terrorist groups. The Bush Administration has pursued these new missions with admirable determination and speed, declaring a new era in which the fight against terror has redefined the international landscape and the primary objectives of America's global engagement. To be sure, the attacks on New York and Washington warranted a shift in U.S. priorities, but it is nevertheless premature to announce the opening of a new era and the consequent emergence of new geopolitical fault lines.

Important and effective responses to the events of September 11 have been made at the tactical level: enhancing intelligence capabilities abroad, preparing military operations against non-state actors and tightening domestic security. Much less has changed at the strategic level. The dictates of international politics make traditional priorities as relevant as ever; Washington still needs to focus on managing relations among major states, integrating rising powers into global markets and councils, and using multilateral institutions to promote cooperation, peace and development. In similar fashion, despite steady bipartisan support for the ongoing war against the Al-Qaeda network, it would be unwise to conclude that September 11 has durably reversed America's diminishing interest in foreign engagement, shoring up U.S. internationalism for the foreseeable future. The popular comparison to Pearl Harbor may well prove erroneous, for the difficult struggle against terrorism is ill-suited to engendering public attention and sacrifice over the long term.

Therefore, even as the United States remains vigilant in countering the threat of terrorism, it must guard against misreading that threat and exaggerating the extent to which it defines a new international system. The problem of terrorism should not delude America into thinking that it has entered a brave new world when it has not. Entertaining such illusions will impel the United States to pursue a misguided grand strategy that will ultimately do much greater damage to U.S. national interests than the terror attacks themselves.

THE MOST significant effect of September 11 has been America's awakening to non-conventional threats to its security. Prior to the attacks, the Bush Administration was scaling back U.S. commitments in peripheral areas and designing a military prepared to take on conventional adversaries with high-tech, stand-off weaponry. It has since altered course, deploying ground troops and special forces in Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Philippines and other locales that were previously deemed outside the scope of America's core security interests. The vulnerability of the homeland has also lent urgency to the task of protecting against weapons of mass destruction (WMD), prompting redoubled efforts to develop missile defense and plans for pre-emptive strikes. Whatever the means, keeping WMD out of the hands of terrorists and rogue states will remain a primary objective.

The United States will also continue to focus on non-military efforts to neutralize terrorist threats, such as rebuilding human intelligence capabilities, strengthening international cooperation among intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and improving capacities for tracing financial flows and freezing assets. Tighter border controls, more domestic surveillance, increased security at airports

and seaports, and greater readiness for biological attack will become permanent elements of efforts to protect the homeland. These shifts in U.S. policy are significant, and they should do much to help counter the threat that they have been designed to meet.

Beyond these adjustments to U.S. strategy, however, it is difficult to sustain the case that September 11 has wrought a more fundamental transformation of world politics. Three major changes were predicted just after September 11; none have come to pass.

First, many analysts predicted that the globe's major powers would come together in a coalition against terror. The Bush Administration agreed, with the President asserting "a new threat to civilization is erasing old lines of rivalry and resentment between nations."³ But September 11 has hardly brought harmony to great power relations. Despite the invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, America and Europe have since drifted far apart, with the EU chagrined by America's unilateralism and its seemingly exclusive focus on fighting terrorism with military force. Beijing and Washington still differ on many core issues. Relations between the United States and Russia have certainly improved, but this rapprochement stems from a unique set of converging interests unlikely to be replicated elsewhere.

Initial assessments of the impact of the attacks on New York and Washington also pointed to a permanent change in relations between the rich North and the impoverished South. Inequality and poverty were allegedly breeding resentment and anti-American sentiment, putting the industrialized and developing worlds on a collision course. Thomas Friedman's "super-empowered angry

³Remarks by the President at The Citadel, December 11, 2001.

man” was turning a socio-economic gap into a geopolitical divide; Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations seemed to be finally taking shape (though this was not necessarily Professor Huntington’s conclusion).

Again, such pronouncements have proved either premature or downright illusory. The central cleavage fueling the terrorism spawned in the Middle East is within the Islamic world itself as it tries to come to terms with modernity, not between the United States and Islamic society. The illegitimacy of governing regimes, clan and factional rivalries, pervasive poverty and a sense of having been left behind by history are the root causes of disaffection within the Islamic world. It is true that this disaffection can fuel widespread anti-American sentiment, but demonstrating against U.S. Middle East policy is not the same as carrying out terror attacks against U.S. targets. The strategic threat that the South poses to America comes from a few isolated groups and rogue regimes, not from the developing world—or the Muslim world—as a whole.

Mounting deterioration and deprivation in the South unquestionably warrant America’s attention and resources. As was the case before September 11, however, the South poses to the North a humanitarian emergency, not a strategic challenge. The North-South divide will become a geopolitical fault line only if America turns it into one, narrowly viewing developing countries as breeding grounds for terrorism rather than as distressed polities in need of structural reform and humanitarian aid.

A third misreading of the events of September 11 concerns their likely impact on the trajectory of U.S. internationalism. Prior to the attacks on New York and Washington, the Bush Administration was abandoning the liberal internationalism of the past five decades in favor of both neo-

isolationist and unilateralist extremes. Washington was backing away from peacekeeping missions and pledging to focus more attention on the Western Hemisphere at the same time that it was distancing itself from international institutions—the ABM Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court—that might constrain the country’s room for maneuver.

For many, the events of September 2001 promised to arrest this trend. As Andrew Sullivan wrote a few days after the attack, “We have been put on notice that every major Western city is now vulnerable. For the United States itself, this means one central thing. Isolationism is dead.”⁴ G. John Ikenberry claimed that terrorism would push the United States “back toward a more centrist foreign policy” that “stresses alliances [and] multilateral cooperation”, thereby providing “new sinews of cohesion among the great powers.”⁵

It is unlikely, however, that terrorism will inoculate the United States against the allure of either neo-isolationism or unilateralism. These inclinations run far deeper than the personality of the Bush Administration. In the long run, America’s leaders may well find the country’s security better served by reducing its overseas commitments and raising protective barriers than by chasing terrorists through the mountains of Afghanistan. The United States has a strong tradition of seeking to cordon itself off from foreign troubles, an impulse that could well be reawakened by the rising costs of global engagement. America’s initial response to the attacks of September 11, after all, was to close its borders with Mexico and

⁴Andrew Sullivan, “America at war: America wakes up to a world of fear”, *The Sunday Times*, September 16, 2001.

⁵G. John Ikenberry, “American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror”, *Survival* (Winter 2001–02), pp. 19–20.

Canada, ground the nation's air traffic, and patrol the country's coasts with warships and jet fighters. It is worth recalling that attacks against Americans in Lebanon (1983), Somalia (1993) and Yemen (2000) induced the United States to withdraw its forces, not to take the fight to the perpetrators. The long-term consequences of the threat of terror may well be an America that devotes much more attention to the security of its own territory and much less attention to resolving problems in distant lands.

It is equally doubtful that the threat of terror will ensure a responsible Congress and a more engaged and attentive public. Bipartisan rancor did disappear instantly on September 11, 2001, and the public stood firmly behind military retaliation. But these were temporary phenomena arising from the shock of the moment; after a few months, partisan wrangling returned and the public mind again began to wander. As one reporter commented on December 2, "The post-Sept. 11 Congress has now almost fully abandoned its briefly adopted pose of high-minded bipartisanship."⁶

The relatively rapid return to business as usual stems in part from the new nature of the challenge at hand. From the 1940s through the 1990s, American leaders had in Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany and then the Soviet Union dangerous and identifiable enemies against which to mobilize the nation. Terrorism represents a far more elusive enemy. Instead of facing a tangible adversary with armored columns and aircraft carriers, America now confronts sleeper cells and disparate groups of extremists schooled in guerrilla tactics. With much of the struggle against terrorism occurring quietly beyond the public eye, evocative images that help rally the country around the flag will be few in number. In the wake of the attacks on New York and Washington and the anthrax scare that followed, President

Bush asked of Americans not that they make a special sacrifice, but that they return to normal life by shopping in malls and traveling by air. Even as American soldiers were fighting and dying in Afghanistan, ABC was trying to woo David Letterman to its late-night slot to replace *Nightline*—one of the few network programs that provides even remotely in-depth analysis of foreign news. As before September 2001, keeping the American public engaged in international affairs promises to be an uphill battle.

The threat of terror also appears to be intensifying, not moderating, America's unilateralist proclivities. Despite offers of help from abroad, the United States preferred to act largely alone in the main battles against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Although terrorists pose a collective threat, they single out specific countries when they strike. Understandably, the attacked country has a much stronger motivation to hit back than others. That is why Israel, Russia, Britain, France and most other targets of terror have been on their own in responding to terrorist attacks on their territory. For better or worse, the type of threat posed by terrorism is more likely to stoke unilateral action than to tame it.

THE DISTANCE between the United States and its putative partners has only increased since the effective end of the fighting in Afghanistan. President Bush's designation of Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an "axis of evil", his determination to topple Saddam Hussein, and his strong support for Israel in its conflict with the Palestinians have exacerbated strains across the Atlantic. Even staunch allies such as Germany have begun to urge that the EU take steps to restrain a wayward America.

⁶Adam Clymer, "A House Divided. Senate, Too", *New York Times*, December 2, 2001.

Rather than changing the underlying dynamics of international politics, the events of September 2001 have only added the need to combat terrorism to an already long list of priorities. Perhaps the main danger ahead is that U.S. policymakers will continue to believe that the international system has changed much more than it has, holding a view of a global landscape that bears little resemblance to that envisaged by the rest of the world. If this misperception continues, the United States may well succeed in eliminating the Al-Qaeda network, but at the expense of the alliances and institutions that remain the bedrock of international peace and prosperity. □

Charles A. Kupchan is a professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. His book, *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century*, will be published in November by Alfred A. Knopf.

Definitions, Doctrines and Divergences

Pierre Hassner

CONTRARY TO what some Americans believe, Europeans have known for a long time about the evils of terrorism and the need to fight it. They know, too, that the world has become a very insecure place due to the ability of small groups of fanatics to inflict unprecedented harm upon civilization. Most also recognize that a world ruled by law—from which inequalities of power and the possibility of war have been eliminated—is an impossible dream; and that a stable, multipolar world based on the balanced rivalry and cooperation of several more or less equally powerful states is not

remotely at hand. In the real world, Europeans know that the United States is much stronger in the classical sense (i.e., militarily and economically) than any rival state or coalition, and that it is the most effective force for good, today as yesterday, against totalitarian threats.

But Europeans tend to believe that the legitimacy and efficacy of American hegemony and of its war on terror depend on a more differentiated view of the world than that evinced by its current mood, which somehow combines a feeling of victimhood, vulnerability and invincibility all at the same time. A sense of moral and military superiority over the rest of the world seems to be forming as the essential basis of America's war on terror, and if it does, the legitimacy and efficacy of American hegemony will suffer. There is more to hegemony than superiority, more to power than military might, more to terrorism than Al-Qaeda or Islamic fundamentalism, more to the fight against them than "war" in the classical sense—and much more to ruling the world, dealing with its problems and fighting its dangers, than can be found in the philosophy of American unilateralism or benevolent empire.

THE BEST introduction to understanding the difference in the attitudes of Americans and Europeans toward the war on terrorism is perhaps the formulation of the Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev, who says: "The Americans feel they are engaged in a war, the Europeans feel they are engaged in preventing one." This is true, but only half so. Both Americans and Europeans *are* engaged in a war against Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations; the war worth preventing is a wider war of the West against the rest, a real clash of civilizations; or a war between rich and poor, North and South, center and periphery, former colonizers and former colonized; or a war of Christians, Jews (and perhaps

Hindus) against Muslims. It is absolutely crucial to maintain the distinction between the organized terrorist movements that hate liberalism and modernity and thrive on ideological fanaticism and, on the other hand, the sources of their recruitment, support and the sympathy they inspire in the greater part of the Islamic and, more generally, in the underdeveloped world—which are feelings of humiliation, oppression and exclusion. This distinction is all the more important as it is precisely the strategy of the terrorists to blur it by provoking the repression of wider circles of the population that they falsely claim to represent.

It follows that any specific strategy in the war against terrorism must get away from moral absolutes and fuzzily defined abstractions. What, for example, is the criterion wherein we define terrorism as “evil”? Is it the deliberate targeting of innocent civilians? But how then were the strategic bombing raids carried out by the Allies in World War II morally distinct from the attack on the World Trade Center? Is the war against terrorism, as some recent presidential pronouncements would seem to suggest, a Holy Alliance of all Great Powers against all insurgent movements, where each ally brings its own definition of terrorism corresponding to its own national or ideological opponents (Chechens, Kashmiris, Albanians, Uighurs)? Is it a war only against global or transnational terrorists, leaving aside local movements? Do we distinguish between states and non-state movements or even individuals? Or is the campaign a defensive operation by the United States (and anyone willing to join it) against those terrorists who specifically threaten to inflict harm on it and its allies while leaving aside all others or even joining forces with them? What, in short, is the evil to be extirpated?

It is clear that American policy and public opinion now tend to neglect these

distinctions, and to see the United States and those who wish it well as the incarnation of the good and those who wish them harm as the incarnation of evil. Of course, one may have to accept evil allies against even more evil or more dangerous enemies; it was legitimate to be allied with Stalin against Hitler. The truth must sometimes bend in the face of strategic necessity. But no such bending should justify morally beautifying the man who perfected the destruction of Grozny; or the authors of genocide in Tibet; or the man responsible for the massacres of Sabra and Shatilla and for countless other reprisals against civilian populations.

Similar problems concern the definition of war. It is legitimate to speak metaphorically of a war against terrorism as one speaks of the war against drugs, cancer or poverty, and even to connect it to the eternal war between good and evil. But as religious writers from Reinhold Niebuhr to Michael Novak have warned, seeing ourselves as the Children of Light fighting against the Children of Darkness carries the danger of self-righteousness and *hubris*, and may lead us ultimately to become fanatics ourselves. One should never lose sight of Arthur Koestler’s saying during the fight against communist totalitarianism: “We are defending a half-truth against a total lie.”

However that may be, this never-ending conflict and this metaphysical confrontation must be sharply distinguished from the concept of war in the Western tradition, lest we fall into the trap laid by bin Laden’s declaration of *jihad*. A war, classically, is an organized activity with a beginning and an end, and with rules concerning both the legitimate ways of waging it (*jus in bello*) and the legitimate causes for declaring it (*jus ad bellum*). Of course, our time offers many examples of undeclared and unfinished war, but this does not obviate the need for rules and standards. This is essential, too, for defin-

ing the status of combatants who must either be protected as prisoners of war or prosecuted as presumed criminals.

Of course, terrorists pose a special problem. Necessity may dictate executing them summarily in times of war. Necessity may also, in an emergency, lead to a selective disregard for legal guarantees in order to prevent an imminent crime or catastrophe (although it should never justify torture with such thin alibis as practicing it by proxy or outside one's own territory). But the point is that the burden of proof should be on those who practice the exceptional treatment. What is deeply worrying is not that principle be breached in extreme circumstances, but that the breach should be made into a generalized doctrine, the criticism of which should then be branded as anti-American.⁷

The same applies to the new doctrine of pre-emption. No reasonable person would deny that if a state has reliable information on a terrorist or on a deadly criminal act about to be perpetrated, it should not wait for the deed to be done but should seize the suspects. Nor would many deny that a pre-emptive strike against a state that is, to the best of one's knowledge, about to attack is justified in certain circumstances. But none of this displaces a central concern of both political philosophy and modern strategy to avoid the security dilemma, the "reciprocal fear of surprise attack", the temptation of "launch on warning" postures or of pre-emptive war. Certainly, the new American doctrine is based on a valid and urgent concern: the impossibility of deterring terrorists who welcome suicide and who offer no targets for retaliation. But, once again, to generalize out of this situation a *doctrine* centered around the idea of launching a unilateral first strike against any state that possesses or builds weapons of mass destruction, is suspected of helping terrorists, and hence may, one hypothetical day, facilitate the use of the

former by the latter against the United States, means extending the notion of pre-emption to an arbitrary and open-ended "anticipatory defense." It means creating a situation of permanent or open-ended exception and insecurity—in practice, permanent war—since there will always be some terrorists and some weapons of mass destruction left, and since suspect states that have been deterred so far may themselves be tempted to pre-empt. Even conceptually, the only end in sight to such a war would be total and, so to speak, totally uncontrolled control by the United States.

THIS BRINGS US to broader ambiguities that surround the notion of American hegemony or empire. There is no question that the conditions for American supremacy have grown with every conflict of the last century. Neither World War I, nor Nazism, nor Communism nor apocalyptic terrorism were invented or provoked by the United States—but in each case its role was decisive in resisting the threat to freedom and civilization. In each case, too—even the last one—it emerged more powerful and better able both to extend its influence (to new territories in Central Asia these days, for instance) and to organize the peace. But in each case daunting obstacles occluded the way of the latter task, inducing contrasting

⁷This is one way in which Leo Strauss explained the difference between Machiavelli and Aristotle. The former took his bearings by the extreme cases and delighted in showing how far they could be carried and how they revealed the truth about politics, whereas the true statesman, in the Aristotelian sense, took his bearings by the normal case and, while knowing that no action can be totally excluded in the face of an evil enemy, made every effort to return to normal priorities and behavior as quickly and as completely as possible.

temptations toward both excessive ambition and withdrawal. Woodrow Wilson's excessively idealistic faith in abstract principles and international institutions, for example, was followed by a partial retreat to half-isolationist unilateralism (except in economic matters). In the 1940s and 1950s, on the other hand, the United States got the balance right. It managed to establish its hegemony solidly on the three pillars of military protection, economic aid and the creation of multilateral institutions. It maintained a high degree of freedom of action, while giving its allies a feeling of belonging and participation. It neither withdrew from responsibility nor overreached, except in the tragic case of Vietnam.

Building a new order after November 1989 and, even more, after September 2001, however, is a much harder task. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union created a constraint that disciplined both America's impulse toward withdrawal and excessive ambition. Today the very nature of the threat encourages both temptations. Anarchy and civil war in faraway lands encourage the reluctance to intervene; decentralized fanatical terrorism encourages the temptation to pre-empt. The prospect of "needing" to reform the political culture of nearly the entire Islamic world demoralizes some, energizes others toward nation-building.

The international scene as a whole, too, has become more complex and difficult to control; other actors have emerged, making it harder for the United States either to withdraw from the world or to control its economic and political institutions: reciprocity becomes inevitable and the cost of ignoring it increases. Last, but not least, global issues involving security, the environment or world health increasingly call for multilateral cooperation and institution-building. So while the use of force cannot always be left to multilateral institutions or to coalitions of the willing,

the prevention and resolution of conflicts cannot be left to the unilateral actions of one power, even a benign one.

WE ARE THUS left with a structural problem of the international security order—but the American administration seems not to credit the problem at all. It tends toward the primacy of unilateralism and military power, a tendency that surely will harm the legitimacy and the long-term stability of American leadership. What seems to stand in the way of the acceptability of U.S. hegemony, in this respect, are two kinds of American exceptionalism: the imperial and the nationalist.

America's imperial exceptionalism consists of a complete asymmetry of rights and duties between the hegemon and the rest of the world, in the U.S. refusal to recognize any superior law or authority that might limit its freedom of action. The last ten years have been occupied by the debate between sovereignists and interventionists, the first claiming that the sovereignty of states was and remains the basis of international order, the second that absolute sovereignty should give way to the right of intervention in favor of human rights. The United States seems to have solved this dilemma, as far as it is concerned, by claiming for itself *both* absolute sovereignty *and* the absolute right to infringe, including by military force, into the sovereignty of others.

America's exceptionalism offers not only the grandiose face of imperial *hubris*, but also the narrower one of parochial national interests. Any imperial power has to balance its narrow national interests with the interests of the system it leads. The Bush Administration, however, seems not to have gotten the hang of this balance, and so America diverges ever further from its best friends and closest allies. It does not hesitate to abandon its

free-trade gospel in favor of the interests of its steel industry or its farmers, or to undermine its own efforts against weapons of mass destruction because of the distaste of its biotech industry for international intrusion.

Moreover, while the logic of empire leads ultimately to Caracalla's edict, by which the Roman emperor extended citizenship to all the subjects of his empire, the current American policy pushes to an extreme the distinction between Americans and non-Americans, between the human rights of an American citizen and of an alien, between the value of an American life and that of allied soldiers, let alone of civilian populations or of enemy combatants. This inclination has always existed in the United States—witness Congress's reluctant attitude even toward those international treaties that correspond to American ideas and ideals—but this is an inclination that should be mitigated if America is to rule by invitation and consent rather than by force alone. This is all

the more so since Americans are clearly not prepared to undertake the risks and accept the costs—moral and political as well as economic—of direct rule.

America's objective should be an international regime that combines its hegemony with respect for international law and multilateral institutions; and those can have no effective role of advice and consent if they do not contain an element of autonomous or non-American power, hence some form of multipolarity. The choice is between an attempt at authoritarian global U.S. rule tempered by anarchic resistance, on the one hand, and, on the other, hegemony tempered by law, concert and consent. What happened last September 11 did not change this choice; it has just made it clearer and more urgent. □

Pierre Hassner is the author of many books and essays, including *Violence and Peace: From the Atomic Bomb to Ethnic Cleansing* and the new Chaillot Paper, *The United States: The Empire of Force or the Force of Empire?*

A Difference of Opinion?

There are still those who profess not to know the difference between a terrorist and a freedom fighter. The difference is clear. The definition of terrorism is simple and unmistakable. Terrorists use random violence on as large a scale as possible against civilian populations to make their points or get their way. Anyone who claims to be confused at this point in history will have to face up to being known as an apologist for terrorism.

—George P. Shultz, "The Work of Diplomacy", May 29, 2002
(speech published by Foreign Policy Research Institute)

Labeling either side's methods as illegitimate is highly questionable. Each side fights in the way it finds most advantageous, and the moral and ethical difference between Palestinian suicide bombings and Israeli collateral damage seems dubious. The basic rule is to fight on the most advantageous terms possible.

—Anthony Cordesman, "Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli and Palestinian Strategic Failure" (Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2002)

The New Containment

An Alliance Against Nuclear Terrorism

Graham Allison & Andrei Kokoshin

DURING THE Cold War, American and Russian policy-makers and citizens thought long and hard about the possibility of nuclear attacks on their respective homelands. But with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the threat of nuclear weapons catastrophe faded away from most minds. This is both ironic and potentially tragic, since the threat of a nuclear attack on the United States or Russia is certainly greater today than it was in 1989.

In the aftermath of Osama bin Laden's September 11 assault, which awakened the world to the reality of global terrorism, it is incumbent upon serious national security analysts to think again about the unthinkable. Could a nuclear terrorist attack happen today? Our considered answer is: yes, unquestionably, without any doubt. It is not only a possibility, but in fact the most urgent unaddressed national security threat to both the United States and Russia.¹

Consider this hypothetical: A crude nuclear weapon constructed from stolen

materials explodes in Red Square in Moscow. A 15-kiloton blast would instantaneously destroy the Kremlin, Saint Basil's Cathedral, the ministries of foreign affairs and defense, the Tretyakov Gallery, and tens of thousands of individual lives. In Washington, an equivalent explosion near the White House would completely destroy that building, the Old Executive Office Building and everything within a one-mile radius, including the Departments of State, Treasury, the Federal Reserve and all of their occupants—as well as damaging the Potomac-facing side of the Pentagon.

Psychologically, such a hypothetical is as difficult to internalize as are the plot lines of a writer like Tom Clancy (whose novel *Debt of Honor* ends with terrorists crashing a jumbo jet into the U.S. Capitol on Inauguration Day, and whose *The Sum*

¹This judgment echoes that of a Department of Energy task force on nonproliferation programs with Russia led by Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler: "The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home." *A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs with Russia*, January 10, 2001.

Graham Allison is director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Andrei Kokoshin is director of the Institute for International Security Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and a former secretary of the Security Council of Russia.

of *All Fears* contemplates the very scenario we discuss—the detonation of a nuclear device in a major American metropolis by terrorists). That these kinds of scenarios are physically possible, however, is an undeniable, brute fact.

After the first nuclear terrorist attack, the Duma, Congress—or what little is left of them—and the press will investigate: Who knew what, when? They will ask what could have been done to prevent the attack. Most officials will no doubt seek cover behind the claim that “no one could have imagined” this happening. But that defense should ring hollow. We have unambiguous strategic warning today that a nuclear terrorist attack could occur at any moment. Responsible leaders should be asking hard questions now. Nothing prevents the governments of Russia, America and other countries from taking effective action immediately—nothing, that is, but a lack of determination.

The argument made here can be summarized in two propositions: first, nuclear terrorism poses a clear and present danger to the United States, Russia and other nations; second, nuclear terrorism is a largely *preventable* disaster. Preventing nuclear terrorism is a large, complex, but ultimately finite challenge that can be met by a bold, determined, but nonetheless finite response. The current mismatch between the seriousness of the threat on the one hand, and the actions governments are now taking to meet it on the other, is unacceptable. Below we assess the threat and outline a solution that begins with a U.S.-Russian led Alliance Against Nuclear Terrorism.

Assessing the Threat

A COMPREHENSIVE threat assessment must consider both the likelihood of an event and the magnitude of its anticipated consequences. As described above, the impact

of even a crude nuclear explosion in a city would produce devastation in a class by itself.² A half dozen nuclear explosions across the United States or Russia would shift the course of history. The question is: how likely is such an event?

Security studies offer no well-developed methodology for estimating the probabilities of unprecedented events. Contemplating the possibility of a criminal act, Sherlock Holmes investigated three factors: motive, means and opportunity. That framework can be useful for analyzing the question at hand. If no actor simultaneously has motive, means and opportunity, no nuclear terrorist act will occur. Where these three factors are abundant and widespread, the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist attack increases. The questions become: Is anyone *motivated* to instigate a nuclear attack? Could terrorist groups acquire the *means* to attack the United States or Russia with nuclear weapons? Could these groups find or create an *opportunity* to act?

I. Motive

There is no doubt that Osama bin Laden and his associates have serious nuclear ambitions. For almost a decade they have been actively seeking nuclear weapons, and, as President Bush has noted, they would use such weapons against the United States or its allies “in a heartbeat.” In 2000, the CIA intercepted a message in

²Although biological and chemical weapons can cause huge devastation as well, “the massive, assured, instantaneous, and comprehensive destruction of life and property” of a nuclear weapon is unique. See Matthew Bunn, John P. Holdren and Anthony Wier, “Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action”, *Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Managing the Atom Project*, May 20, 2002, p. 2. This report provides extensive, but not-too-technical detail on many of the points in this essay.

which a member of Al-Qaeda boasted of plans for a “Hiroshima” against America. According to the Justice Department indictment for the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, “At various times from at least as early as 1993, Osama bin Laden and others, known and unknown, made efforts to obtain the components of nuclear weapons.” Additional evidence from a former Al-Qaeda member describes attempts to buy uranium of South African origin, repeated travels to three Central Asian states to try to buy a complete warhead or weapons-usable material, and discussions with Chechen criminal groups in which money and drugs were offered for nuclear weapons.

Bin Laden himself has declared that acquiring nuclear weapons is a religious duty. “If I have indeed acquired [nuclear] weapons”, he once said, “then I thank God for enabling me to do so.” When forging an alliance of terrorist organizations in 1998, he issued a statement entitled “The Nuclear Bomb of Islam.” Characterized by Bernard Lewis as “a magnificent piece of eloquent, at times even poetic Arabic prose”, it states: “It is the duty of Muslims to prepare as much force as possible to terrorize the enemies of God.” If anything, the ongoing American-led war on global terrorism is heightening our adversary’s incentive to obtain and use a nuclear weapon. Al-Qaeda has discovered that it can no longer attack the United States with impunity. Faced with an assertive, determined opponent now doing everything it can to destroy this terrorist network, Al-Qaeda has every incentive to take its best shot.

Russia also faces adversaries whose objectives could be advanced by using nuclear weapons. Chechen terrorist groups, for example, have demonstrated little if any restraint on their willingness to kill civilians and may be tempted to strike a definitive blow to assert indepen-

dence from Russia. They have already issued, in effect, a radioactive warning by planting a package containing cesium-137 at Izmailovsky Park in Moscow and then tipping off a Russian reporter. Particularly as the remaining Chechen terrorists have been marginalized over the course of the second Chechen war, they could well imagine that by destroying one Russian city and credibly threatening Moscow, they could persuade Russia to halt its campaign against them.

All of Russia’s national security documents—its *National Security Concept*, its military doctrine and the recently-updated *Foreign Policy Concept*—have clearly identified international terrorism as the greatest threat to Russia’s national security. As President Putin noted in reviewing Russian security priorities with senior members of the Foreign Ministry in January 2001, “I would like to stress the danger of international terrorism and fundamentalism of any, absolutely any stripe.” The illegal drug trade and the diffusion of religious extremism throughout Central Asia, relating directly to the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, threaten Russia’s borders and weaken the Commonwealth of Independent States. The civil war in Tajikistan, tensions in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge, and the conflicts in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh—all close to the borders of the Russian Federation—provide feeding grounds for the extremism that fuels terrorism. Additionally, Russia’s geographical proximity to South Asia and the Middle East increases concerns over terrorist fallout from those regions. President Putin has consistently identified the dark hue that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) give to the threat of terrorism. In a December 2001 interview, in which he named international terrorism the “plague of the 21st century”, Putin stated: “We all know exactly how New York and Washington were hit. . . . Was it ICBMs? What threat

are we talking about? We are talking about the use of mass destruction weapons terrorists may obtain.”

Separatist militants (in Kashmir, the Balkans and elsewhere) and messianic terrorists (like Aum Shinrikyo, which attacked the Tokyo subway with chemical weapons in 1995) could have similar motives to commit nuclear terrorism. As Palestinians look to uncertain prospects for independent statehood—and never mind whose leadership actually increased that uncertainty in recent years—Israel becomes an ever more attractive target for a nuclear terrorist attack. Since a nuclear detonation in any part of the world would be extremely destabilizing, it threatens American and Russian interests even if few or no Russians or Americans are killed. Policymakers would therefore be foolish to ignore any group with a motive to use a nuclear weapon against any target.

II. Means

To the best of our knowledge, no terrorist group can now detonate a nuclear weapon. But as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has stated, “the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” Are the means beyond terrorists’ reach, even that of relatively sophisticated groups like Al-Qaeda?

Over four decades of Cold War competition, the superpowers spent trillions of dollars assembling mass arsenals, stockpiles, nuclear complexes and enterprises that engaged hundreds of thousands of accomplished scientists and engineers. Technical know-how cannot be un-invented. Reducing arsenals that include some 40,000 nuclear weapons and the equivalents of more than 100,000 nuclear weapons in the form of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium to manageable levels is a gargantuan challenge.

Terrorists could seek to buy an assembled nuclear weapon from insiders or

criminals. Nuclear weapons are known to exist in eight states: the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, China, Israel, India and Pakistan. Security measures, such as “permissive action links” designed to prevent unauthorized use, are most reliable in the United States, Russia, France and the United Kingdom. These safeguards, as well as command-and-control systems, are much less reliable in the two newest nuclear states—India and Pakistan. But even where good systems are in place, maintaining high levels of security requires constant attention from high-level government officials.

Alternatively, terrorists could try to build a weapon. The only component that is especially difficult to obtain is the nuclear fissile material—HEU or plutonium. Although the largest stockpiles of weapons-grade material are predominantly found in the nuclear weapons programs of the United States and Russia, fissile material in sufficient quantities to make a crude nuclear weapon can also be found in many civilian settings around the globe. Some 345 research reactors in 58 states together contain twenty metric tons of HEU, many in quantities sufficient to build a bomb.³ Other civilian reactors produce enough weapons-grade nuclear material to pose a proliferation threat; several European states, Japan, Russia and India reprocess spent fuel to separate out plutonium for use as new fuel. The United States has actually facilitated the spread of fissile material in the past—over three decades of the Atoms for Peace program, the United States exported 749 kg of plutonium and 26.6 metric tons of HEU to 39 countries.⁴

³See U.S. Department of Energy, *FY 2003 Budget Request: Detailed Budget Justifications—Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation* (Washington, DC: DOE, 2002), p. 172.

⁴Summarized in NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database, available at www.nti.org.

Terrorist groups could obtain these materials by theft, illicit purchase or voluntary transfer from state control. There is ample evidence that attempts to steal or sell nuclear weapons or weapons-usable material are not hypothetical, but a recurring fact.⁵ Just last fall, the chief of the directorate of the Russian Defense Ministry responsible for nuclear weapons reported two recent incidents in which terrorist groups attempted to perform reconnaissance at Russian nuclear storage sites. The past decade has seen repeated incidents in which individuals and groups have successfully stolen weapons material from sites in Russia and sought to export them—but were caught trying to do so. In one highly publicized case, a group of insiders at a Russian nuclear weapons facility in Chelyabinsk plotted to steal 18.5 kg (40.7 lbs.) of HEU, which would have been enough to construct a bomb, but were thwarted by Russian Federal Security Service agents.

In the mid-1990s, material sufficient to allow terrorists to build more than twenty nuclear weapons—more than 1,000 pounds of highly enriched uranium—sat unprotected in Kazakhstan. Iranian and possibly Al-Qaeda operatives with nuclear ambitions were widely reported to be in Kazakhstan. Recognizing the danger, the American government itself purchased the material and removed it to Oak Ridge, Tennessee. In February 2002, the U.S. National Intelligence Council reported to Congress that “undetected smuggling [of weapons-usable nuclear materials from Russia] has occurred, although we do not know the extent of such thefts.” Each assertion invariably provokes blanket denials from Russian officials. Russian Atomic Energy Minister Aleksandr Rumyantsev has claimed categorically: “Fissile materials have not disappeared.” President Putin has stated that he is “absolutely confident” that terrorists in Afghanistan do not have

weapons of mass destruction of Soviet or Russian origin.

For perspective on claims of the inviolable security of nuclear weapons or material, it is worth considering the issue of “lost nukes.” Is it possible that the United States or Soviet Union lost assembled nuclear weapons? At least on the American side the evidence is clear. In 1981, the U.S. Department of Defense published a list of 32 accidents involving nuclear weapons, *many of which resulted in lost bombs*.⁶ One involved a submarine that sank along with two nuclear torpedoes. In other cases, nuclear bombs were lost from aircraft. Though on the Soviet/Russian side there is no official information, we do know that four Soviet submarines carrying nuclear weapons have sunk since 1968, resulting in an estimated 43 lost nuclear warheads.⁷ These accidents suggest the complexity of controlling and accounting for vast nuclear arsenals and stockpiles.

Nuclear materials have also been stolen from stockpiles housed at research reactors. In 1999, Italian police seized a bar of enriched uranium from an organized crime group trying to sell it to an agent posing as a Middle Eastern businessman with presumed ties to terrorists. On investigation, the Italians found that the uranium originated from a U.S.-supplied research reactor in the former Zaire, where it presumably had been stolen or purchased *sub rosa*.

⁵The Nuclear Threat Initiative maintains a database of cases and reported incidents of trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials in and from the former Soviet Union. Available at www.nti.org.

⁶U.S. Department of Defense, “Narrative Summaries of Accidents Involving U.S. Nuclear Weapons: 1950–1980” (April 1981).

⁷Joshua Handler, Amy Wickenheiser and William M. Arkin, “Naval Safety 1989: The Year of the Accident”, *Neptune Paper No. 4* (April 1989).

Finally, as President Bush has stressed, terrorists could obtain nuclear weapons or material from states hostile to the United States. In his now-infamous phrase, Bush called hostile regimes developing WMD and their terrorist allies an “axis of evil.” He argued that states such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea, if allowed to realize their nuclear ambitions, “could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred.” The fear that a hostile regime might transfer a nuclear weapon to terrorists has contributed to the Bush Administration’s development of a new doctrine of pre-emption against such regimes, with Iraq as the likeliest test case. It also adds to American concerns about Russian transfer of nuclear technologies to Iran. While Washington and Moscow continue to disagree over whether any safeguarded civilian nuclear cooperation with Iran is justified, both agree on the dangers a nuclear-armed Iran would pose. Russia is more than willing to agree that there should be no transfers of technology that could help Iran make nuclear weapons.

III. Opportunity

Security analysts have long focused on ballistic missiles as the preferred means by which nuclear weapons would be delivered. But today this is actually the least likely vehicle by which a nuclear weapon will be delivered against Russia or the United States. Ballistic weapons are hard to produce, costly and difficult to hide. A nuclear weapon delivered by a missile also leaves an unambiguous return address, inviting devastating retaliation. As Robert Walpole, a National Intelligence Officer, told a Senate subcommittee in March, “Nonmissile delivery means are less costly, easier to acquire, and more reliable and accurate.”⁸ Despite this assessment, the U.S. government continues to invest much more heavily in developing and deploying missile defenses than in

addressing more likely trajectories by which weapons could arrive.

Terrorists would not find it very difficult to sneak a nuclear device or nuclear fissile material into the United States via shipping containers, trucks, ships or aircraft. Recall that the nuclear material required is smaller than a football. Even an assembled device, like a suitcase nuclear weapon, could be shipped in a container, in the hull of a ship or in a trunk carried by an aircraft. After this past September 11, the number of containers that are X-rayed has increased, to about 500 of the 5,000 containers currently arriving daily at the port of New York/New Jersey—approximately 10 percent. But as the chief executive of CSX Lines, one of the foremost container-shipping companies, put it: “If you can smuggle heroin in containers, you may be able to smuggle in a nuclear bomb.”

Effectively countering missile attacks will require technological breakthroughs well beyond current systems. Success in countering covert delivery of weapons will require not just technical advances but a conceptual breakthrough. Recent efforts to bolster border security are laudable, but they only begin to scratch the surface. More than 500 million people, 11 million trucks and 2 million rail cars cross into the United States each year, while 7,500 foreign-flag ships make 51,000 calls in U.S. ports. That’s not counting the tens of thousands of people, hundreds of aircraft and numerous boats that enter illegally and uncounted. Given this volume and the lengthy land and sea borders of the United States, even a radically ren-

⁸U.S. Senate Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, “Statement of Robert Walpole before the Senate Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services”, 107th Cong., 1st sess., March 11, 2002.

ovated and reorganized system cannot aspire to be airtight.

The opportunities for terrorists to smuggle a nuclear weapon into Russia or another state are even greater. Russia's land borders are nearly twice as long as America's, connecting it to more than a dozen other states. In many places, in part because borders between republics were less significant in the time of the Soviet Union, these borders are not closely monitored. Corruption has been a major problem among border patrols. Visa-free travel between Russia and several of its neighbors creates additional opportunities for weapons smugglers and terrorists. The "homeland security" challenge for Russia is truly monumental.

In sum: even a conservative estimate must conclude that dozens of terrorist groups have sufficient motive to use a nuclear weapon, several could potentially obtain nuclear means, and hundreds of opportunities exist for a group with means and motive to make the United States or Russia a victim of nuclear terrorism. The mystery before us is not how a nuclear terrorist attack could possibly occur, but rather why no terrorist group has yet combined motive, means and opportunity to commit a nuclear attack. We have been lucky so far, but who among us trusts luck to protect us in the future?

*Chto Delat?*⁹

THE GOOD NEWS about nuclear terrorism can be summarized in one line: no highly enriched uranium or plutonium, no nuclear explosion, no nuclear terrorism. Though the world's stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials are vast, they are finite. The prerequisites for manufacturing fissile material are many and require the resources of a modern state. Technologies

for locking up super-dangerous or valuable items—from gold in Fort Knox to treasures in the Kremlin Armory—are well developed and tested. While challenging, a specific program of actions to keep nuclear materials out of the hands of the most dangerous groups is not beyond reach, *if* leaders give this objective highest priority and hold subordinates accountable for achieving this result.

The starting points for such a program are already in place. In his major foreign policy campaign address at the Ronald Reagan Library, then-presidential candidate George W. Bush called for "Congress to increase substantially our assistance to dismantle as many Russian weapons as possible, as quickly as possible." In his September 2000 address to the United Nations Millennium Summit, Russian President Putin proposed to "find ways to block the spread of nuclear weapons by excluding use of enriched uranium and plutonium in global atomic energy production." The Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship between the United States and Russia, signed by the two presidents at the May 2002 summit, stated that the two partners would combat the "closely linked threats of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." Another important result yielded by the summit was the upgrading of the Armitage/Trubnikov-led U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghanistan to the U.S.-Russia Working Group on Counterterrorism, whose agenda is to thwart nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism.

Operationally, however, priority is measured not by words, but by deeds. A decade of Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs has accomplished much in safeguarding nuclear materials. Unfortunately, the job of

⁹A proverbial Russian refrain: "What is to be done?"

upgrading security to minimum basic standards is mostly unfinished: according to Department of Energy reports, two-thirds of the nuclear material in Russia remains to be adequately secured.¹⁰ Bureaucratic inertia, bolstered by mistrust and misperception on both sides, leaves these joint programs bogged down on timetables that extend to 2008. Unless implementation improves significantly, they will probably fail to meet even this unacceptably distant target. What is required on both sides is personal, presidential priority measured in commensurate energy, specific orders, funding and accountability. This should be embodied in a new U.S.-Russian led Alliance Against Nuclear Terrorism.

Five Pillars of Wisdom

WHEN IT COMES to the threat of nuclear terrorism, many Americans judge Russia to be part of the problem, not the solution. But if Russia is welcomed and supported as a fully responsible non-proliferation partner, the United States stands to accomplish far more toward minimizing the risk of nuclear terrorism than if it treats Russia as an unreconstructed pariah. As the first step in establishing this alliance, the two presidents should pledge to each other that his government will do everything technically possible to prevent criminals or terrorists from stealing nuclear weapons or weapons-usable material, and to do so on the fastest possible timetable. Each should make clear that he will personally hold accountable the entire chain of command within his own government to assure this result. Understanding that each country bears responsibility for the security of its own nuclear materials, the United States should nonetheless offer Russia any assistance required to make this happen.

Each nation—and each leader—should provide the other sufficient transparency to monitor performance.

To ensure that this is done on an expedited schedule, both governments should name specific individuals, directly answerable to their respective presidents, to co-chair a group tasked with developing a joint Russian-American strategy within one month. In developing a joint strategy and program of action, the nuclear superpowers would establish a new world-class “international security standard” based on President Putin’s Millennium proposal for new technologies that allow production of electricity with low-enriched, non-weapons-usable nuclear fuel.

A second pillar of this alliance would reach out to all other nuclear weapons states—beginning with Pakistan. Each should be invited to join the alliance and offered assistance, if necessary, in assuring that all weapons and weapons-usable material are secured to the new established international standard in a manner sufficiently transparent to reassure all others. Invitations should be diplomatic in tone but nonetheless clear that this is an offer that cannot be refused. China should become an early ally in this effort, one that could help Pakistan understand the advantages of willing compliance.

A third pillar of this alliance calls for global outreach along the lines proposed by Senator Richard Lugar in what has been called the Lugar Doctrine.¹¹ All states that possess weapons-usable nuclear materials—even those without nuclear weapons capabilities—must enlist in an international effort to guarantee the security of such materials from theft by terrorists or criminals groups. In effect, each

¹⁰Bunn, Holdren and Wier, “Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials.”

¹¹Speech by Senator Richard Lugar, May 27, 2002, at the Moscow Nuclear Threat Initiative Conference.

would be required to meet the new international security standard and to do so in a transparent fashion. Pakistan is particularly important given its location and relationship with Al-Qaeda, but beyond nuclear weapons states, several dozen additional countries hosting research reactors—such as Serbia, Libya and Ghana—should be persuaded to surrender such material (almost all of it either American or Soviet in origin), or have the material secured to acceptable international standards.

A fourth pillar of this effort should include Russian-American led cooperation in preventing any further spread of nuclear weapons to additional states, focusing sharply on North Korea, Iraq and Iran. The historical record demonstrates that when the United States and Russia have cooperated intensely, nuclear wannabes have been largely stymied. It was only during periods of competition or distraction, for example in the mid-1990s, that new nuclear weapons states realized their ambitions. India and Pakistan provide two vivid case studies. Recent Russian-American-Chinese cooperation in nudging India and Pakistan back from the nuclear brink suggests a good course of action. The failure and subsequent freeze of North Korean nuclear programs offers complementary lessons about the consequences of competition and distraction. The new alliance should reinvent a robust non-proliferation regime of controls on the sale and export of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear material and missile technologies, recognizing the threat to each of the major states that would be posed by a nuclear-armed Iran,

North Korea or Iraq.

Finally, adapting lessons learned in U.S.-Russian cooperation in the campaign against bin Laden and the Taliban, this new alliance should be heavy on intelligence sharing and affirmative counter-proliferation, including disruption and pre-emption to prevent acquisition of materials and know-how by nuclear wannabes. Beyond joint intelligence sharing, joint training for pre-emptive actions against terrorists, criminal groups or rogue states attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction would provide a fitting enforcement mechanism for alliance commitments.

AS FORMER Senator Sam Nunn has noted: “At the dawn of a new century, we find ourselves in a new arms race. Terrorists are racing to get weapons of mass destruction; we ought to be racing to stop them.”¹² Preventing nuclear terrorism will require no less imagination, energy and persistence than did avoiding nuclear war between the superpowers over four decades of Cold War. But absent deep, sustained cooperation between the United States, Russia and other nuclear states, such an effort is doomed to failure. In the context of the qualitatively new relationship Presidents Putin and Bush have established in the aftermath of last September 11, success in such a bold effort is within the reach of determined Russian-American leadership. Succeed we must. □


¹²Sam Nunn, “Our New Security Framework”, *Washington Post*, October 8, 2001.

Archy: “An optimist is a guy that has never had much experience.”

—Don Marquis, *Archy and Mehitabel* (1927)

**“Very, very important to the life of
the United States, to the West, and,
I am convinced, to freedom.”**

—Jeane J. Kirkpatrick



Commentary

Sound thinking for the 21st century.

\$45.00 for 11 issues • Subscribe today! • \$79.00 for 22 issues

Call 1 800 829-6270

Harbinger or Aberration?

A 9/11 Provocation

—John Mueller—

THE TERROR attack of September 11, 2001 was quite literally off the charts: no other single act of terrorism has ever done remotely as much damage. Over the course of the entire 20th century, fewer than twenty terrorist attacks managed to kill as many as one hundred people, and none killed more than four hundred. Until September of last year, far more Americans were killed in any given grouping of years by lightning than by all forms of international terrorism combined. Of course, such data beg the central question of the post-9/11 world: Will we revert to the relatively benign levels of the past, or have we really entered a new and nasty era?

Most observers hold to the latter, believing that the September 11 attacks represent a sort of historical step function—the “everything has changed” point of view. Accordingly, they suggest that such extensive destruction to life and property will become common or even routine, particularly if the United States and its allies fail to respond vigorously to the threat. This is hardly a baseless supposition. It is clear that the convergence of certain political and technological trends

gives such concerns real logical traction. However, a case can be made that rather than foreshadowing the future, the attacks may turn out to have been a statistical outlier, a kind of tragic blip in the experience of American national security.

One reason to take the outlier thesis seriously is simple enough: There have been several extreme and highly alarming events in recent decades that seemed to imply future patterns, but failed to do so. Indeed, near the beginning of every decade since at least 1930 there came a major shock that many people presumed to mark the beginning of big and very bad trends. The Depression had convinced many by the early 1930s that capitalism was in terminal crisis. At the beginning of the 1940s came World War II; around 1950 came the shock of both the Korean War and the maturation of the balance of thermonuclear terror; in the early 1960s the trauma of the Cuban missile crisis; then the oil crisis and malaise of the early 1970s; then the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on the very cusp of 1980; then a decade later the seeming prospect of major ethnic warfare around the periphery of former Communist Europe—and now 9/11. It is worth reviewing this record in a bit more detail, and recalling what people had to say about these and other alarming events at the time.

John Mueller is professor of political science at Ohio State University. His books include *Democracy, Capitalism, and Ralph's Pretty Good Grocery*; *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War*; and *Astaire Dancing*.

WORLD WAR II was the most destructive war in history. It has yet to inspire a sequel, but that is not how it looked to most in its immediate aftermath when historian Arnold Toynbee confidently argued, "In our recent Western history war has been following war in an ascending order of intensity; and today it is already apparent that the War of 1939–45 was not the climax of this crescendo movement."¹ After V-J Day, Ambassador Joseph Grew, one of America's most perceptive diplomats, concluded that "a future war with the Soviet Union is as certain as anything in this world."² Soviet dictator Josef Stalin concurred: "We shall recover in fifteen or twenty years and then we'll have another go at it."³ Relatedly, when the Communists successfully fomented a coup in democratic Czechoslovakia in 1948, there were great fears in the West that this would be followed by further Communist takeovers in Europe, especially in Italy and France. Public opinion polls conducted in the United States in the mid-1940s characteristically found 30 to 75 percent opining that, on account of such trends, the next world war would occur within 25 years.⁴ Even decades later, the prominent political scientist, Hans J. Morgenthau, announced that "the world is moving ineluctably towards a third world war—a strategic nuclear war. I do not believe that anything can be done to prevent it. The international system is simply too unstable to survive for long."⁵

But something was done to prevent it: It was called the containment policy, carried out more or less skillfully by successive U.S. administrations in the context of the NATO alliance. And thanks in large part to the Marshall Plan, Italy and France were not suborned by Communists.

Communist aggression in Korea in 1950 was deeply alarming. As President Truman put it, "The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war."⁶ Bernard Brodie recalled that the Joint Chiefs "were utterly convinced that the Russians were using Korea as a feint to cause us to deploy our forces there while they prepared to launch a 'general' (i.e., total) war against the United States through a major attack on Europe."⁷ The Russians, it turned out, were up to no such thing; there were no other "Koreas" after Korea. (Vietnam arose from Communist insurgency, not direct aggression.)

In the early 1960s, it was widely feared in the United States that Castro's victory in Cuba presaged the embrace of Soviet communism over all Latin America. It didn't. Meanwhile, the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 was the most extreme crisis of the Cold War, and when it was resolved, many felt the Soviets

¹Arnold J. Toynbee, *War and Civilization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 4.

²Grew quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 218.

³Quoted in Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1962), pp. 114–5.

⁴For data, see John Mueller, "Public Expectations of War During the Cold War", *American Journal of Political Science* (May 1979), pp. 303–7.

⁵Quoted in Francis Anthony Boyle, *World Politics and International Law* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985), p. 73.

⁶Quoted in Marshall D. Shulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised* (New York: Athenaeum, 1963), p. 150.

⁷Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 63.

would respond to their failure there by creating trouble somewhere else, probably in Berlin. As Defense Secretary Robert McNamara predicted, "sure as hell they're going to do something there."⁸ In other words, the "smart money" postulated that the missile crisis was just the beginning of a more intense phase of confrontation as Soviet military power grew, and so, conditioned by several years of Soviet bluster and swagger, the Americans poised themselves for the next challenge. But it never came: Cuba proved to be the last major direct U.S.-Soviet military-strategic crisis of the Cold War.

When the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan in late December 1979, many saw it as an aggressive ploy relevant to the entire Middle East and South Asia. Alarmed that the Soviet probe might be a prologue to further adventures in the oil-rich Persian Gulf area, President Carter sternly threatened to use "any means necessary" to counter a further Soviet military move in the area, a threat reiterated by his successor, Ronald Reagan, the next year.⁹ It was the first time Soviet forces had been sent openly into a country outside their empire since 1945. It was also the last.

When ethnic conflicts and warfare broke out on the periphery of Europe in the early 1990s, many expected it to metastasize all over the continent, maybe even leading to a nuclear war between Russia and Ukraine. Even short of such an extreme prediction, many analysts believed that we were in for an age of multiplying ethno-national conflicts in Europe with a terrifying potential to spread and grow. The problems mostly fizzled away, however, and even the larger Balkan conflicts (and the Armenian-Azeri one), ugly as they were, did not spread.

Many other doomsday predictions failed to hold, as well. There was a nearly unanimous expectation in the 1950s and 1960s that dozens of countries would

have nuclear weapons by the end of the 20th century. The CIA extrapolated in 1960 that the Soviet GNP might be triple that of the United States by the year 2000.¹⁰ It was widely assumed in the early 1960s that, since the Soviets enjoyed such an overwhelming lead in the space race, they would surely be first to get to the moon. There was a common fear during the Cold War that a nuclear weapon would inevitably explode somewhere and soon; C.P. Snow said in 1960: "Within, at the most, ten years, some of those bombs are going off. I am saying this as responsibly as I can. *That* is the certainty."¹¹ Then there was the wisdom that the oil shocks of the 1970s proved that world power was shifting to the Middle East, and the series of related predictions after 1974 and again in 1979 that oil prices would rise sharply, and stay high. None of these things happened.

A similar pattern holds with some more recent extreme acts of terrorism. Since its alarming release of poison gas in the Tokyo subway in 1995—an attack that sickened thousands and killed twelve—the apocalyptic group Aum Shinrikyo appears to have abandoned the terrorism business. And Timothy McVeigh's destructive truck bombing in Oklahoma City has failed, at least thus far, to inspire successful American imitators. Even Libya's Muammar Qaddafi, a devil *du jour* of terrorism of the 1980s, seems to have gone on to other, far more innocuous things.

⁸Quoted in McGeorge Bundy and James G. Blight, eds., "October 27, 1962: Transcripts of the Meetings of the ExComm", *International Security* (Winter 1987/88), p. 92.

⁹Quoted in Morton H. Halperin, *Nuclear Fallacy* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987), p. 45.

¹⁰Richard Reeves, *President Kennedy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), p. 54.

¹¹"The Moral Un-Neutrality of Science", *Science*, January 27, 1961, p. 259. (Emphasis in the original.)

The Uses of Fear

NONE OF this is to suggest that all extreme events prove to be the last in their line. At the time, World War I—called the Great War for decades—was the worst war of its type. Yet, as many expected, an even more destructive one followed. Nor is it to suggest that deep concern about extreme events is unreasonable or necessarily harmful. Fear has its uses. Aid and alliances in Western Europe surely did help to keep the area out of Communist hands, the forceful response in Korea to dissuade the Communists from further direct military probes, anti-Castro efforts in Latin America to prevent further Communist gains there, the reaction to the Soviets' Cuban venture to discredit crisis as a tactic, intervention in the Balkans to contain or defuse similarly-sourced conflicts nearby. Thus, efforts to confront terrorism and to reduce its incidence and destructiveness are certainly wise and justified.

Moreover, while Aum Shinrikyo and Qaddafi may be under control, Al-Qaeda and like-minded terrorist groups are unlikely to die out any time soon: September 11 was, after all, their second attempt to destroy the World Trade Center. And, of course, terrorism itself will never go away: it has always existed and always will. The central issue is whether such spectacularly destructive terrorist acts will become commonplace. Experience suggests that it is entirely possible that they will not.

As we wait to find out, efforts directed against terrorism might perhaps be more usefully considered a campaign against crime than a war. Now, this is not to say that the initial U.S. government reaction to the events of this past September 11 was wrongheaded. The war imagery rallied American people and it helped to clear up the longstanding legal and psychological fog concerning just what our adversaries

have been up to. But from the start there were risks with using such imagery, and we as a society are not compelled to retain it if we conclude, upon reflection, that there is a better way to think about our problems.

One such risk is that war imagery does not fit the facts of the current challenge in a way that most Americans can understand. Wars end, but terrorism and crime, since they are carried out by isolated individuals or by tiny groups at times of their own choosing, never do. One cannot, therefore, "conquer" terrorism. As with crime, one can at best seek to reduce its frequency and destructiveness so that people feel reasonably—if never perfectly—safe from it. Of course, military measures may sometimes be highly useful in the campaign, as they have proved to be in Afghanistan. But to frame the campaign against terror as a "war" risks the danger of raising unreasonable expectations, this despite the administration's repeated efforts to counsel patience and forbearance.

The war imagery also suggests that ordinary people should be asked somehow to make sacrifices. This popular conclusion is at least partly fanciful. Few Americans except those directly involved in the wars in Korea or Vietnam really made much of a sacrifice, and, although there were inconveniences and shortages during World War II, homefront consumer spending by the Greatest Generation generally surged. A goal of terrorism presumably is to hamper the economy, and therefore the best response to it—hardly much of a "sacrifice"—would be to go out and buy a refrigerator or to take an airplane to a vacation resort. The war imagery suggests we should be cutting back; but cutting back, and hunkering down, helps the terrorists.

It makes great sense to heighten security and policing measures, and to ask people to maintain awareness—as with crime, to report any suspicious behavior to authorities. But it is important that this

be done without inducing hysteria. In the extreme foreign policy events noted above, the creation of panic was only a by-product of the main concern; in the case of terrorism, it is central because it is integral to terrorism as a strategy.¹² Alarmism can be harmful, particularly economically, because it can create the damaging consequences the terrorists seek but are unable to bring about on their own. As Michael Osterholm of the University of Minnesota Medical School has stressed, there is a big difference between living *with* fear and living *in* fear.

This is a difficult challenge, but not an impossible one. It would help if officials and the press were to assess probabilities more sensibly and put them in some sort of context, rather than simply stress extreme possibilities so much and so exclusively. It is certainly reasonable to point out that an atomic bomb in the hands of a terrorist could kill tens of thousands of people, but it may also be worthwhile to note that making such a bomb is an extraordinarily difficult task. And while a "dirty bomb" might raise radiation 25 percent over background levels in an area, and therefore into a range the Environmental Protection Agency officially considers undesirable, there ought to be some discussion about whether that really constitutes "contamination" or, indeed, much of a danger at all given the somewhat arbitrary and exceedingly cautious levels declared to be acceptable by the EPA.

Nor would it necessarily be remiss to note that biological and chemical weapons have not proven so far to be great killers. Although the basic science about them has been well-known for at least a century, both kinds of weapons are notoriously difficult to create, control and focus. Thus far, biological weapons have killed almost no one, and the notion that large numbers of people could be killed by a small number of poison gas explosives is highly questionable. Although

they obviously can be hugely lethal when released in gas chambers, their effectiveness as weapons in warfare has been unimpressive. In World War I, for example, gas attacks caused less than one percent of total combat fatalities; on average, it took a ton of gas to produce one fatality. In the conclusion to the official British history of the war, chemical weapons are relegated to a footnote asserting rather mildly that gas "made war uncomfortable . . . to no purpose."¹³ A 1993 analysis by the Office of Technology Assessment found that a terrorist would have to deliver a full ton of sarin nerve gas perfectly and under absolutely ideal conditions over a heavily populated area to cause between 3,000 and 8,000 deaths, something that would require the near-simultaneous detonation of dozens, even hundreds, of weapons. Under slightly less ideal circumstances—if there was a moderate wind or if the sun was out, for example—the death rate would be only one-tenth as great.¹⁴

The problem is that the press and most politicians find that extreme and alarmist possibilities arrest attention more effectively than discussions put in their proper, broader contexts. Moreover, there is more reputational danger in underplaying risks than in exaggerating them. H.G. Wells' prediction that the conflict beginning in 1914 would be "the war that will end war" is often ridiculed in retrospect, but not his equally confident declaration

¹²See David Fromkin's still excellent essay, "The Strategy of Terrorism", *Foreign Affairs* (July 1975).

¹³Sir James E. Edmonds and R. Maxwell-Hyslop, eds., *Military Operations: France and Belgium, 1918*, vol. 5 (London: HMSO, 1947), p. 606.

¹⁴Office of Technology Assessment, United States Congress, *Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks*, OTA-559 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 54.

at the end of World War II that “the end of everything we call life is close at hand.”¹⁵ Disproved doomsayers can always claim that caution induced by their warnings prevented the predicted calamity from occurring. (Call it the Y2K effect.) Disproved Pollyannas can bank on no such convenient refuge.

Moreover, the record with respect to fear about crime suggests that efforts to deal responsibly with the risks of terrorism will prove difficult. Fear of crime rose notably in the mid-1990s even as statistics were showing it to be in pronounced decline. When Mayor David Dinkins, running for re-election in New York City, pointed to such numbers, he was accused by A.M. Rosenthal of the *New York Times* of hiding behind “trivializing statistics” that “are supposed to convince us that crime is going down.”¹⁶ New Yorkers did eventually come to feel safer from crime in the 1990s than they had in the 1980s, but this was probably less because crime rates actually declined than because graffiti, panhandlers, aggressive windshield washers and the homeless were banished or hidden from view. So it makes sense, at least for a while, to have armed reservists parading menacingly around airports. It is not always clear how they prevent terrorist attacks, and pulling them from productive jobs hardly helps the economy. But if they provide people with a sense of security, their presence may be beneficial.

More extreme forms of alarmism are not reasonable, however. Some commentators are now arguing, for example, that the United States has become “vulnerable”, even “fragile.” All societies are “vulnerable” to tiny bands of suicidal fanatics, but the United States is hardly “vulnerable” in the sense that it can be toppled by extreme and dramatic acts of terrorist destruction—however grimly, the country can readily absorb that kind of damage. (It does, after all, “absorb” some 40,000 deaths each year from automobile acci-

dents.) There are, as always, dangers out there; as always, too, uncertainties abide and abound. But the sky, as it happens, isn’t falling.

NO ONE really knows, of course, whether September 11 will prove to be a blip or a step function. The record suggests, however, that terrorists will find it difficult to match or top it. The extreme destruction of the events of last September 11 has also raised the bar, reducing the psychological and political impact of less damaging attacks. That even ambitious terrorists will fail to deliver as painful a blow seems at least as likely as that they will succeed.

In practical terms, too, Al-Qaeda represents a difficult but still bounded problem: in its concentric circles of evil, from Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants to the thousands of glassy-eyed misfits trained in Taliban-hosted camps, the numbers of terrorists and terrorist adjuncts are finite and probably manageable. Other potential apocalyptic terrorists from other climes are imaginable, and if many of those potential terrorists emerge, then our problem could slip its bounds. But it is not obvious that these potential terrorists will have either the motivation or the resources to murder Americans in large numbers. A vastly exaggerated U.S. global military response to September 11, however, could inadvertently produce enough fear and resentment abroad to increase the possibility of this happening. No chance of that, is there? □

¹⁵H.G. Wells, *The War That Will End War* (New York: Duffield, 1914); H.G. Wells, *The Last Books of H.G. Wells* (London: H.G. Wells Society, 1968), p. 67.

¹⁶A.M. Rosenthal, “New York to Clinton”, *New York Times*, October 1, 1993. For data showing that crime peaked in New York in 1990 and declined steadily thereafter, see *New York Times*, February 19, 1998.

Surveying the Global Economy

A Conversation with Carla Hills & Martin Feldstein

A few weeks ago in New York City, Carla Hills and Martin Feldstein sat with TNi editor Adam Garfinkle to discuss various aspects of the world economy. Here follows a transcription of that conversation.

THE NATIONAL INTEREST: May I begin, please, by asking each of you your view of what has happened, or not happened, since this past September 11 that may be described as out of line with the early post-attack expectations of economic analysts?

MARTIN FELDSTEIN: After September 11 of last year, you will recall that stock markets collapsed, and the reason was obvious: People were afraid. Consumers worried that the U.S. economy would go into a tailspin, and businessmen worried that such expectations would create a self-fulfilling prophecy. In fact, the economy did very well. It has since slowed down, but this is part of a normal cyclical pattern. I don't think we can attribute very much to September 11 insofar as broad economic effects are concerned, and I think this does run contrary to many expectations at the time.

CARLA HILLS: Anticipations of damage may have been excessive, but security concerns continue to be a drag on the market. Companies are spending for protection, an expense they had no idea would be needed before last September 11. The congestion at our borders, north and south, has had an adverse effect on some sectors, too. Many believe—indeed, the administration has said explicitly that it believes—that another strike is highly likely. This makes the market quite jittery, and this is not about to go away.

TNI: Let me ask this as an addendum: Had the war in Afghanistan not gone as swiftly and successfully as it did, do you think it would have made any difference? In other words, would a general lack of confidence in the conduct of the war against terrorism have translated psychologically into a greater lack of confidence in the economy?

MF: Good question, but it's very hard to say.

CH: It is, indeed, hard to say, but I think we need to keep in mind that the war on

Carla Hills, Chairman and C.E.O. of Hills & Company, International Consultant, served as U.S. Trade Representative (1989–93).

Martin Feldstein, President of the National Bureau of Economic Research and George F. Baker Professor of Economics, served as Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors (1982–84).

terrorism is not over with the campaign in Afghanistan. Clearly, large numbers of bright and thinking people are concerned about the road ahead. Their concerns enter into how the government plans its budget, and into the planning of both companies and individuals. It affects the countries that they will invest in and a host of other decisions. So, yes, there is a link between how people perceive the war on terrorism to be going and their economic decisions on a range of issues and levels. But as Marty suggests, tying down the details of the relationship is very difficult.

East Asian Prospects

TNI: Let's tour the world, shall we? Japan is still, I believe, the world's second-largest economy—unless one counts Europe's euro zone as a single economy (which I, as a Euroskeptic, do not—at least not yet). And the Japanese are having great difficulties getting out of their protracted recession. Why has it proven so difficult for them to shake their problems?

MF: The Japanese lack the *political* ability to tackle the restructuring that they need to undertake. They lack the political wherewithal to put funds into a restructured banking system—if indeed they could summon the courage to restructure it. And many large non-financial companies, especially in construction and retailing, also need to be foreclosed or restructured. At the same time, the Bank of Japan is trying unsuccessfully to provide stimulus to the system. It has driven interest rates down; indeed, short-term interest rates are down to virtually zero and the longer-term rate is just one percent. But the banks aren't lending because they are afraid to take the risk, as they see it, of lending additional money while the economy is at a stand-still and many businesses are insolvent. In sum, then, the Japanese can't deal with their long-term restructuring problems, and they can't achieve the short-term cyclical turnaround that they need to stop prices from falling and to start creating more jobs.

CH: I don't disagree.

TNI: Let me press a little further on the particulars of the political aspects of this problem. Banks will be banks, and consumer psychology, as ever, remains something of a mystery, and that explains, as you suggest, some of Japan's problems—especially its shorter-term ones. But how much of the seeming structural paralysis has to do with the relationship between the ruling LDP (Liberal Democratic Party), the large industries and the ministries that deal with them, and the banks?

MF: Yes, ultimately, there are a lot of industries that are very well connected with the LDP—and the politicians, who benefit in many ways from these connections, are unwilling to force bankruptcies upon those industries. That, in turn, contributes a lot to the problems that the banks have, and it helps explain why stimulus policies emanating from the Bank of Japan do not have the impact they otherwise might. Moreover, if Japanese policymakers took the right kinds of fiscal actions, by reshaping the tax system, they could stimulate the economy. That would make it possible to deal with the long-term problems—so we should not separate sharply what we call short-term and long-term problems.

TNI: Let's move on to China. China has acceded to the WTO and now faces a series of adjustments, some easy and some that pose very difficult dilemmas for them. They have a schedule against which to make those adjustments. How are they doing in the early going, and what would you project would be their course?

CH: China has made enormous progress in recent months. They've enacted thousands of new laws and regulations, and published many of them. This may not seem to some like a major event, but this makes China as a WTO member very different from the China that existed before the WTO. They have a great deal more to do. As you say, the challenges before them are tremendous. Their banking system is carrying huge amounts of non-performing loans that have been made to state-owned enterprises. Some state-owned enterprises have been privatized but many are still getting loans that will never be repaid in order to make products that are neither wanted nor needed. That is because state-owned enterprises continue to provide employment to people who otherwise would be left out of China's continuing surge of economic growth. China needs to create about 30 million jobs to absorb the unemployment that will be caused by the restructuring that the government has promised. If that does not sound daunting enough, consider that about 10 million Chinese enter the workforce every year. So they have a huge challenge before them.

Moreover, the Chinese have not yet developed a safety net to provide pensions and protections for those who are laid off; that is another reason why it is so difficult and potentially so unsettling politically to privatize the state-owned enterprises rapidly. These enterprises have traditionally supplied what social safety net that does exist. But reforming too slowly has adverse implications, too—not least for a banking system that, as I just said, suffers from too many politically-directed loans to economically deficient enterprises.

China also faces an enormous problem with rural unemployment and poverty, which is truly grinding. The rural sector is not only growing at a much slower rate than the urban sector, it is actually declining. That is why China has an estimated floating population of about 150 million—people who have left farms in search of work in the cities—and it is why the urban-rural gap is growing rapidly. It is in the countryside then, not surprisingly, where we are seeing a rising tide of protests and uprisings against local authorities.

So China has an enormous challenge before it, but it has made tremendous progress, and it is clearly a different country than it was a decade ago. Changes on such a scale take time; we need to continue to work with China, in my view—patiently and for as long as necessary—because these changes, whatever their temporary side effects, are as positive for the United States as they are for China and East Asia.

TNI: Let's talk for a moment about the impact of these changes in China on the rest of Asia, especially Southeast Asia. As I understand it, the huge size of China's poor population suggests that China will maintain a competitive labor wage advantage for a long time. This worries countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and others; they fear that there is no bottom to China's capacity to be a production platform—to make things cheaper than everybody else—and, hence, to capture export markets more effectively than everybody else.¹ Are these worries justified?

¹See, for example, Hugo Restall, "Asia's Giant Sucking Sound", *Wall Street Journal*, June 20, 2002; and the analysis in Nicholas R. Lardy, *Integrating China into the Global Economy* (Washington: Brookings, 2002), especially chapter 5.

MF: There are really two issues here. First, not only is the size of China not a handicap—after all, China has been growing at about 6–8 percent a year for the past many years—but the potential of China as a market is a major factor. Foreign businesses value their positions in China not just because wages are low, but because the market is enormous.

Now, with respect to the fears of their neighbors, I also hear that a lot when I am in Asia. And it is true, the Chinese will end up making some things now being made in Thailand or Korea; but they're not going to make everything, and the Thais, Indonesians, Malaysians and others have their own relative advantage. They will remain major exporters.

CH: We should remember, too, that China's economy is not static. In those sectors where they are competitive, as they grow and become more productive, there will be an increase in wages. You see that already in the coastal regions, which are becoming, relatively speaking, quite wealthy. The seemingly endless supply of low-wage workers is, in large measure, in the interior of the country; but what is being produced there is not in competition with, for example, what is made by a comparable factory in South Korea. South Korea's industry is way up the value-added chain from that.

I tell my friends in Southeast Asia that, were they to band together in an effective ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, they would do themselves a big favor. With 500 million people, they would be a much more attractive target for investment and a much more efficient region for combined production—both for regional markets and for export beyond. The point is that they should not just stand still and whine about China; they should take positive action to enhance their competitive edge.

Atlantic Static

TNI: I've been talking lately with a lot of Europeans, and every time we discuss American policy, they raise the steel tariffs and the farm bill and commence to lecture me, as their token captive-audience American, about the specter of American protectionism. I find these chidings a little odd, for two reasons. First, because I remember reading an article by Mickey Kantor—one of your Democratic successors, Carla—just after the steel tariffs were announced saying that the tariffs were a good idea, and that worried me. Second, in terms of protectionism aimed against poorer countries, aren't the EU-member states worse than the United States in many respects?

CH: I take your point. I have trouble defending the decision on steel—and the farm bill, too—on economic grounds. But politically, I understand the tremendous pressure put by Congress on the administration to do something about steel. You know, it's remarkable that after we declared that we would take a safeguard action—which is provided for in the rules of the World Trade Organization—we actually ran into short supply for our own users. So, it hasn't worked to our nation's overall economic interests.

The good news is that a safeguard is temporary—three years maximum. And, we will be forced to explain our rationale in a case that is being brought to the WTO by a number of countries. Were a panel to set it aside then, of course, we would abide by the ruling. Then the administration could say to the steel industry that it tried.

TNI: Do you think the administration expects an adverse WTO ruling?

CH: Well, let's just say that there are many trade experts who have written on this subject, and they are not confident that we will prevail.

TNI: I see. Well, let's not leave the Europeans quite yet. Of the many substantive deficiencies of journal editors in this field, economic literacy seems to be prominent among them. I certainly include myself. I cannot understand how the euro zone will work in the future. If there are such significant differences among the countries that are part of the euro zone, how can a single interest rate and a homogenous monetary policy make sense?

MF: Adam, you may not be an economist, but your difficulty in this respect is widely shared. There will be essentially one interest rate in the euro zone, since there is only one currency. There will be only one monetary policy. There will also be, therefore, only one exchange rate. And especially as the number of countries in the EU increases, it becomes more and more difficult to see how the same policy can be appropriate for all of them.

My European friends immediately reply: "You Americans have fifty states with economies as different as Alaska and Florida, and yet you have a single currency; so why can't we, with a smaller number of states, have a single currency, too?" To them, I say that the U.S. economy is very different from the European economy. One of the things we have going for us is that we all speak the same language, so that when demands slump in my own home state of Massachusetts, for example, people stop coming to Massachusetts, and people in Massachusetts start moving to places where the jobs are plentiful. But Europeans will not as readily move from Portugal to Germany, even if the Germans were willing to let them come. So, that's a major difference that is a real handicap for them.

A second difference is that our labor market is much more flexible than the European market. When a region in the United States sees a slump in demand for its product, instead of a large rise of unemployment locally, we see wages adjusting in that part of the country relative to what they are elsewhere. That provides a basis for employers to stay in production in that area.

And there's a third factor, which is that we have a centralized fiscal system. What that means in practice is that if demand falls and incomes fall in Massachusetts, say, then the taxes that flow from Massachusetts to Washington go down and the benefits that come from Washington to Massachusetts go up. As it happens, it's about forty cents on the dollar; that is to say, if the GDP in Massachusetts declines by a dollar, the net transfer to Washington declines by forty cents. That's a big stimulus to the Massachusetts economy. There's nothing like such a system at this point in Europe.

So while they have at least as much of a potential problem with a "one-size-fits-all" monetary policy as we do, they lack these three advantages that we have to help us cope: a common language; flexible wage-adjustment capabilities; and a centralized redistributive fiscal system. So, I think, as you do, that at some point they will get into trouble. At a minimum they will see more cyclical unemployment than would otherwise be the case. I suspect also that the European Central Bank, in the long run, will have a different attitude about inflation than the *Bundesbank*. The creation of the euro zone may have been good politically for moving forward with the European Union ...

TNI: ... and they did derive some one-time advantages from it, I think.

MF: That's right; but from a strictly economic point of view, they are liable to run into some fairly serious problems ahead.

CH: Yes, and I think it's worth pointing out that each country also gave up, to a certain extent, its own independent fiscal policy. Take Germany. Not only did it give up its independent monetary policy, but as it bumps up against the three percent EU deficit limit, it cannot use fiscal measures to stimulate growth. Usually, a country uses either monetary or fiscal policy to stimulate flagging economic growth. Moreover, the countries that need the stimulation usually have a debt burden that works as an additional inhibitor. So national governments in Euroland are pretty much without a tried and true economic policy to help them through rough waters.

TNI: Marty, you mentioned the fact of a single exchange rate. This also baffled me. Obviously, some economies in Europe are more export-dependent than others. A relatively weak euro would tend to help exporters, while a relatively strong euro would make imports cheaper and help consumers. The exchange rate, then, has a certain political quotient. So it matters who gets to decide the rate, doesn't it?

MF: I don't think any particular country is going to get control of the rate. The market will set the exchange rate between the euro and the dollar and the yen. But it's still true that fluctuations in that exchange rate are going to be more significant in some countries than in others, and that does have political implications. Countries in Europe that have extensive trade outside the euro zone will be much more affected than countries that trade mostly within Europe.

Dollarization and the Western Hemisphere

TNI: Since we're speaking of a new currency bloc, let's turn now to our own hemisphere where the question of dollarization has been much discussed in recent years. Given what's happened in Argentina lately, these formerly theoretical discussions seem to have been reshaped by events. How would you characterize the problems in Buenos Aires, and what connection do they have to the dollarization debate?

MF: Argentina is really an example of a country that fixed its exchange rate relative to the dollar, but without actually adopting the dollar as its currency. That was also a problem in Southeast Asia in 1997–98; it contributed fundamentally to the Thai problem and to a certain extent to Korea's problem. But those countries wised up and shifted to a floating exchange rate, as has Brazil, as has Mexico. By 2001, therefore, Argentina was odd man out in sticking to a policy that was very helpful a decade ago in bringing inflation under control, but it lacked an exit strategy back to a floating exchange rate—which they probably should have done five years ago when things were going well.

True dollarization, which they have not done, would mean not simply making the peso convertible to a dollar on a one-to-one basis, but eliminating completely the peso so that the Argentine people and businesses use the dollar as currency. And that makes no sense at all for an economy whose main trading partners are Brazil and Europe. It means that if the dollar strengthens relative to the euro, Argentina is in trouble. If the Brazilian *real* devalues relative to the dollar, Argentina is in trouble,

too. So, it doesn't make sense for them, and that was why the debate to which you have referred ended as it did.

TNI: What, then, was the rationale for those proposals in the first place? Just to control inflation, or was there some other rationale?

CH: It is more than just inflation control. Ecuador also has adopted the dollar. Ecuador was under terrible financial stress and, by doing that, I think it offered them a new beginning, a new chapter in their economic story.

TNI: Agreed, but how do you get out of it once you no longer need the confidence that dollarization brings? How does Ecuador in future avoid the mess that the Argentines got themselves into?

MF: If a country has literally adopted the dollar, it is a problem. But it's a limited problem; sovereign nations need only a printing press to introduce a new currency. So Ecuador could in principle bring back its own currency at some time in the future.

The Russian Front

TNI: Let's talk about Russia for a minute or two. China is in the WTO, but Russia still isn't, and one of the items on the agenda of U.S.-Russian policy today is a cluster of economic issues: from the importation of chicken parts to declaring Russia a market economy to the rescinding of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. Also, when I was in Russia recently, I was struck by the contradiction between the Russians telling us, on the one hand, that they want more American and other foreign direct investment, especially in their energy sector, and, on the other, their inability to establish legal and business structures, not to mention a debt market, that would make more investment possible. When this contradiction is raised, many Russians point to the Duma and, as often as not, throw up their hands and shake their heads. You said earlier that China is headed in the right direction; is Russia as well?

CH: We should be encouraged by the reforms that President Putin has put in place. Both Europe and the United States have now designated Russia as a market economy. The benefit of doing this is that it puts pressure on a government to move in the right direction, and that's important because the cycle you mentioned is absolutely true: business people go to climates that are predictable and hospitable, and the more they go there and create a constituency, the more predictable and hospitable the climates tend to become.

You laugh when you describe Russians who are frustrated with the Duma, their legislative branch. But how often do many of us wish that our Congress would pass laws that *we* think are needed with alacrity and with intelligence?

Reforming the WTO

TNI: Yes, well said. Let's move on to a functional issue. We have discussed the implications of China's joining the WTO, and U.S.-European Union conflict in that arena as well. We know that off to the side of those matters there have been pressures brought

to bear concerning the operation of the WTO itself. The anti-globalization crowd, but others as well, have raised the question of the WTO's decision-making transparency. Is there a need for reform of the WTO's *modus operandi*, and if so, at which sort of model should we be looking? Some have suggested, for example, that the WTO might function a bit like the U.S. Supreme Court, accepting representations from friends of the court, but still conducting its deliberations in private.

CH: Let me start with the value of the WTO. I think that the Dispute Settlement System is the jewel of the trading regime. If we didn't have a mechanism for resolving our disputes, we would be plunged into the economic version of the law of the jungle. Every complaint we register about a trading partner withdrawing trade benefits and raising tariffs because they have won a case before the WTO casts a negative light on the institution. But we need to understand that if we didn't have the WTO, our trading partners could do that and much more to harm American commercial interests. So, it's a huge benefit to us, as it is.

Can any institution be improved? Absolutely. And, of course, that includes the World Trade Organization. You speak of transparency. This is a legitimate issue, but it would not be wise to permit wholesale the presentation of *amicus* briefs. That would bog things down and allow an excessive politicization of the proceedings. But we could and should have rules governing the filing of briefs from those that have a demonstrated interest. These could help the WTO make its determinations. If the WTO's proceedings were open to everyone, regardless of pertinent interest, the organization simply could not function. The Supreme Court of the United States does not permit outsiders to sit in on its Friday afternoon deliberations. So, yes, there can and should be more transparency, but we should be very, very happy that we have the WTO. We should also remember that the United States is the most frequent user of the WTO and the most frequent winner—and although there are some high-visibility decisions that have disappointed us, we would be very, very much worse off without the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.

TNI: Somebody once told me that just the travel budget of the World Bank exceeds the *entire* budget of the WTO.

CH: Yes, that's right. The WTO is grossly under-funded for what it contributes.

TNI: How much of a budget boost might be required to have the WTO run at an optimal level?

CH: Well, any institution as underfunded as the WTO would be helped by any increase. But it's not the absolute amount that is so important, and it's not only about travel vouchers for its staff. One of the problems for the developing world is that many of these countries lack the technical capacity to deal with some trade issues—either to frame them during negotiations or to deal with differences that arise with their trading partners. It would be extremely helpful to the global economy if the WTO were to have a capacity to provide such assistance to the poorest nations.

The Doha Round, Development and the Virtuous Circle

TNI: Let's talk about trade policy more generally. I read recently of various estimates of how another round of trade liberalization—it's called the Doha round, is it not?...

CH: ...sometimes the Doha round, sometimes the Development round or the Millennium round....

TNI: Right. That there are so many names probably points to how inchoate it all is at this point. Anyway, there are figures being bandied about concerning how much of an increase in global GDP we might see from new advances in trade liberalization, especially liberalization that would affect the developing world's ability to export foodstuffs and textiles and shoes and things like that? Are these just guesses? What estimates are credible?

CH: Well, those figures aren't just guesses. There are several groups—one in Australia, for example—that have analyzed the economic effects of the Uruguay Round (the last, eighth round of talks), and other groups are making projections now. The benefits are in the billions of dollars. Of course, to get good estimates we have to specify what we are liberalizing. But your reference to the developing world is to the point. The developing world is badly hurt, and the least developed nations are the worst hurt, by the trade restrictions imposed on them by the industrialized countries. Certainly, in agriculture and in textiles, particularly at the lower end, we have very high protections in our country, as do the Europeans, the Japanese and the Koreans. This is heavily detrimental to the world economy as a whole.

You see particular examples of this harm done to Latin America today, and our national interests as well as theirs are adversely affected. We don't want Latin American countries to send us cocaine, but we won't buy their roses or their orange juice or their agricultural products or their textiles. By insisting on the maintenance of such restrictions, we force their farmers into the production of illicit items that cause us great harm.

We need to do a better job of informing the world and our own public as to the benefits of trade. It is true that when we remove our trade barriers to low-wage countries, the least-developed countries, they do sell us more products. But it is also true that with the currency they earn, they buy more from us. This creates a virtuous circle that benefits our economy tremendously. But this is not readily understood. All that seems to be recognized is that when we lower our barriers, these countries sell more to us, which affects our balance of trade and threatens some American jobs, and we forget the enormous benefits we receive.

TNI: Isn't it also true that when people worry about the loss of relatively low-skill jobs in the United States, they're really worrying overly much, because those jobs have left us a long time ago. Isn't it so that what we have seen in recent years is the displacement of one overseas country for another, rather than a massive loss of more jobs in the United States?²

CH: That's a macro-analysis, and it is correct as far as it goes. But if you are the person who holds one of the remaining low-skills jobs on a micro level, you're very unhappy when a more competitive foreign product displaces you. Those who are directly affected are very unhappy and nervous about the next wave of change. So there's a high degree of anxiety in our country with respect to trade, globalization and open

²See, for example, Mary Jordan, "Mexican Workers Pay for Success: With Labor Costs Rising, Factories Depart for Asia", *Washington Post*, June 20, 2002.

markets for capital, goods, and services. I think we have to do a better job not only in explaining the benefits of trade to the economy as a whole, but also do a better job trying to figure out how to raise the skill levels of those who are displaced so that they can move into sectors that provide higher pay, better benefits and greater security. The benefits of trade are great. Trade is truly the bedrock of our prosperity. But if we don't find a way to bring along those who may be displaced, we'll lose the national consensus that supports our nation's leadership in opening markets.

Energy Prices

TNI: If trade liberalization can help the global economy, we should also mention a factor that might harm it: an energy crunch. I have seen lately several projections of what oil prices might be over the next few years, out to a decade. Many people in the oil industry argue something like this: We have been living for the past decade or so on wells that were developed in the 1960s and the 1970s, while in most of the 1980s and the 1990s the industry was investing at something like 20 percent of the rate of the 1960s and 1970s. The reason is that prices were mostly soft and the investment climate in geologically promising areas has not been hospitable. As a result of this dearth of investment, they say, the rough balance of supply and demand we have witnessed in the 1990s will give way to shortages and price increases. Many industry analysts believe that prices will rise fairly substantially in the next few years, and that if substantial new investment is not forthcoming soon, high prices will predominate for a long time. That, of course, would put a whole different spin on the prospects for global economic growth. Since such projections have been made in the past and have been proven wrong, what do you make of these new analyses?

CH: The oil companies must go where the oil is located, and that very often is not a hospitable climate. They also have a five- to eight-year capital outlay before they achieve a return, and they cannot know exactly what the politics and investment climate will be in the future. But as you say, in the mid-1970s, our intelligence agencies were telling us that we were going to run out of oil by the 1990s. Frankly, there are markets opening up all the time. We are integrating Russia into the world economy and newly found reserves are being announced regularly. Also, new technologies are being developed, and we will have mechanisms for producing energy that did not exist in the past.

MF: That's a very important point: thanks to technological advances, we're getting a lot more oil out of the same wells than we did before. I think we will see Mexico become a larger supplier and, with any luck at all, as Carla said, Russia will become a very major supplier as well.

I think we also have to give credence to market signs. Certainly, there's nothing in the futures market for oil that suggests that people who are investing in those markets believe that there will be major increases in the benchmark price anytime soon. Moreover, if energy experts really believed that—if the consensus really was that the price was going to go to, say, \$30 to \$35 per barrel—the producers would pull back on their production now in order to get that higher price in the future, and the price would go up now. So the fact that the price is where it is today is in itself, to some extent, a forecast about the future.

TNI: Let me pose a related question: Is it ever appropriate for the United States government to try to insure or in some other way protect investments in the energy sector from risky projects in politically unstable places? The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is a great example of such a case. Many people have wanted that pipeline built for a variety of political and strategic reasons, but the United States government has until now turned away from the idea of subsidizing it. And since the people who build pipelines and do other things in the energy business have pretty sharp pencils, they will only build it if they think it is financially viable. So far, they don't think it can be. Should the U.S. government ever distort the market, as it were, for national security reasons?

CH: No. Having a reliable energy source is in our national interest, and so the government should craft an energy policy that maximizes the possibilities of creating that reliability. Providing a subsidy is a different thing, however. One of the reasons why some pipelines are not developed is because they're not needed now.

TNI: They're not economically viable, in other words.

CH: Yes. They don't provide adequate returns to cover the risk. But if they are needed, the returns will go up, and at a certain point the incentives will become sufficient to cause the line to be built.

The Corporate Governance Crisis

TNI: There has been much comment in recent weeks about what has been called the crisis of corporate governance in the United States. From the examples of Enron, Adelphi, WorldCom and other apparent cases of a lack of integrity in high business places, media pundits (and some others) have declared a crisis, some claiming that dishonest high-rollers have done more harm to the American economy than that ever done by terrorists. How serious is all this, really? What are the implications, if any, for the world economy?

MF: The problem of inadequate corporate governance and improper accounting is certainly serious but not comparable to the effects of terrorism and potential future terrorism. Our economy depends on a healthy capital market and capital markets can only function well where investors have confidence in the data that are reported by firms. Corporate accounting in America has been regarded as better than accounting in other countries. This has given the American economy the advantage of a lower cost of funds. The recent discussion about the problems of U.S. corporate profit reporting now weakens American markets relative to those of other countries. That is hurting the dollar and U.S. equity markets. In my judgment, the weakness of American corporate reporting is exaggerated on the basis of a few egregious cases. With time, accounting standards and governance procedures will be stronger for all.

CH: I agree that, without question, there has been real harm. The cases cited in your question, Adam, and others, have indeed caused investors to lose confidence in our corporate governance system, and yes it has adversely affected our stock market and contributed to the weakening of the dollar. While ours is still the most respected capitalist system in the world, we must recognize that there are aspects of it in need of overhaul. I believe that we can build on what we have, making it even stronger. For example, I

believe that the audit function must be substantially strengthened. The recent spate of problems show audit partners yielding to management pressures to inflate earnings. To improve the quality of audits, independent directors must have and must exercise much greater authority over the audit. Audit committees (not management) should have the power to hire and fire the auditors. They should insulate outside auditors from pressures from management. The New York Stock Exchange could require as a condition of listing that audit committees make a serious evaluation of the external auditors at regular intervals, say every four years. At such evaluations, independent expertise could be used to assist the committee in judging the competence and the independence of the auditors' work. Committee members could ask whether the audit partner has in fact exercised judgment as to whether the company's financial statements present the company's financial position in the fairest fashion and determine, where appropriate, whether the audit partner has explained to the audit committee any alternative ways in which estimates or assumptions could be made. Under this proposal, the audit committee would have an affirmative obligation to determine whether it was in the shareholders' interest to renew the external auditor contract.

I believe this approach is far superior to the mandatory rotation of outside auditors that some have suggested. Mandatory rotation gives the new audit firm a pass for the first two years because, under most circumstances, no one can tell how good or bad the audit is until well into the second cycle. And for the last two years of the audit firm's engagement, the fact that replacement will occur no matter what reduces incentives for the audit firm to be candid and careful, and for the audit committee to press for a replacement that will occur shortly in any event. Thus, mandatory rotation would have the perverse effects of immunizing the audit firm from being replaced and reducing the authority of the audit committee over the external auditors, whereas a four year evaluation system would maintain appropriate incentives for both.

*

*

*

TNI: I have one final question for you, Carla. Do you talk much these days with Bob Zoellick? What do you talk about?

CH: I have talked to Bob, yes. He's very bright and very strategic in the way he thinks about trade. I think he's doing a very good job under very difficult circumstances. Do we talk daily on policy? No. He doesn't begin to have the time, nor do I. But on issues like trying to ensure that the administration gets fast track authority, yes, we have talked. And I've talked to other people in the agency, where I think I can be helpful.

TNI: That's good to know; I'm sure you have been helpful. You certainly have helped me improve my grasp of these issues, and so have you, Marty. I thank you both. □

We're out of money; it's time to think.

—Lord Rutherford

Judging Nazism and Communism

Martin Malia

NOW THAT the 20th century is at last “history”, what does this enhanced perspective tell us about the relationship between that century’s two great threats to liberal democracy, Nazism and Communism? During the high Cold War decade following 1945, the matter appeared simple to the majority of Western opinion: the two systems should be equated in their infamy. Yet, as anti-Communism came under fire in the 1960s, and as the Cold War itself dwindled into détente in the 1970s, the Hitler-Stalin comparison largely fell into disrepute. At the end of the 1980s, however, European Communism’s ignominious end re-opened the question, thus inaugurating a decade of debate over the issue of which “totalitarianism” was the greater scourge. Nor will this issue ever really go away again. For while Nazism and Communism are most unlikely to recur in the historical forms in which we knew them, the political impulses underlying them are still at work in modern political culture, indeed in the human condition itself.

Martin Malia earned his Ph.D. at Harvard and spent most of his teaching career at the University of California, Berkeley. His principal works are *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917–1991* and *Russia under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum*.

Thus far, however, the renewed debate has suffered from an exceptional imbalance between heat and light. And this is because when we ask whether it is Communism or Nazism that must be judged the greater evil, we are too often unclear about what exactly should be compared in order to frame an answer. The usual procedure is to contrast inventories of horror: numbers of victims, means and circumstances of their deaths, types of concentration camps. Yet how do we make the transition from the raw facts of atrocity to a judgment of their moral meaning? Why, for example, is the industrialized extermination mounted by Hitler more evil than the “pharaonic technology” employed by Stalin and Mao Zedong?¹ It would be an error to suppose a simple or direct answer to such a question. Rather, this greatest of vexed issues handed down from the 20th century must be approached on three interrelated levels: moral, political and historical.

On the moral level we are concerned with the philosophical matter of ascertaining degrees of evil; it is this exercise that arouses the greatest passion and that has produced the most extensive literature. On the political level, we are inquiring whether the two systems may be legitimately equated as totalitarian polities;

¹Solzhenitsyn’s expression in *The Gulag Archipelago*.

and since totalitarianism is clearly a bad thing, this subject also has moral ramifications that make it almost as contentious as the first. Yet to give convincing answers to either of these questions, the indispensable preliminary is to confront some basic historical problems: Nazism and Communism's two-decade relationship with each other, their organizational structures, their ideological purposes, and their actual *res gestae*.

It is to delineating a perspective on this third, historical level that the present essay is devoted. The first level will be touched on only by implication; the second level, which is more easily grounded in history, is given greater direct attention and evaluation, and something like a concept of generic totalitarianism will emerge by the end. As for the third level, the task here is not to make a substantive, still less a systematic, historical comparison, but rather to trace the historiographic parameters of such an investigation. The reason for this, as we shall see, is that scholarly writing on Nazism and Communism has developed so unevenly that most combined analyses of the pair to date can hardly qualify as serious. To compare and contrast them from a moral or a political perspective presupposes an equal level of understanding of both as historical phenomena. Since this is alas lacking, dissecting their two somber historiographies is the necessary preliminary to any other judgment.

Sorting Out the Basics

EVEN WITHIN this narrowed-down task we encounter a complex mixture of overlapping and asymmetry. As to the former, there is, first and obviously, a temporal overlapping: Hitler and Stalin were contemporaries; Nazism developed in part in opposition to Communism while Communism's primary defining adver-

sary was always claimed to be "fascism"; and in this interlocking relationship the two went to Armageddon together in the most traumatic moment of the century. Conversely, there is a major temporal asymmetry: Nazism lasted only twelve years and centered in a single country, spreading outward only by conquest, whereas Soviet Communism lasted 74 years and eventually cloned itself over a third of the planet. Indeed, Communism is still with us, though in anemic form, in East Asia and just offshore from Miami.

Then, too, there are asymmetries of a conceptual sort. Is Nazism a unique case or part of a generic "fascism", beginning with Mussolini's March on Rome in 1922 and embracing the Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War, the Romanian Iron Guard, and Tojo's generals in Japan? After all, Hitler and Mussolini intervened together to aid Franco, they formed a Rome-Berlin Axis and eventually, with Japan, an Anti-Comintern Pact. Until well after the war, the term "Axis" was colloquial shorthand for everyone on the "fascist" side (only Finland escaped obloquy for its involvement).

With the passage of time, however, this picture was significantly blurred. Throughout the century the Communists alone adhered consistently to the category of generic fascism (which they had indeed invented in the 1920s). From the mid-1930s onward the slogan "anti-fascism" beckoned liberals to their side in one or another "popular front", and even today it remains a mobilizing watchword. Non-communist historians, for their part, wavered on this issue; most have distinguished "national authoritarian" regimes, such as Franco's Spain or Salazar's Portugal, with their commitment to social conservatism, a purely defensive foreign policy and traditional religion, from the "neo-pagan" and imperialistic "mobilization regimes" of

Germany and Italy.² The exceptional nature of the Nazi death camps and the growing postwar awareness of the Holocaust, in conjunction with the thesis of its world-historical uniqueness, have also increasingly argued for Nazism's singularity among European "fascisms."

By contrast, the existence of a generic Communism can scarcely be questioned. It has existed everywhere a Leninist party with the mission of "building socialism" has taken power, that socialism requiring the suppression of private property and the market in favor of institutional dictatorship and a command economy. Even so, this formula has in practice yielded significantly different results from one case and period to another. Thus, within the Soviet matrix there were marked fluctuations in coercive power: from Lenin's War Communism of 1918–21 to the semi-market New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1921–29; from Stalin's "revolution from above" of the early 1930s to his Great Terror of the decade's end; and so on to the perilous wartime and imperial postwar periods. (Nazism, on the other hand, subdivides chiefly into prewar and wartime periods, and public attention has focused overwhelmingly on the latter.) Finally, in the Soviet case, the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras are distinguished from Stalinism by diminished revolutionary vigor and a much-reduced level of terror.

Outside the Russian matrix, variations in the Leninist formula are even more notable. The Soviets' postwar "outer empire" in Eastern Europe was significantly different from the "inner empire" of the USSR itself. There were no real revolutions in Eastern Europe (outside of Yugoslavia, which soon left the Soviet orbit, and the strange case of Albania), but instead a diversified process of conquest and absorption. Postwar Poland, for example, where the peasantry was never collectivized, is hardly comparable to Russia under Stalin, or even to Romania

under Nicolae Ceaușescu. And although political police were active everywhere in Eastern Europe, there was simply not space enough for real Gulags.

When we move from the Soviet zone in Europe to the Communisms of East Asia, we find greater differences still. Not only were all these regimes institutionally independent of Moscow, but each was different from the other. Kim Il-sung's socialism in North Korea meant a hermetically closed family dictatorship as surreal as that of Ceaușescu; yet the "Great Leader" retained the Soviet alliance as a shield against China. Mao Zedong, on the other hand, was Moscow's greatest enemy on the Left; so to prove his superiority over Khrushchev and his "capitalist roaders", he outdid even Stalin's terror in seeking instant socialism through the Great Leap Forward of 1959–61 and the Cultural Revolution of 1966–76. Ho Chi Minh, by contrast, though as authentically Leninist as his predecessors to the north, at least channeled his party's energy into a war his population supported. Pol Pot, finally, produced the demented *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole Communist enterprise as he attempted to out-radical not just Moscow, but Beijing and Hanoi as well. All these Communisms, moreover, varied in the intensity of their fury from one period to another, most notably as Maoism gave way to Deng Xiaoping's "market Leninism."

Another important variation on the generic Communist formula is introduced by the overlap of Leninism with nationalism, not only in the Soviet zone and in East Asia but also in Cuba. It has often been noted that "proletarian internationalism" has been a very weak competitor to modern nationalism; and indeed, ever since European socialist parties in 1914

²Notably, Stanley G. Payne, *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995). Significantly, Payne is a historian of Franco's Spain.

voted for war credits in their respective parliaments, in almost any crisis workers have put patriotism first. Consequently, it has been claimed that Stalinism was basically a new species of messianic Russian nationalism, that Maoism was an exacerbated Chinese reply to Soviet “hegemonic” pretensions, that Ho Chi Minh was a kind of a Vietnamese George Washington, and that the sui-genocidal rampage of Pol Pot was a product of traditional Cambodian hatred of Vietnam directed now toward surpassing the Communist exploits of Ho Chi Minh. Obviously, also, Fidel Castro’s revolution was a reaction to Yankee imperialism. Nationalism, of course, has played a role in all these cases; the real question, however, is whether that role has been sufficient to demote generic Communism to secondary rank.

The answer depends on what we consider to be Communism’s social base. If we take the rhetoric of the “international workers’ movement” literally, then worker addiction to nationalism argues against generic Communism’s importance.³ In truth, however, that “movement” has always been a movement of parties, not of proletariats. These parties, moreover, were founded and largely run by intellectuals, at least in their heroic phase, not by their alleged worker base; only later were any Communist parties run by such ex-worker-apparatchiks as Khrushchev or Brezhnev. By then, of course, the full administrative autonomy of the East Asian parties (and the relative autonomy of the East European ones) had fragmented Stalin’s genuinely international movement into sovereign entities. Even so, each entity preserved its Leninist structure and goals.

Resolution of the question of nationalism prevailing over Communism also depends on historical period: in the case of Lenin’s and, indeed, Stalin’s Russia, the answer is definitely no; in the case of Jiang Zemin’s China it may turn out to be yes. We will not know for sure until we see

how the last Leninist regimes disappear. An even deeper answer to this question, however, is that Leninist parties, whether united or at odds with each other, have mastered their populations’ nationalism only so long as their millenarian zeal lasted; when that zeal waned, nationalism returned to the fore. Indeed, the withering away of zeal is what explains the fate of both the former Soviet Union and the Yugoslav federation. In each case it was the prior death of the party that produced the collapse of the unitary state, with such former apparatchiks as Slobodan Milosevic and Nursultan Nazarbaev taking up the nationalist cause to retain power.

Compare and Contrast

GIVEN THIS RANGE of asymmetries between Nazism and Communism, as well as the differences among the Leninist cases, what should we compare in assessing their political kinship or the depth of their criminality? Psychologically satisfying though it may be for some to find sharp distinctions between the two systems and for others to find close kinship, it should be obvious that the vagaries of history force us to settle for a mixture of similarities and differences.⁴

³The position of Dan Diner, *Das Jahrhundert verstehen* (Munich: Luchterhand, 1999).

⁴The most useful exercises in comparison are Henry Rousso et al., eds., *Nazisme et stalinisme: histoire et memoire comparees* (Bruxelles: Complexe, 1999), and Marc Ferro, ed., *Nazisme et communisme: deux régimes dans le siècle* (Paris: Hachette, 1993), especially the article by Krzysztof Pomian. A disappointing effort is Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin, eds., *Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), a volume that never comes to focus. Kershaw and some Russianist contributors are aware of the disparity between the two

The basic similarity is that both movements, whatever they claimed to be themselves, had the same enemy: liberal democracy. Both emerged in the wake of World War I as explicit negations of Europe's long-term movement toward constitutional government founded on universal suffrage; and so both replaced rule-of-law parliamentarianism with a one-party regime under a supreme leader, exercising dictatorial power and employing police terror. Both regimes, furthermore, instituted command economies, whether through outright nationalization as in Russia or by administrative pressure as in Germany. Finally, both were driven by millenarian ideologies: in the case of the Nazis, the quest for the world hegemony of their Aryan *Volksgemeinschaft* (people's community), and in the case of the Communists, the triumph of world socialist revolution.

These political and ideological characteristics, of course, amount to what is known as the "totalitarian model", as this was defined in the wake of World War II by such figures as Hannah Arendt and the political scientists Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski.⁵ In truth, however, this perception of similarity antedates the war. In the 1930s it was commonplace to refer to Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin collectively as "the dictatorships." Indeed, this perception had been given scholarly conceptualization as early as 1937 by Elie Halévy in his brilliant book, *The Era of Tyrannies*, which explained the emergence of the dictatorships by a conjunction of the socialist ideal with the mass mobilization of modern war.⁶

When modern war actually came a second time it confirmed the 1930s' prior judgment, first of all in the collusion between the two chief dictators in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939. Even more important, however, was the revelation of the Nazi death camps, which made it starkly clear that modern "dictatorship"

was an unprecedented phenomenon in world politics. At the same time, Communism's victory did nothing to mitigate its own, equally unprecedented state terrorist power. In the face of these realities, the classical terms "tyranny" and "despotism" were inadequate, as was the limp modern label "authoritarianism"; so "totalitarianism" carried the definitional day. This choice was confirmed as militant Communism spread during the next five years over a third of the planet to reach its historical apogee. Thus, as World War II gave way almost immediately to the Cold War, Stalin came to fill the whole totalitarian space, becoming in the eyes of the liberal world Hitler's moral heir.⁷

This unitary perception of totalitarianism, however, progressively lost ground after Stalin's death in 1953. As Khrushchev attempted limited reform and as open dissidence appeared under Brezhnev, the Soviet party-state, though it remained tyrannical, appeared distinctly less total and monolithic. Concurrently, as scholarship accumulated about the Third Reich, the Nazi dictatorship came

central historiographies; however, they fail to understand how deep it cuts or the factors that produced it.

⁵Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1951); Friedrich & Brzezinski, *Totalitarianism, Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956). The best overview of the totalitarianism debate is Enzo Traverso, *Le Totalitarisme: le XX^e siècle en débat* (Paris: Le Seuil, 2001).

⁶Elie Halévy, *The Era of Tyrannies: Essays on Socialism and War* (translated by R.K. Webb) (New York: New York University Press, 1966). The book was first published in French in 1938 from lectures given in 1937.

⁷The intellectual history of the concept is given in Abbot Gleason, *Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

to seem less Behemoth-like—to acknowledge Franz Neumann's early contribution to our understanding of Nazism—and more “polycratic” than had earlier been supposed. Finally, as public awareness of the Holocaust grew after the 1960s, the Nazi case came to be increasingly distinguished from the Soviet one until it was widely regarded as a historically unique manifestation of “absolute evil.” In this perspective, Mussolini's regime, with a weak party-state, no camp system, and only belated anti-Semitism, came to be treated as distinctly less evil than Hitler's. In consequence, the concept of generic fascism retreated into the background.

Concurrently, throughout the post-war period the evil of Nazism was increasingly dramatized to the world: the Nuremberg trials of 1945–46, the Eichmann trial of 1961–62, Claude Lanzman's film *Shoah* of 1986, and so on to Steven Spielberg's *Schindler's List* in 1993. But beyond the writings of Soviet dissidents such as Evgeniia Ginzburg and especially Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, there have been no comparable popular dramatizations of the Gulag to world opinion. Nor has any major Communist figure ever stood trial. East Germany's Erich Honecker was permitted to leave for Chile, and sensitive souls, later so zealous in extraditing General Augusto Pinochet to the same destination, were not at all disturbed. The second-rank figures now being considered for trial in Cambodia (who even knows their names?) will surely not be brought to justice in any foreseeable future.

Thus, by the time of European Communism's collapse in 1989–91, most specialists of both Nazism and Sovietism had renounced not only generic fascism but the totalitarian model as well, emphasizing instead the absolute singularity of Hitler's Reich. This may well be the historically justified evaluation, but, for pre-

sent purposes, the relevant point is that the disproportion between the attention accorded Nazi and Communist crimes has been so great as to constitute, *a priori*, a double standard in judging them. Indeed, the disproportion has made the exercise of comparison as such a sign of political bad taste.

This double standard, however, was challenged by the Communist collapse—and it has not been sufficiently emphasized that this collapse was not just Soviet, but eminently generic. It began with Deng Xiaoping's conversion to the market in 1979 and the 16-month “self-limiting revolution” of Solidarity in Poland the following year; it became irreversible in 1989 with the simultaneous destruction of the Maoist mystique on Tiananmen Square and the fall of the Soviet “outer empire” in Europe; and it culminated in 1991 with the disintegration of the Soviet matrix itself. Not only were the geopolitical results of World War II undone, but the “short 20th century”, as inaugurated by World War I and Lenin's October, was brought to a close.

The impact of this revolution on our understanding of the old century was not that it revealed the full extent of Communist crime: this had long been no mystery to researchers who really wanted to know. The impact came, rather, from the liberating effect that the system's universal failure had on Western minds: It at last became possible to discuss Communism's record realistically and yet remain in good taste. Hence, the 1930s' inclination to compare it with Communism's fascist adversary inevitably returned. The publication of *The Black Book of Communism* in 1997 was the boldest and most systematic expression of this change. A work of solid scholarship, its greatest originality was to treat the subject of Communist crime not just in terms of the Soviet case, but of Communism

worldwide. In this perspective, of course, Communism turned out to be far bloodier than Nazism, totaling roughly 85–100 million as opposed to 20–30 million victims, depending on who is counting and what manner of death is being considered.⁸

Moreover, this unavoidable—and to most people startling—fact raises the question of whether such a quantitative difference translates into a qualitative difference in the degrees of evil embodied by the two systems. At the same time, the geographical extension of the problem affected existing arguments for distinguishing, or conflating, the two systems, in particular as regards the viability of the concept “generic Communism.” Is urban, European Communism comparable to rural, Asian Communism? Must generic Communism therefore be broken down, once again, into more basic national and cultural units?⁹ Or does the already-noted fact that Communist leaders everywhere were neither workers nor peasants but intellectuals outweigh this sociological consideration? There indeed exists a human bridge between the Red East and its Western godfather: Zhou En-lai embraced Communism in France in 1921, and Ho Chi Minh and Pol Pot were members of the French Communist Party in Stalin’s time.

As of the 20th century’s calendar end, however, the verdict of 1989–91 had not really been absorbed into our historical consciousness. *The Black Book* in particular has provoked a mixed reaction. Although almost a million copies have been sold worldwide, including in both Russian and Chinese (Hong Kong) translations, thus indicating widespread interest, the intelligentsia’s reception has been distinctly chilly, beginning in France itself but especially in the United States.¹⁰ For reasons addressed below, this split reaction is indeed part of the problem of comparison itself.

The Historiographic Predicate

IN THIS CONFUSED situation, then, the first step toward clarification must be to compare not actual historical cases, but historiographies. As Benedetto Croce long ago remarked, “all history is contemporary history”; and though it is going too far to embrace the post-modern inflation of this point, which would make the past a mere discursive construct or “text”, it is true that we invariably read that past through the prism of the present with all of its political, cultural and ethical passions. This circumstance has bequeathed us radically asymmetrical historiographies for Nazism (and/or “fascism”) and the different varieties of Communism.

The basic factor in explaining this asymmetry is that the Nazis lost World War II while the Soviets won it. Beginning in 1945, therefore, Nazism’s disastrous balance sheet was clear to everyone, and historians had its archives to hand. By contrast, the Soviet “experiment” appeared open-ended until 1991; its records remained secret, and for another half century the liberal world was

⁸Stéphane Courtois, Nicolas Werth and Jean-Louis Margolin, *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression* (translated by Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).

⁹Serge Wolikow, Michel Dreyfus *et al.*, eds., *Le Siècle des communismes* (Paris: Les Editions de l’atelier, 2000). Colloquially known in Paris as “The White Book of Communism”, this collective endeavor answers *The Black Book* by breaking Communism down into a series of discrete movements, with mixed positive and negative results.

¹⁰See, for example, J. Arch Getty’s crude polemic against *The Black Book* in *The Atlantic Monthly* (March 2000). For a rare positive review, see Neil McInnes, “The Long Goodbye”, *The National Interest* (Summer 2001).

confronted with the global challenge of its power. Moreover, Nazism's historiography was developed primarily by Germans who had to live with the consequences of the disaster, and hence could not avoid treating it for what it was. The historiography of the various Communisms, on the other hand, offers the bizarre case of a scholarly corpus developed almost entirely by foreigners (we may ignore the official, heroic histories of the various Communist regimes). These outsiders, moreover, were deeply divided over the meaning of Communist revolution as it moved from Stalin to Mao to Castro.

Some of them, who for simplicity's sake we may call cold warriors, sought to mobilize Western opinion against Communism's progression, while others, ranging from cautious doves to outright fellow travelers, sought to justify détente with the adversary, active sympathy for its "achievements", and even "convergence" with its institutions. Our historiography of Communism, therefore, has always been as much a debate between the domestic Left and Right about Western hopes and fears as it was an inquiry into Soviet and Maoist realities.¹¹ So, for almost a century intelligentsia "political pilgrims" trudged from Lenin and Trotsky to Mao and Ho and on to Castro and Ché.¹² Nazism, on the other hand, has found foreign admirers since 1945 only among such fringe figures as the British historian and Nazi apologist David Irving.

The result of these contrasting circumstances is that we have radically different "databases" for our two cases: the historiography of Nazism is voluminous, rich and varied, whereas the historiography of Communism, though copious (at least for the Soviet case) is fragmentary, thin and defective. In fact, much of it is out-and-out misleading.

This historiography's weakest link is East Asia. Despite the brief popularity of

the "Little Red Book", the Maoist mystique in the West never rivaled that of Lenin and Stalin, and the premier American school of Sinology, that of John K. Fairbank, was, to say the least, lacking in lucidity about the Chinese regime while the Great Helmsman was still in charge. It is no exaggeration to claim that the Western-language historiography of 20th century East Asia (except for defeated Japan) has developed seriously only in the last two decades; and even then the archives of all the East Asian Communist regimes remained closed. Nor was the historical investigation of modern East Asia driven by the quest to measure evil that the Holocaust has provided to the Nazism-Stalinism comparison: Hitler and Auschwitz, or even Stalin and the Gulag, have never been a focus of moral debate in East Asia. These issues, then, are not a universal preoccupation, but only a European or Western one.

So we are returned to our point of departure in the Nazi-Communist confrontation in Europe during the period 1930-45 and its treatment in German and Western Soviet historiography. In both bodies of literature, the first mode of explanation was Marxist, or at least *marx-isant*. In the Russian case, this was for the obvious reason that the Revolution was supposedly "proletarian", and Westerners wanted to find out if this were really true. So émigré Mensheviks, until 1939 in Berlin and Paris and after the war in New York, were prominent in spreading this perspective, powerfully aided by the

¹¹For an academic work treating generic Communism favorably, see William G. Rosenberg & Marilyn B. Young, *Transforming Russia and China: Revolutionary Struggle in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

¹²Paul Hollander, *Political Pilgrims: Western Intellectuals in Search of the Good Society* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998).

Revolution's great loser (who nonetheless remained its prophet), Trotsky, and such of his disciples as Isaac Deutscher. In the German case, émigré Social Democrats or other Leftists, such as Franz Neumann or Arthur Rosenberg, played a similar role in molding Western perceptions, with the result that Nazism, when it was not explained in the Communist manner as the product of "finance capital", was given a social base in "lower middle classes threatened by proletarianization."¹³

After the war, however, the two historiographies diverged, with that of Nazism emerging as by far the more complex and variegated.¹⁴ If this scholarly corpus has a leitmotiv, it may be called *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*; that is, mastering or overcoming the past. In broad outline, this enterprise developed as follows.

After an initial postwar phase of conservative resistance to facing up squarely to that past, in the 1970s a new generation produced a "Hitler Welle", or Hitler wave, an increasingly probing body of literature, as researchers moved from classical prewar Marxism to the para-Marxist Frankfurt School, to Max Weber, to the French Annales School or American structural-functionalism. The first fruit of this methodological mix was a sophisticated elaboration of the totalitarian thesis's emphasis on politics and ideology. This effort in turn, and in conjunction with extensive explorations in social history, fueled a debate over Nazism as the product of a long-term German *Sonderweg*, or special path of development. In due course, the first of these interpretations was challenged for exaggerating the Nazi regime's internal coherence and the second for oversimplifying German historical development.

All these debates, moreover, were stimulated by the Holocaust's growing centrality in the German national consciousness, a problem clearly resistant to ordinary political or social interpretation.

This issue, therefore, engendered still another debate, this time between intentionalists, who emphasized Hitler's racist ideology, and functionalists, who emphasized the regime's institutional dynamics and the unfolding of the war—that is, politics. As was only to be expected, in the late 1980s these developments produced a conservative reaction explaining Nazism as a response to Bolshevism, though in the ensuing *Historikerstreit* (historians' quarrel) these dissenters clearly lost out. Down to the present, therefore, political, ideological and indeed millenarian explanations have been further refined, and the thesis of Nazi singularity has essentially prevailed. The conclusions of this historiography, moreover, are known in general outline to social scientists in other fields. Who among them has not heard of the German *Sonderweg*, the intentionalist-functional debate or the *Historikerstreit*? And if anyone needs a refresher course on these matters there exist whole books that sum them up.¹⁵

By contrast, Soviet Communism has never been integrated into the common historical culture of Western academia. For example, a prominent historian of Nazism, in commenting on a recent book

¹³See Franz Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942); and Arthur Rosenberg, *The History of the German Republic* (London: Methuen, 1936). This tradition is reflected in Seymour Martin Lipset's classic, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1960).

¹⁴Ian Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems & Perspectives of Interpretation* (London: Arnold, 2000).

¹⁵For example, Charles S. Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), and Peter Baldwin, *Reworking the Past: Hitler, the Holocaust, and the Historians' Debate* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981).

venturing some comparisons of Hitler and Stalin, objected that the author “tends to rely more on older scholarship more closely associated with the politicized arguments of the Cold War than on the heavily documented studies by younger scholars of the Soviet Union who have worked extensively in recently opened former Soviet archives.”¹⁶ In other words, this Germanist believes that scholarship on Soviet Russia in recent decades has been non-political, “value-free” and archivally based to the same degree as the scholarship on Nazism.¹⁷ This is decidedly not the case. When comparing Nazism with Communism, Westerners are in fact hobbled by a great disparity in our knowledge of the two cases.

Thus, although most Soviet specialists are literate in what academia’s common historical culture tells us about Nazism, specialists of Nazism have no comparable literacy about the development of Soviet studies. Who among them knows that calling October 1917 a “coup d’état” was long a fighting matter within the profession? Who understands what was at stake in the debate over the “Bukharin alternative” versus the “Cultural Revolution” of 1928–31? Or how many non-specialists are aware that Sovietology’s still dominant explanations of Stalinism were laid down in the 1970s, two decades before Moscow’s archives were opened? In consequence, the comparison of Nazism and Communism has been largely the affair of people who know a great deal about the former but precious little about the latter—if they are not downright misinformed about it.

The Soviet Deficit

CONSEQUENTLY, Soviet historiography must be outlined here more fully than was done for Nazism—all the more so since there exists no handy short course of

Sovietology to which an outsider might turn.¹⁸ A still more crucial difference is conceptual: if the Sovietological corpus has a leitmotiv, it is not overcoming a painful past; it is mining it to divine a future in which the “experiment” would at last turn out right.

Accordingly, postwar Soviet historiography overall developed in the reverse direction from that of Nazism: that is, it moved from the primacy of politics and ideology acting “from above” to the primacy of socioeconomic processes, particularly popular radicalism, acting “from below.” Or, in the field’s shorthand, it moved from the “totalitarian model” to social-history “revisionism.” This shift occurred in part for the professional reason that, beginning in the 1960s, social history predominated in all branches of the discipline. And who can deny the necessity of knowing the social facts in any historical configuration? In the Soviet case, though, this trend was pushed to an extreme by politics. For the Soviet Union was then mellowing while the Western cause was turning sour in Vietnam; so the totalitarian model was denounced as mere Cold War ideology and a gross caricature of Soviet complexities. In its place, social process was enthroned as the basic explanatory principle of Communism. To be sure, “cold warriors” such as Robert Conquest continued to write about

¹⁶Omer Bartov, review of Michael Burleigh’s *The Third Reich*, in *The New Republic*, November 20, 2000.

¹⁷Kershaw recognizes this disparity (p. 35, note 35), but hardly appreciates its depth.

¹⁸To my knowledge, only two brief essays on this subject exist, both in my name: “*L’histoire soviétique*”, in Serge Bernstein and Pierre Milza, eds., *Axes et méthodes de l’histoire politique* (Paris: PUF, 1998), and “Clio and Tauris”, in Anthony Molho and Gordon S. Wood, eds., *Imagined Histories: American Historians Interpret the Past* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

Communist terror, but such concerns came then to be viewed by the mainstream as archaic and superficial.

So revisionism proceeded to discover a Soviet Union that was at the same time social and sociable. As the new narrative ran, the Leninist record, though flawed by Stalin's excesses, was nonetheless an overall achievement and a durable feature of modernity. The Communist system thus must be understood as an alternative form of "modernization", one promising, moreover, a social-democratic fulfillment internally and enduring détente internationally.

The ideological subtext of this picture should be readily apparent. The new narrative, after all, began with the thesis that October 1917 was not a Bolshevik coup d'état, as the "totalitarians" claimed, but a social revolution of workers and peasants; and in 1917 the masses did indeed revolt against the possessing classes.¹⁹ Yet it is equally obvious that they themselves did not come to power; a party of Marxist ideologues did. After such a beginning, it ought not be surprising that revisionism followed October's heirs in real history by developing in two divergent directions. The movement divided into what might be called "soft" and "hard" versions—the cause of the divorce being those troublesome Stalinist excesses.

To the soft revisionists, true Leninism was the semi-market NEP of the 1920s, an allegedly humane path to socialism defended after the Founder's death by Nikolai Bukharin; and in view of this "Bukharin alternative", Stalin's brutal "revolution from above" became an "aberration."²⁰ The hard revisionists, on the other hand, rejected the NEP "retreat" to the market and instead claimed that Stalin's first Five-Year Plan was October's real culmination and Lenin's authentic heritage. This "second October", moreover, allegedly developed from below through a "Cultural Revolution" (1928–31) of work-

ers and party activists. The essence of the Stalin era consequently was the proletariat's massive upward "social mobility"—into the Party *nomenklatura*, that is.²¹ As for the Great Terror of 1936–39, the hard revisionists swept it under the rug with the claim that it was only "a monstrous post-script" to the Revolution, while the number of deaths by execution was modestly placed in the "low hundreds of thousands."²² Another revisionist classic recognized only that "many thousands of innocent victims were arrested, imprisoned and sent to labor camps. Thousands were executed."²³

Even granted that until the opening of the Soviet archives after 1991 our knowledge of the system was incomplete, at no time were these figures anything less than *prima facie* absurd. It is inconceivable that anyone could get away with similarly egregious claims in German history. Yet the hard revisionists at most encountered polite collegial chiding—except from the soft revisionists, who were enraged at their whitewashing of Stalin. The reason for this internecine passion, of course, is that, as the two schools squared off in the 1970s and early

¹⁹Ronald Suny, "Towards a Social History of the October Revolution", *American Historical Review* 88 (1983), p. 31–52.

²⁰Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888–1938* (New York: Knopf, 1973), and Moshe Lewin, *The Political Undercurrents of Soviet Economic Debates: From Bukharin to the Modern Reformers* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

²¹Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928–1931* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).

²²Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution* (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 3, 157.

²³J. Arch Getty, *Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933–1938* (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 8.

1980s, they were really arguing over what to hope for under the next General Secretary: Bukharinite “socialism with a human face”, or a refining of Brezhnev’s existing “authoritarian welfare state” with its “institutional pluralism.” The underlying reason for these ideological contortions was that Stalin was indeed the culmination of the Soviet story and at the same time, in the eyes of his own heirs, a criminal.

It should be transparent to any neutral observer that we are not dealing here with rival emphases in social history but with a sectarian dispute between two species of ideologues: neo-Bukharinists and para-Stalinists. Indeed, Western revisionism overall developed within what was basically a Soviet, or at least a Marxist, perspective. Putting matters this bluntly, however, was until recently impossible in academic discourse, especially in America. Down through the failure of Gorbachev’s *perestroika*, any allusion to these obvious facts was met with protestation from the revisionists that they were not Marxists but merely positivists whose “social science”, unlike that of the Cold War “totalitarians”, was a strictly non-political, “value-free” enterprise. Or they might revert to the countercharge of “McCarthyism.”

But bluntness is presently a therapeutic necessity; for, though the time is long past when the revisionist master narrative was plausible, the time has not arrived when this is adequately reflected in the historiography. Where now are revisionism’s “conquests”? October as a “social revolution” rather than a Party coup d’état? The “Bukharin alternative” of market socialism as true Marxism-Leninism? The “Cultural Revolution” of 1928–32 as the democratic crowning of the Soviet edifice? All are no more than fantasy chapters of an epic culminating in a socialism that turned out to be a mirage. All the same, though revisionism itself

ended along with the Soviet regime, the revisionists themselves are still in place, and the debris of their narrative still frames our historical discourse and furnishes the basis for our comparisons with Nazism.²⁴ Since the parties concerned will not say this, it is necessary to say it in their stead. If they protest their positivist purity, this should carry no more weight than David Irving’s protestations that he is not anti-Semitic or partial to Nazism.

Why, however, did David Irving fail so utterly, while the revisionists’ perspective was so long triumphant? The first reason, of course, is that they wrote before anyone knew how the Communist adventure would turn out. As Croce’s mentor G.W.F. Hegel famously put it, “the owl of Minerva flies only with the falling of the dusk.” So it was only after Communism at last ended up in the disaster column, as Nazism had fifty years earlier, that it became possible to have a “normal”, post-mortem Soviet historiography.

The transformation has begun: in the

²⁴On the level of the general survey see, for example, John M. Thompson, *A Vision Unfulfilled: Russia and the Soviet Union in the Twentieth Century* (Lexington/Toronto: D.C. Heath, 1996); and the section on the 1930s in Gregory L. Freeze, ed., *Russia: A History* (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). On the level of new scholarship, see the Yale University Press series, *Annals of Communism*, the volumes on the 1930s: J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, eds., *The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932–1939* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); William J. Chase, ed., *Enemies within the Gates?: The Comintern and the Stalinist Repression, 1934–1939* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001); and, to a lesser extent, Lewis Siegelbaum and Andrei K. Sokolov, eds., *Stalinism as a Way of Life: A Narrative in Documents* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).

1990s a new generation was actively rethinking the Soviet experience—though as yet no new paradigm has emerged to orient what one commentator has called “a creative disorder.”²⁵ Indeed, given the thirty-year accumulation of revisionist literature, it will take a full generation to dig out “from under the rubble”, to borrow Solzhenitsyn’s phrase about the Soviet legacy itself.²⁶ One thing, however, is already clear: a valid new historiography of the Soviet Union can be built only by reversing revisionism’s explanatory priorities; that is, by treating the Soviet system in the first instance not as a *society*, but as a *regime*.

The reason why Minerva’s owl was so slow to fly in the Russian case (contrary to its performance after the French events that inspired Hegel’s maxim) is that October 1917, unlike 1789, never knew a Thermidor. To be sure, ideological zeal abated after Stalin’s death in 1953, but the structures of Party, Plan, and Police that he and Lenin had between them built remained in place until 1991. The heritage of 1917 therefore ossified into the historically unprecedented phenomenon of an “institutional revolution” (to borrow a label from later Mexican history); and its only Thermidor was its demise. Not until the historiographical consequences have been drawn from such a paradoxical outcome can we hope to have symmetrical “databases” for comparing Nazism and Communism.

The Role of Socialist Ideology

YET EVEN IF this empirical goal is achieved, the comparison between Communism and Nazism will always be clouded by their contrasting ideological auras, and these derive from their relationship to that greatest of modern utopias: socialism. Both movements after all claimed that name, and both pretended to speak with a

single voice for all the “people.” Hence both strove to transcend liberal democracy by submerging the individual in the “collective” or the “communal”, whether a fraternal internationalism or a particularistic *Volksgemeinschaft*. And this aspiration—presciently diagnosed by Elie Halévy—is surely the lowest common denominator of generic totalitarianism. This concept, therefore, is best considered both as a historical benchmark and as an ideal type, not a literal description of either dictatorship’s “monolithic” control of society.

Over and above this bond, however, socialism is relevant to the Nazi-Communist comparison for a still more basic reason: the pervasiveness of its mystique in the moral economy of modern politics. Generic socialism, after all, was the preeminent theoretical project of the 19th century, and its maximal version was the Marxist program of leaping to an egalitarian society through the suppression of private property and the market. This ambition then became the great practical endeavor of the 20th century, whether its adherents settled for the diluted democratic variant of a welfare state or sought complete triumph through a Leninist party-state.

Well, we have just spent a near century finding out that Marxism’s perfect egalitarian society does not exist, and that on the far side of capitalism there is only a Soviet-type regime. Thus the Great Collapse of 1989–91 brought not only

²⁵David Shearer, “From divided consensus to creative disorder: Soviet history in Britain and North America”, *Cahiers du monde russe* (October–December 1998).

²⁶Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *From Under the Rubble* (translated by A.M. Brock) (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975). For an earlier version of the argument given here see Martin Malia, “From Under the Rubble, What?”, *Problems of Communism* (1991).

Communism's fall but that of generic socialism, as well. To be sure, there are still numerous socialist parties and governments in the world, but none proposes to make the world-historical leap out of capitalism. (It is noteworthy, for example, that the anti-globalization surge of 1999–2001 never called itself “socialist.”) Still, this second fact has not yet penetrated the contemporary consciousness; and until it does, the specter of socialism will haunt the Hitler-Stalin debate.

For that specter brings with it all the passion of the Left-Right polarity introduced into history by 1789. In the 19th century this polarity focused on the universal-suffrage republic versus monarchy and aristocracy, and in the 20th it graduated to the antithesis socialism versus capitalism antithesis. Yet, though the 19th-century political republic could be achieved, the 20th-century social republic proved to be a far more elusive goal. Most modern societies have therefore been governed in an alternation of Left-center reformism and Right-center prudence, and so rarely faced the stark choice: *either* capitalism *or* socialism. In the great crises of 1914–45, however, this centrist equilibrium broke down, and both “fascism” and Communism attempted the impossible millenarian leap. Ever since, in the modern political dynamic Communism has functioned as the absolute Left and Nazism as the absolute Right.

This absolutizing of extremes clearly favors the former—and at the expense of the center. In the 19th century the outer limit of the Right had been the Bourbons, and the first principle of progressive politics was “no enemies to the Left.” In the 20th century the outer limit of the Right became Hitler, and the Golden Rule received the ironclad corollary of “no friends to the Right.” In consequence, the thesis that Hitler was incomparably evil places moderate conservatives on permanent warning against all “unsa-

vory” allies to their right, and indeed against their own dark demons. Their comparing Stalin to Hitler only “plays into the hands of the Right”; for is not the real target of the comparison the Social Democratic Left?

It is because of this dynamic that *The Black Book* met with the chilly reception it did—beginning with France's most prestigious newspaper, *Le Monde*. For did it not deflect attention from the far Right racist, Le Pen? And of course, in the light of 20th-century experience, racism must always be denounced and combated. Yet in strict logic, it hardly follows that this means refraining from honest (if belated) recognition of Soviet crime, any more than the scholarly “historicizing” of Nazism entails its moral “trivialization.”

Clearly, such passionate reactions cannot be explained by the economic and institutional differences between “capitalism” and “socialism”; only the moral and philosophical values grounding those differences provide an answer. At this most basic level, what the Left is about is equality and universality, or the fraternal unity of the human species; the Right, on the other hand, is about hierarchy and particularity, or the functional differentiation indispensable to making any society work—and this inevitably means inequality. By extension, moreover, the Right, which in the 19th century defended the Old Regime cause of “altar and throne”, in the democratic 20th century came to defend both capitalism and the various national particularities defining competing societies.²⁷ In American usage, the shorthand contrast for the Left-Right difference is “compassionate” versus “mean-spirited.” (In France, it is the presence ver-

²⁷For a probing analysis, see the Crocean treatment of Norberto Bobbio, *Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction* (translated by Allan Cameron) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996; first published in 1994).

sus the lack of “*générosité*.”) In modern political rhetoric, therefore, it has always been easier to make a vibrant plea for equality and fraternity than for hierarchy, distinction and privilege, or even for individual liberty. So the moral economy of modern politics gives the Left a permanent, built-in advantage.

This fact grounds what is perhaps the most frequently drawn moral distinction between the two regimes: the claim that no matter how criminal Communism became, it was inspired initially by “good intentions” and humanistic universalism (in *Le Monde*’s high style: the contrast is between *la face lumineuse* of Communism and its *face ténébreuse*). Nazism, on the other hand, was never motivated by anything but national egotism, racism, and conquest. (Of course, it is these associations that explain the already-noted double standard for judging crimes that are in effect comparable.) Thus such a strong anti-communist as Raymond Aron had at one time advanced what is now a standard argument: Nazism must be judged worse than Communism since it practiced extermination as an end in itself while the latter did so as a means to some other political or economic end.²⁸

This popular Western distinction, however, may be contrasted with the opinion of such East Europeans as Vasilii Grossman, Aleksander Wat, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, all of whom had direct experience of both Nazism and Communism and all of whom held the two to be comparably criminal.²⁹ The crux of their judgment is that Communist mass murder remains mass murder whatever its ideological inspiration; indeed, they suggest that crimes against humanity committed in the name of humanity are in a sense more perverse than the blatant criminality of Nazism. This view arises from the insidious nature of the Soviet “Lie.” A colloquial Soviet term for “the system” made famous by Solzhenitsyn, the Lie denotes the fatal

contradiction of a universalism driven, not by charity, fellow feeling or natural Reason, but by the ideological principle of “class war”, or more exactly pseudo-class war. And of course, the Soviet “building of socialism” was not a genuine social contest but a political struggle in which the redeemer class (that is, its ideological substitute, the party) was destined to eliminate all exploiting classes (namely, anyone resisting party policies). So, as Solzhenitsyn put it, “in the twentieth century ideology made possible evil on a scale of millions.”³⁰

THESE TWO antithetical moral judgments point to a moral of their own: that our efforts to frame value distinctions between Nazism and Communism will continue to seesaw back and forth with the contrasting magnetisms of the Right-Left polarity. Nor will this cease to be true even as the historiographies of the two movements approach each other in empirical grounding and analytical sophistication.

Nevertheless, achieving that rapprochement remains the precondition for

²⁸Aron expressed this view in *Democracy and Totalitarianism* (Ann Arbor: Michigan Press, 1968). Tzvetan Todorov, in *Mémoire du mal, tentation du bien* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2000), pp. 44–7, criticized that book as conceding too much to Communism. In fact, in his last work—*Mémoires* (1983)—Aron himself said that such an abstract formulation of Communist intentions is useless.

²⁹See Vasilii Semenovitch Grossman, *Life and Fate: A Novel* (translated by Robert Chandler) (New York: Harper & Row, 1986); Aleksander Wat, *My Century: The Odyssey of a Polish Intellectual* (translated and edited by Richard Lourie) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago* (translated by Thomas P. Whitney) (New York: Harper and Row, 1973–74).

³⁰Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago*, vol. 1, p. 174.

all serious comparison. And for this, the first priority is to overcome the pitiful lag a half-century has put between the historiographies of Stalinism and Nazism. Consider the distance the latter has traveled. No one talks any longer about “finance capital” or “proletarianized lower middle classes” as basic causes of Nazism. Instead, among our most recent authorities, Ian Kershaw highlights Hitler’s “charismatic” *Führerprinzip* and Michael Burleigh the “political religion” of Aryan

racial supremacy. Nor is anyone allowed to be value-free; rather, moral judgment is *de rigueur* and crime is called by its proper name. Rightly so, for moral judgments are indeed intrinsic to all historical understanding.

So how to narrow the discursive gap? A solution might well be for historians of the Soviet phenomenon to read each other less and their Germanist colleagues more. This, in turn, might give the latter a worthy incentive to help close the literacy gap on their eastern flank. □

Genocide and Terror Compared

In Nazi circles during the early 1940s there was much frowning talk of the need to streamline the killings, to make them more “*elegant*”; the supposed concern was for the mental health of the executioners. . . . In the USSR there seems to have been little anxiety about the moral and psychological wounds sustained by the Chekists. “Find tougher people” was all that Lenin had to say on the question. And Stalin, selecting downward, as always, evidently *wanted* his men to be finished, morally finished; it bound them to him, and, more than that, it confirmed his unspoken assessment of human nature. He knew that human beings, given certain conditions, can in fact kill all day, and all year. Is there a clear moral difference between the railtracks and smokestacks of Poland, on the one hand, and, on the other, the huge and unnatural silence that slowly settled on the villages of the Ukraine in 1933? The Holocaust is “the only example which history offers to date of a deliberate policy aimed at the total physical destruction of every member of an ethnic group”, write Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin in *Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison*—whereas, under Stalin, “no ethnic group was singled out for total annihilation.” The distinction thus resides in the word “total”, because Lenin pursued genocidal policies (de-Cossackization) and so of course did Stalin. Indeed, most historians agree that if Stalin had lived a year longer his anti-Semitic pogrom would have led to a second catastrophe for Jewry in the mid-1950s. The distinction may be that Nazi terror strove for precision, while Stalinist terror was deliberately random. Everyone was terrorized, all the way up: everyone except Stalin.

—Martin Amis,
Koba the Dread: Laughter and the Twenty Million
(Talk Miramax, 2002), pp. 84–5.

Fate and Freedom in History

The Two Worlds of Eric Foner

—John Patrick Diggins—

Ideals, conventions, even truth itself, are continually changing things so that the milk of one generation may be the poison of the next. . . . When a generation succeeds . . . in handing down all of its discoveries and none of its delusions, its children shall inherit the earth.

F. Scott Fitzgerald, 1924

Give a professor a false thesis in early life, and he will teach it till he dies. He has no way of correcting it.

John Jay Chapman, 1900

CAN THE “milk” of one generation become the “poison” of the next? Only if it goes stale and asks to be drunk as fresh. The generation of the Sixties started out with its “discoveries” about the tragedy of the Vietnam War and the deficiencies of America in general. From that dramatic moment, when ideals clashed hard against reality, the generation proceeded to its analysis of the causes of things, and as the Sixties New Left evolved into the Academic Left, it began to hand down to a subsequent generation its delusions about the meaning of America and the

nature of history, delusions for which there seems to be no means of correction.

We can divide post-World War II American historical scholarship into two categories: pre-Sixties and post-Sixties. An essentially liberal anti-communist outlook that characterized the field for two decades from the late 1940s through the late 1960s was superseded by a post-Sixties revisionism that subjected America to scrutiny while turning to a stance of anti-anti-communism. The Vietnam fiasco gave us that, and it is not hard to see why the older view came under stress and strain. What is hard to understand is why the post-Sixties anti-anti-communist outlook in the academy has itself not been affected by the end of the Cold War, and particularly by the *way* it ended. The post-Sixties school remains dominant now in its fourth decade, and there are scant signs of a subsequent school of thought arising to replace its take on things political and cultural. No doubt a future generation will impose its own delusions onto history, but for now, the staying power of the post-Sixties school defies both Charles Darwin and Andy Warhol: Its thinking seems helpless to adapt to change, and it refuses to relinquish its 15 minutes of fame.

A common impression, however, would have us believe the opposite: that the conservative 1950s complacently rested its case on a consensus that resisted

John Patrick Diggins is professor of history at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, and author of a forthcoming book on Eugene O'Neill entitled *Desire Under Democracy*.

change, while the radical 1960s uncovered the deeper reality of conflict and demanded profound changes everywhere in American life. But if the 1950s stood for the status quo, why did that generation prove incapable of sustaining it in the academy? Conversely, if the 1960s generation stood for change, why does our present academic Left resist all change in its own views and hold to interpretations of history that history itself has left behind?

There is an embarrassing disparity between the political character of America and the activist historians who interpret it. On the one hand, every opinion poll indicates that Americans hold values that are conservative on economic issues and somewhat liberal on cultural matters, and that poor people believe in the American dream far more than the intellectuals who deride it. On the other hand, many historians, especially labor and social historians, remain convinced that the poor have a higher consciousness by virtue of their sufferings, and that history “from the bottom up” will challenge capitalism and deliver us to one or another form of progressive socialism. Such thinking, as Oscar Wilde once noted, confuses Marx with Jesus: “There is only one class in the community that thinks more about money than the rich, and that is the poor. The poor can think of nothing else. That is the misery of being poor.”

The persistence of the post-Sixties school of historiography in misinterpreting America is unique in the annals of American intellectual history. When previous generations of radicals—the Lyrical Left of New York’s Greenwich Village in the pre-World War I years, the Old Left of the depression years—saw that history had failed to fulfill their expectations, most members reconsidered their misplaced hopes for a better world and sought new interpretations of

America’s consensual social order. In the postwar era, that effort started as early as 1950 with Lionel Trilling’s *The Liberal Imagination*. Trilling advised scholars to reconsider the mantra of social realism. It concluded in 1960 with Daniel Bell’s *The End of Ideology*, which demonstrated why Marxism must make room for Weber and Tocqueville. But the post-Sixties academic perspective identifies truth with tenacity and mistakes reiteration for reflection. When history failed to conform to its dreams, many of its members went on to graduate school and became, among other things, professors of history. Within a decade the generation of Sixties radicals progressed from political error to professorial tenure.

The most impassioned defense of post-Sixties historical scholarship is Lawrence Levine’s *The Opening of the American Mind: Canons, Culture, and History*, published in 1997. Past president of the Organization of American Historians and winner of a MacArthur Prize, Levine responds to growing criticism of multiculturalism in higher education by listing the ways in which campuses are now more receptive to their increasingly complex ethnic and minority population. An obvious retort to Allan Bloom’s *The Closing of the American Mind*, Levine argues that all of American historiography is a study in generational revisionism, and that historians should not imagine that there was ever some mythical age in which the problem of change did not exist. Fair enough. But the irony is that Levine does not apply this insight to the post-Sixties school he seeks to defend. We have been waiting now for close to a half century for the post-Sixties professoriate to express the “opening of the American mind” by opening itself to new interpretations, and to revise its own heralded revisions. We wait in vain.

One thinks (yet again) of Isaiah Berlin's hedgehog and fox. As we know, the "hedgehog" is the monist who sees only one big thing and relates everything else to it, whereas the "fox" is the pluralist who pursues different ends and entertains a variety of thoughts without concern for philosophical foundations. The hedgehog presumes to understand both the movement and the meaning of history, but is often untutored in or unconcerned about practical matters. The fox confesses perplexity in the face of history's inscrutable ways, but accepts the responsibility of coping with events. In American terms, hedgehogs tend to be ideologues, foxes pragmatists. At the height of the Cold War, European intellectuals were presumed to be ideological and American intellectuals pragmatic. Today it often seems the other way around, at least in certain sections of historiography. Consider in that light the careers of François Furet and Eric Foner.

French Fox, American Hedgehog

FURET HAD been a member of the French Communist Party from 1948 to 1956, when he broke away in protest of the Soviet invasion of Hungary. In his career as a historian, he came to realize that his attraction to communism flowed from his personal need for protective illusions. "A great deal of intelligence", he quotes Saul Bellow's epigram, "can be invested in ignorance when the need for illusions is deep." No one had to tell Furet that the personal is the political: "The question I am trying to understand today is therefore inseparable from my own existence."¹

Furet became a leading authority on the French Revolution and, hard into its details like a fox, could not help but illuminate its practical lessons for contemporary scholars and intellectuals. In *Penser*

la Revolution française and elsewhere, he observed French radicals operating under the perilous illusion that they spoke for and represented the will of the people—the very thing John Adams keyed upon in his critique of Rousseau's idea of the "general will." When the Revolution turned toward terror in the 1790s, the competition for control of committees became vital, and those who could manipulate discourse and dominate language, like Robespierre, rose to the top. The Jacobin faction succeeded temporarily not because it was democratic but because it was linguistically adept, and hence sought "to radicalize the Revolution by making it consistent with its discourse."²

Furet's description of France almost succumbing to the most persuasive and devious writers and orators bodes ill for countries willing to trust their future to frustrated intellectuals, particularly those with a will to political correctness. In France the Jacobins fell; in Russia, however, they triumphed, and Furet's *The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century*, offers a comprehensive study of the course of the Bolshevik Revolution in different epochs, and of the illusions held by intellectuals in various countries in each of those epochs.

Few Europeans, Furet notes, had any real idea of what was going on in Russia; there was no equivalent, for example, of New York's *Partisan Review*. After World War II, French communists could barely

¹François Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (translated by Deborah Furet) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 117.

²François Furet, *Penser la Revolution française* (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), pp. 133–208, 257–316; see also Donald Sutherland, "An Assessment of the Writings of François Furet", *French Historical Studies* (Fall 1990).

stand the thought that their country had been liberated by America, Furet notes, as he describes how the French Left depicted the hopelessly “bourgeois” United States carrying the seeds of “fascism” and “totalitarianism.” All along, the Bolsheviks disdained everything the United States stood for, although such views had to be played down during the period of the Popular Front and the U.S.-Soviet alliance of World War II. Later, however, after he broke with communism, Furet came to see the United States as a “role model”, a country whose religion nourished capitalism and liberal individualism. He became an admirer of Tocqueville, the first Frenchman to see America’s promise and the vision of the future it could offer. In his last few years (he died in 1997), Furet had become something of a cultural hero on French television. Adults of his generation, as well as young students and academics, were shocked to find that they had been misled by their elders about Russia, particularly by writers like Jean-Paul Sartre, who denied the terrors of Stalinism and the existence of slave labor camps. Furet helped them see that what they had been taught about Russia was worse than an illusion; it was a lie.³

WITH ERIC FONER we are in a different world entirely. Like Furet, Foner came of political age under the influence of communism, although for him it was more a family than a party affair, with

Foner’s father and uncle imbuing him with Marxism and the mystique of class struggle. But unlike Furet, Foner saw, and continues to see, no reason why events in the Soviet Union should cause one to reconsider communism as an ideological system, or why anyone could possibly consider America a positive “role model.” In 1990, shortly after communist regimes had collapsed throughout Eastern Europe, Foner



University of Chicago News Office

François Furet

returned from teaching in Russia anxious to explain to Americans how the Russian people were being misled into thinking that life under Lenin and Stalin may not have been the best, or even the only, of all possible worlds. He also strove to explain why Russian students and scholars misunderstood American history and society:

I delivered a talk at the Institute of World History on blacks and the American Constitution. I discussed how the Founding Fathers had written protections for slavery, such as the obligation to

return fugitives, into the document; how even free blacks had enjoyed few legal rights before the Civil War; and how it had taken almost a century for the promise of emancipation and Reconstruction to begin to be fulfilled.

Nothing I said would have seemed particularly controversial to American historians. But my talk was not, shall we say, greeted with enthusiasm. Listeners praised my research but seemed puzzled by my ‘oppositional’ stance. One historian commented that although he did not agree with my interpretation, it was good for Soviet scholars to hear such views—as if my ‘take’ on the subject were hopelessly eccentric. Another remarked that my rather

³See Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion*, pp. 440–514.

bleak account of the economic condition of black America in the 1980s seemed at odds with the current Soviet interpretation of the Reagan years, which sees the lot of all Americans, including blacks, as having improved markedly.⁴

So the American historian wonders why Russians are not sufficiently appreciative of having lived under communism, and the Russians wonder why the American historian cannot appreciate a country that affords him and other “eccentrics” the freedom to speak and write as they wish.

Foner wonders why his Russian “students shared the current obsession with locating missed opportunities and roads not taken in the Soviet past.” Where Furet saw the tragic consequences of the Bolshevik Revolution, Foner could think of no reason for Russians to reconsider their history at all. He wondered why the Russian “press and public officials now paint the history of the Soviet era in the blackest hues” and he lamented the loss of Marxism as an interpretive paradigm. An analysis that assumes history is “evolving in a predetermined direction, that capitalism is declining and socialism on the rise, that class struggle is the motive force of historical change”—these useful perspectives, he complains, have been replaced by a new “study of the role of ‘great men’ in historical change”, with “civilization” the new focus instead of class formation. Instead of economics, historians now pay “far greater attention to culture, religion, and other noneconomic aspects of historical development.”

Foner’s complaint grows more bitter the closer Russia comes to emulating America. The “concept of ‘revolution’ is being rethought—turned on its head, really.” The new view is that “revolutions (like the French and the Russian) that attempt to abolish the existing order entirely should be deemed less radical than ‘organic revolution’ (like the American) which build on existing institutions rather than destroying them” and thereby respect property and “create more favorable conditions for economic growth.” At the same time, the “traditional Marxist distinction between ‘bourgeois’ and ‘socialist’ ideologies has given way to a search for ‘universal human values.’” In this account, the great tragedy of Russian history was not the prison of Bolshevik tyranny but the promise of American democracy.



Joseph Piniere

Eric Foner

“This love affair with America can lead to some remarkable conclusions”, writes Foner, noting a post-Soviet Russian view he regards as preposterous: “Since a socialist society is one that fully embodies ‘universal values’, one scholar has proposed, the United States is actually more socialist than the Soviet Union.” At the very cusp of the Soviet collapse, Foner found it a pity that so many Russians looked upon America with curiosity and even envy. Once upon a time, he waxed nostalgically, Stalinist Russia had played up “America’s

⁴Eric Foner, “Restructuring Yesterday’s News: The Russians Write a New History”, *Harper’s* (December 1990).

ills: poverty, homelessness, racism, unemployment. Today, criticism is out of the question. America has become the land of liberty and prosperity of our imagination.”⁵

THE VIEWS of Eric Foner require our attention because of the eminence and influence of a mind that cannot rethink what it had been taught. Foner has had the distinction of serving as president of the Organization of American Historians and the American Historical Association, presiding as the Harmsworth Professor at Oxford University, and of holding the Dewitt Clinton Chair of History at Columbia University. All the while he has prided himself in being associated with such publications as the short-lived *Marxist Perspectives* and the long-lived *Radical History Review*. Foner’s views parallel quite nicely those of the first version of the National History Standards (NHS) released in the early 1990s. Here, too, one encounters historical writing without any reference to what actually went on in Russia under Lenin and Stalin: nothing about the police terror, party purges, or the loss of more than 10 million lives in the forced collectivization policies of the Five Year Plans and in the avoidable Ukrainian famine. The original NHS draft emphasized class and social conflict, ridiculed the idea that “great men” shaped history, oozed with implicit anti-Americanism and explicit anti-capitalism, and scorned “organic” revolution for its conservative continuity with political and social traditions.⁶

Ever vigilant, for decades Foner has attacked any historian who unearthed evidence critical of the Rosenbergs, Alger Hiss and Paul Robeson. Robeson was a brilliant actor and singer and by no means either a spy or a card-carrying communist. But he was a tragic figure (a

cultural hero to me, whatever his misguided politics) so taken in by Stalin’s Russia that he assumed American blacks could identify with the Russian masses because former slaves felt a common bond with peasants. For pointing out, in a review of a biography of Robeson, that the actor was hailing peasant culture at the very time Stalin was killing it with collectivization, I was denounced in *The Village Voice* as a “McCarthyite” by Eric Foner. (McCarthyism was the best thing that ever happened to American communism. It provided a ready-made therapy of denial, saving the denier from the sobering shock of skepticism. “By exposing the absurdities of other systems”, wrote David Hume, “every voter of every superstition could give sufficient reason for his blind and bigoted attachments to the principles in which he had been educated.” With Joseph McCarthy ranting and raving, the mind of the pro-communist Left remained as closed as a lock without a key.)

But if the reality of the old Soviet Union could not be faced for fear of acknowledging a doctrinaire theory that failed, the reality of the United States cannot be faced for fear of acknowledging an “experiment” in the “new science of politics” that succeeded. Why does Foner claim that American liberty and prosperity are not real but part of “our imagination”? His answer is telling:

Writing in *Moscow News*, one [Russian] historian declared that since Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence, Americans have valued ‘freedom of the individual over

⁵Foner, “Restructuring Yesterday’s News.”

⁶John Patrick Diggins, “The National History Standards”, *The American Scholar* (Autumn 1996); Walter McDougall, “What Johnny Still Won’t Know About History”, *Commentary* (July 1996) and “Whose History? Whose Standards?”, *Commentary* (May 1995).

everything else’—a statement that certainly would have surprised Jefferson’s hundred slaves, to say nothing of the millions freed only by the Civil War.

Liberal America, it seems, must remain forever corrupted by slavery while Bolshevik Russia remains, even in the historical past tense, forever free of tyranny. Foner as hedgehog is both an unabashed apologist for the Soviet system and an unforgiving historian of America. Foner applies to the plight of African-Americans in the United States an analysis he refuses to apply to the plight of Russians and others in the USSR. In both countries workers were subjected to conditions of forced labor. But while those conditions are made manifestly clear in regard to the plantation South in both the Antebellum and Reconstruction eras, they disappear when post-Sixties historians write about Soviet Russia.

America’s “Unfinished Revolution”

FONER’S prize-winning 1988 book, *Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877*, is a magisterial narrative of the precarious status of African-Americans in a period of history that could have been a turning point, if history had only turned in the right direction. A political ideal appears most tragically in history when it is struggling to be born and suffers an early death. Foner offers a moving account of what should have happened but did not. The failure of America to allow an entire race to make the full transition from slavery to freedom meant that the “house divided” still stood. In *Reconstruction* Foner emphasizes repeatedly that freed blacks “failed to achieve economic independence” even with the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863, and, after the end of the Civil War and the onset of Reconstruction, the political

restoration of old southern ruling elites “forced them to return to plantation labor.”⁷

Foner describes with passion how African-Americans hungered for their own plots of land and for the animals and tools with which they could work the earth in the new spirit of freedom, but he seems entirely insouciant when it comes to such issues in Russia. The Soviet Union pioneered, as Max Nomad put it, “a new form of slavery for the working class” and, one might add, an old form of tyranny for the masses, who were denied political rights by the Bolsheviks just as they had been denied the citizen’s right to participate in government by the czars.⁸ Foner describes the “violence” and “terror” from which African-Americans suffered in Reconstruction America, but such policies go unmentioned in his accounts of Soviet Russia. If Reconstruction was an “unfinished revolution” because it denied blacks economic opportunities and political freedoms, can the Bolshevik Revolution ever have been described in a positive light when it denied the Russian people the same thing?

The stench of double standards often makes us think with our nostrils. In a 1997 *New York Times* op-ed, Foner called for nothing less than a rewriting of American history to demonstrate that there are things in the South more honorable than the Confederate flag. Specifically, he advocated histories of slave uprisings and of the 200,000 African-Americans, mainly freed slaves, who fought in the Union Army during the Civil War.⁹ More recent-

⁷Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877* (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), pp. xiii, 602.

⁸Max Nomad, *Aspects of Revolt: A Study in Revolutionary Theories and Techniques* (New York: Noonday, 1959).

⁹Eric Foner, “The South’s Hidden Heritage”, *New York Times*, February 22, 1997.

ly, Foner has become an enthusiastic advocate of reparations for blacks whose ancestors suffered slavery. This advice, however—some of which bears merit, no doubt—comes from the same historian who earlier wondered why Russians would wish to know the untold story of those who fought in their own Civil War of 1918–20. Apparently, in Russia those who won, won; to quarrel with that inevitability is absurd. The enslaved, but not the defeated, may argue with the course of events. For Foner, the world of historical experience falls into two spheres: in America, the contingent struggle for freedom; in Russia, a satisfaction with determinism. In the first case history is *made* or should be made to happen; in the second it simply is, with no revenge or reparations possible or necessary.

Historians on the Left tend to assume that the existence of slavery and the residues of racism contradict the idea of America as a country animated by Lockean liberalism. Thus, according to Foner, a “search for ‘universal human values’” represents “another Gorbachev by-word, which seems oddly ahistorical, since it denies the significance of time and place in establishing moral standards.” By relativizing moral standards, as did John C. Calhoun, one can defend slavery and Stalinism alike. What makes a value universal is that it transcends all particulars of time and place, and it was “universal human ideals” that came to be incorporated in the amendments to the Constitution as a result of the Civil War, amendments which, had they not been betrayed, would have granted black Americans citizenship and entitled them to all its rights, privileges and immunities. But Foner himself is the one who is “oddly ahistorical”, a historian who assumes there can be freedom without opposition, liberty without property, justice without rights, revolution without representation.

“The Crimes of Communism”

THE POST-SIXTIES professoriate in history has not gone entirely unchallenged, especially since the end of the Cold War. But the challenge is posed not so much within the core institutions of academe, but on its “public intellectual” fringes. In the summer of 1994, *Dissent* published Eugene Genovese’s provocative article, “The Crimes of Communism: What Did You Know and When Did You Know It?” The ironies were rich, for *Dissent* was first published by Irving Howe and Michael Harrington, whose political legacies reached back to *The New Internationalist*—a Trotskyist journal of the late 1930s and 1940s. The New York Trotskyists, who included the cerebral James Burnham and the legendary Max Shachtman, knew about the crimes of Stalin half a century before Genovese, a former communist, saw the light.

Foner’s response to Genovese’s interrogating query is revealing. Foner insisted that a “balanced reassessment” of the history of communism will show that the “silence in the face of unspeakable crimes” came from an understanding of the “communists’ contribution to some of the country’s most important struggles for social betterment.” To Foner, Stalinism is not and never was the problem; the greater danger is the anti-Stalinist, particularly one who, like Genovese, has reconverted to Catholicism:

The political stance with which Genovese proposes to replace socialism is not presented in anything resembling a coherent manner, but it can be inferred from his random remarks. Human nature is immutable, hierarchy inevitable, equality impossible, the desire for personal autonomy pernicious, socialism equivalent to tyranny, religion the foundation of morality (somehow, religious believers are not held culpable for the Inquisition or the

millions killed in wars of religious intolerance). Although Genovese, for reasons difficult to understand from his article, refers to himself as part of the left, his current outlook has far more in common with a long tradition of elitist antiliberalism, including Tory romanticism and Old South criticism of capitalism in the nineteenth century, and with various expressions of right-wing ideology in the twentieth. The principles he enumerates offer no guidance whatever to those desiring to rethink the history of socialism while retaining a commitment to social change. Had they prevailed throughout American history, there would have been no antislavery movement, no feminism, labor movement, or civil rights struggle.¹⁰

Think again. If abolitionism, the cause of American labor, feminism and the civil rights movement had to wait for socialism before making their respective moves in the course of American history, they would still be waiting for Lefty to come through the door. Whatever success these causes have had in America is due to the Constitution and to a flexible rights-based political culture ultimately working within that Constitution. It is due to procedural liberalism, not social radicalism; to the New Deal and not the "New Man." It is due, as well—and this fact goes far too often unappreciated—to a productive economy that puts successive strivings for economic justice within reach, if not realization. It is also absurd to claim, as did some respondents to the *Dissent* symposium, that the American Communist Party was always in the forefront of causes such as racial equality and feminism. Ever since the 1930s, the CP made sure the class question always came before the race question; as to modern women, they finally made their move by breaking with the "chauvinistic" Students for a Democratic Society—in the early 1970s.

Foner also mischaracterized Genovese. His "elitist antiliberalism" is not of recent

vintage but was much in presence when he was a full-blooded communist. I once dined with Gene and his wife Betsy at Stanford in the late 1960s. I was feebly trying to express sympathy toward the counterculture rocking loudly nearby on the streets of San Francisco, expressing a view that the hippies and "flower children" were something new under the sun, when suddenly there came a mailed fist upon the table and a deep voice growled: "Stalin would have known what to do with these types!"

The truth is that radical pro-communists and conservative anti-communists share a common scorn for liberalism. In his 1999 book, *The Story of American Freedom*, and in his AHA presidential address, "American Freedom in a Global Age", Foner is not so much scornful as reticent, or perhaps reluctant, to equate freedom with liberalism.¹¹ He is certainly hesitant to give up his life-long delusions about communism, or to acknowledge that in an established liberal political culture such as America enjoys, radicalism must rethink its premises. Thus he implies that the Cold War was due to the threat Soviet Russia posed to America's political culture: "Whatever Moscow stood for was by definition the opposite of freedom—and not merely one-party rule, suppression of free expression, and the like, but public housing, universal health insurance, full employment and other claims that required strong and persistent government intervention in the economy." The Cold War, he said, resulted from "McCarthyism at home", which "propelled liberal thinkers toward a wholesale repudiation of mass politics. In its place emerged a pragmatic, managerial liberalism meant to protect democratic institutions against the excesses of the

¹⁰"Reply", *Dissent* (Summer 1994).

¹¹New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999; *American Historical Review* (February 2001), respectively.

popular will.” That the Soviet Union threatened the United States because it represented the American “popular will” and enjoyed a full welfare state, and “not merely” because of its denial of freedom, is a belief that can only be held in the American academy—certainly not anywhere in Russia or eastern Europe.

“The Exclusionary Dimensions of American Freedom”?

FREEDOM IS a curious subject for an historian more comfortable writing about slavery. “American freedom”, Foner declares in *The Story of American Freedom*, “was born in revolution.” Surely this is a stretch. The Declaration of Independence did not claim to give birth to freedom; rather, its author protested that the pre-existing freedoms and rights of the colonists had been abused by the mother country. And such “natural rights”, the Founders believed, endowed to the human species prior to political organizations, had been carried over from England, where freedom itself was not so much a result of radical rebellion as the slow growth of institutions. But Thomas Paine, a hero of Foner’s and the subject of one of his books, rushed off to Paris with the storming of the Bastille, hailing both the American and the French revolutions as radically innovative and transformative.

But no modern non-“organic” revolution has resulted in freedom, which is more a matter of evolution, or more exactly, social devolution from the top down. First the nobility challenges the crown and then the ascendent bourgeoisie challenges the aristocracy and later the working class confronts the bourgeoisie, with power moving from monarchy to oligarchy to democracy. (“Ours”, John Adams reminded the *Francophiles*, “was a revolution against innovation.”) But Foner’s ringing sentence about America’s

being born in revolution echoes the sentiments of the National History Standards, where students are asked to “compare” America’s Revolution with those that took place in the 20th century in Russia, Cuba, China and Vietnam. One would think American students need to be asked another question: Can there be a true revolution without a civil war or counter-revolution? And if America had neither, what happened between 1776 and 1787 that made a revolution unique in not devouring its own children?

In *Who Owns History?*, Foner’s most recent book, that question goes unanswered.¹² The longest essay deals with the age-old question: “Why Is There No Socialism in America?” The flip-side of the question could be: “Why was there no freedom in the Soviet Union?” Had Foner dealt with Weber, Tocqueville, and Marx himself, he might begin to work out an answer to both questions. But he spends all his effort discussing the work of fellow historians who also shy away from listening to what the master thinkers had to say. While Marx warned that Russia could not make the transition to socialism before going through the liberal capitalist stage of development, he recognized that America had moved through that stage and that the question then was whether there would be a stage beyond it. Tocqueville observed that America was “born” free and especially equal, having skipped feudalism, and, in a country where commerce arises with democracy, the value of freedom is established in a “*consensus universalis*”, a point that Marx and Engels confirmed when they said of Americans: “the bourgeois conditions look like a *beau ideal* to them.” What the post-Sixties radical scholars cannot face is that there is no “stage” beyond an America in which liberal democracy has been firmly established.

¹²New York: Hill & Wang, 2002.

Unwilling to accept the wisdom of Marx or Tocqueville, Foner cites the work of newer scholars showing past workers, feminists and various ethnic groups supposedly challenging the liberal consensus by protesting against it. But do they challenge it to overturn it or to become part of it? After all, consider not what the Sixties-era students said but what they did. After denouncing the university as a monstrous bureaucratic "system without a face"—indeed, after shouting with Mario Savio that they would "put their bodies against the machine and make the machine stop until we're free"—the Sixties generation got their Ph.D.s and meekly entered into the university without so much as a blush, becoming the very tenured professors they once abominated.

Foner is interested in freedom less as the philosophical riddle of liberalism than as the political program of radicalism, and thus he protests that the idea of freedom "has been largely appropriated by libertarians and conservatives of one kind or another, from advocates of unimpeded market economics to armed militia groups, insisting that the right to bear arms is the centerpiece of American liberty." The more legitimate idea of freedom, he argues, would have students join with African-Americans to march for civil rights, or going into the factories to support the ranks of labor, or taking a stand on women's rights and gender equality. Foner rightly emphasizes America's failure to live up to its egalitarian ideals and the struggles of those trying to realize such ideals. But he is struck by the thought that as America expanded and developed, it engaged in what he calls "the exclusionary dimensions of American freedom." Wrongly put. Since freedom enjoyed in a democracy is by definition inclusionary, freedom itself cannot engage in acts of exclusion. The story of American freedom is also the story of American power, and power seldom

moves with democracy but more often against it. Democracy seeks to expand, absorb, encompass, and, above all, include; power aims to restrict, confine, limit, and, above all, exclude. Freedom and power may be antithetical but they are also inseparable. For example, one faction's freedom to undertake an action curbs another faction's freedom to oppose it. Why, then, does the historian not see the dialectic of freedom and power?

The answer is that the academic Left prefers to use the language of democracy and freedom to avoid looking at what is really going on in the culture wars today. The phenomenon of multiculturalism that Foner and Levine celebrate has little to do with freedom in the proper sense of the term, but much to do with power and those who seek it without mentioning it by name. On the university campus, various minority programs and affirmative action mandates are nothing less than exercises in power that include some groups at the expense of others. That the post-Sixties generation of scholars continues to hire only its own ideological kind is another expression of academic power that has witnessed the establishment of social history and other radical fields and the falling off of traditional political, diplomatic and intellectual history.

Professor Foner himself, I happily hasten to add, has been willing to hire and support teachers of differing ideological loyalties, and in his remarkable academic career he has been more professional than political, a gentleman scholar rather than an academic apparatchik. My critique concerns only the claim, made by Lawrence Levine and others, that the post-Sixties generation is more open to new ideas and has a better capacity for change than any prior generation of American historians, and the opposite claim, made by Foner, that progressive political causes have depended upon the maintenance of an unchanging radicalism.

In addition, there remains an unchanging and predictable complaint: In dealing with American history, slavery is Foner's only trump card. Without it, he's a fish out of water. Yet if America has yet to resolve the race question, presumably the Soviet Union had solved the class problem, and thus the American historian returns from Moscow completely bewildered by a people who, instead of accepting their fate, would give up despotic communism for Western liberalism. The denials to freedom trouble the historian of American historiography who would have us feel guilt in the country's having betrayed the ideals of the Declaration of Independence. But of the democratic ideals of Karl Marx, which Sidney Hook went to his grave believing in, the historian remains coldly

indifferent. Thus he is seemingly oblivious to the disappearance of freedom's possibility in early 20th-century Russian history after the Constituent Assembly had been crushed by the Bolsheviks directed by Lenin, the Kronstadt uprising massacred at the orders of Trotsky, and the intelligentsia liquidated in the Moscow show trials arranged by Stalin. Foner sees the "silence" surrounding such crimes as explainable, and thus justifiable, by communism's "contribution" to humanity. Is this hopelessly stale reasoning the acclaimed "opening of the American mind" on the part of a generation that relishes change? Or is it the reflex of an historian identifying himself as a radical revisionist who cannot, when it comes to his own undying delusions, revise? □

Minds Wide Shut

Men's thoughts, are much according to their inclination; their discourse and speeches, according to their learning and infused opinions; but their deeds, are after as they have been accustomed. . . .

Therefore, since custom is the principal magistrate of man's life, let men by all means endeavor, to obtain good customs. Certainly custom is most perfect, when it beginneth in young years: this we call education; which is, in effect, but an early custom. So we see, in languages, the tongue is more pliant to all expressions and sounds, the joints are more supple, to all feats of activity and motions, in youth than afterwards. For it is true, that late learners cannot so well take the ply; except it be in some minds, that have not suffered themselves to fix, but have kept themselves open, and prepared to receive continual amendment, which is exceeding rare.

—Francis Bacon,
"Of Custom and Education" (1611)

Reforging the Atlantic Alliance

Philip H. Gordon

LESS THAN 24 hours after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, America's allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came together to invoke the Alliance's Article 5 defense guarantee—this “attack on one” was considered an “attack on all.” When it came time to implement that guarantee, however—in the form of the military campaign in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom—NATO was not used. The Americans decided not to ask for a NATO operation for military, political and strategic reasons: only the United States had the right sort of equipment to project military force half way around the world, and Washington did not want political interference from 18 allies in the campaign.

In the wake of these developments—and steadily mounting disagreement and even rancor about a long list of political and strategic issues—some observers have begun to question whether NATO has any enduring role at all. Charles Krauthammer bluntly asserts that “NATO is dead”; it may still have a marginal role to play as an incubator for Russia's integration into Europe and the West, but as a military alliance it is a “hollow shell.”¹ Jeffrey

Gedmin, director of the Aspen Institute Berlin, once a bastion of Atlanticism, believes that U.S. and European views of security are now so different that “the old Alliance holds little promise of figuring prominently in U.S. global strategic thinking.”² Robert Kagan urges his readers “to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world.”³ He does not explicitly envisage, let alone call for, NATO's demise, but his views on the growing Euro-American divergence about the use of force—as well as the fact that NATO is hardly mentioned in a 25-page journal article about transatlantic security issues—leaves little doubt about how he sees the future of the Alliance. Even *The Economist*, a strong proponent of transatlantic security cooperation, wonders whether NATO will survive, concluding “it is harder than it used to be to imagine NATO, as it is, advancing far into the 21st century.”⁴

NATO-skeptics make serious points; there are good reasons to be concerned

¹Krauthammer, “Re-Imagining NATO”, *Washington Post*, May 24, 2002.

²Gedmin, “The Alliance is Doomed”, *Washington Post*, May 20, 2002.

³Kagan, “Power and Weakness”, *Policy Review* (June/July 2002), p. 3.

⁴“A moment of truth—the future of NATO”, *The Economist*, May 4, 2002.

Philip H. Gordon is a Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution and a former Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council.

about the future of the Alliance—especially if nothing is done to revitalize and adapt it to current circumstances. The Afghanistan campaign revealed significant gaps between the war-fighting capabilities of the United States and its allies, most of whom did not have the stealth, all-weather and communications technologies to enable them to take part in the early stages of the operation. The quick success of that operation also reinforced the already strong perception in some quarters in Washington—especially in the Pentagon—that it is easier to fight alone than with allies who have little to offer militarily and who might hamper efficient decision-making. Moreover, the U.S. decision in the wake of the terrorist attacks to increase its defense budget by some \$48 billion for 2003—an increase that is larger than any single European country's entire annual defense budget—will only widen the capabilities gap. If the war on terrorism leads the United States to undertake military operations in other distant theaters—such as Iraq—and if the Europeans are unwilling or unable to come along, NATO's centrality will be further reduced. Add to all this the gradually diminishing NATO role in the Balkans (a role that arguably saved NATO from obsolescence in the 1990s), the emergence of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) whose long-term relationship with NATO is uncertain, and a big enlargement of NATO's membership that risks diluting its coherence, and it is not difficult to see why many wonder whether NATO's first actual military missions—in Bosnia and Kosovo—will turn out to have been its last.

Four Reasons to Save NATO

YET TO conclude that NATO no longer has any important roles to play, just because it was not used in a mission for which it was not designed in the first place,

would be a mistake. While NATO's roles in the 21st century will be very different from those relevant at the Alliance's founding in 1949, the United States has a strong national interest in preserving and adapting NATO. This is true for four main reasons.

First, NATO remains the primary vehicle for keeping the United States engaged in European security affairs. Perhaps it will turn out to be the case that the wars of the 21st century will be fought without Europeans and far away from Europe. In that case, America's European engagement over the past sixty years could be deemed a job well done and the transatlantic security partnership would no longer be necessary. But after a century that saw two world wars start in Europe and end in horrendous conflict in the Balkans (which, like the world wars, required American intervention to stop), it would seem more prudent for the United States to remain engaged until the continent's future—including that of Russia, Ukraine and eastern Europe—is more clear.

A second enduring role for NATO is to contribute to the continent's integration and stabilization process through enlargement. The incentive of NATO membership has been a powerful force in getting candidates throughout central and eastern Europe to undertake political, economic and military reforms that they would not otherwise have made. Since the enlargement process began in the mid-1990s, NATO aspirants have: resolved border disputes; changed electoral laws to ensure minority rights; discarded old and dangerous weaponry; reduced arms sales to unstable regions; cracked down on anti-Semitism; accelerated privatization; streamlined bloated military-industrial complexes; and promoted the transformation of civil societies. In all of this the desire to meet NATO standards and join the Alliance of democracies was a central motivating factor. Building peace through

the development of stable, cooperative allies bears little resemblance to Cold War deterrence, but it represents just as great a contribution to European security.

The enlargement process is now even starting to bear fruit in terms of NATO's relationship with Russia, which under President Vladimir Putin has stopped actively opposing NATO enlargement and is now seeking instead to cooperate with the Alliance. Far from being a factor of division in Europe (as not only its opponents but even some of its supporters reasonably feared it might be), NATO enlargement is making major contributions toward the integration of all European states into the Western security community.

Similarly, through the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Alliance has promoted military cooperation with partners as far away as Central Asia. These newly independent states—mostly still autocracies—have a long way to go before they would be welcome in an alliance built on democratic values. But the military-military ties, political contacts, institutional links and promise of better relations with the West promoted by the Partnership for Peace are among the West's most promising tools for having a positive impact on the region. Building on their PfP relationships, several of America's Central Asian partners ended up making essential contributions to the campaign in Afghanistan.

A third important role for NATO is ensuring peace in the Balkans, where the Alliance deploys 51,000 troops. Their presence is essential to preventing the region from reverting to the horrible conflicts of the 1990s. Even though the number of troops is gradually being reduced—to around 45,000 by mid-2003—and there is talk of the Europeans under the ESDP eventually taking over the entire mission, NATO's role will be indispensable for at least the next several years. No other organization can effectively plan

and coordinate the diverse military forces from all the contributing countries, including the American military presence.

Finally but perhaps most importantly, NATO remains an essential peacetime preparation organization, a "tool box" of interoperable military capabilities that can be drawn upon by allies or groups of allies when needed. It is true that European member-states do not spend enough, and that they spend badly, with many redundancies among national European militaries and too high a proportion of immobile ground forces. Taken all together, the European members of NATO will spend only around \$150 billion on defense in 2003, compared with some \$380 billion for the United States. But \$150 billion is not an insignificant amount of money, even by Pentagon standards. However inefficient they might be, the European members of NATO do have considerable military resources at their disposal, and they are often willing to undertake missions in which the United States does not want to be directly involved. European contributions to NATO's Bosnia and Kosovo campaigns were indispensable to the success of those operations, and today European NATO members (and Partners) are providing the overwhelming majority of Balkan peacekeeping forces—using NATO doctrines, tactics, procedures and interoperable equipment.

It is also worth noting that NATO can make important military contributions even in operations where the Alliance as such is not involved. This was the case, for example, during the Gulf War and in parts of the operation in and around Afghanistan. NATO was not formally involved in either case, but in both cases Allied forces, bases and cooperation among NATO militaries were critical. In the Afghan campaign, most NATO allies were excluded from the initial operations for understandable reasons, but have become more involved over time. This

involvement has included combat and special forces missions undertaken by British, Canadian and German soldiers conducting cave-clearing missions in the Afghan mountains; British and French reconnaissance, air-defense, in-air refueling and combat aircraft missions; the deployment of a French carrier-led naval task force alongside American ships patrolling the Indian Ocean; "backfilling" by NATO nations of U.S. military missions in the Balkans and even in the United States (where NATO Airborne Warning and Control Systems were deployed to protect American airspace); and the use of European NATO bases for staging operations during the Afghan campaign.

All of these tasks were facilitated by the existence of common NATO operational doctrines (for example, so that French reconnaissance officers know what kinds of information U.S. pilots need), agreed equipment standards (so that Turkish refueling nozzles fit into U.S. planes), routine multinational exercises (so that allied forces are in the habit of working together and know what problems to expect), and interoperable secure communications (so that various nations' forces can share real-time intelligence and data during an operation). When it came time to organize an international security force for Afghanistan to provide stability once victory was won, European NATO allies provided the vast majority of the forces (first under British, now Turkish, command). By summer 2002 nearly half of the 13,000 foreign troops there came from NATO allies other than the United States. In the long run, NATO itself may prove to be the best option for the maintenance of a long-term, Western-led security force in Afghanistan.

In short, while the war on terrorism does indeed suggest that NATO is no longer the central warfighting institution it was during the Cold War, it would be shortsighted to conclude that its mission

is over. As a military machine designed to protect Alliance borders from an external ground attack, the Alliance may indeed be "dead" or dying; that is the benign consequence of its success. But as a community of democracies with common values and interests, and a community that is determined to maintain the political relationships and military tools to protect those interests, it is most certainly worth preserving. Surely, if it may be granted that the United States is wise to seek allies, there is no imaginable substitute for the capacities, military and otherwise, that America's NATO allies can provide.⁵

Five Tasks

INSTEAD OF giving up on NATO, the North American and European allies should use the upcoming summit in Prague to adapt the Alliance to the most important security challenges of the day. Just as previous developments—the Soviet deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles, the end of the Cold War and the conflicts in the Balkans—have obliged the Alliance to adapt, September 11 and the conflict that has followed it require NATO leaders to think boldly and creatively about how to ensure that the Alliance continues to serve European and American security and political interests.

How should NATO adapt at Prague and afterwards? How can the United States best use the Alliance to promote its own interests? Five tasks stand forth.

First, Alliance leaders need to make clear that new threats such as international terrorism are a central concern to NATO member-states and their populations. When the Prague summit takes place in late November, the American public is not going to be focused on NATO

⁵Nicely argued by John O'Sullivan, "With Friends Like...Whom?", *National Review*, July 1, 2002.

enlargement, ESDP or the Balkans, however important those issues remain. They will be wondering whether NATO contributes to the most important security challenge the United States faces, and NATO leaders will have to give them “yes” for an answer.

Already in its 1991 Strategic Concept, NATO recognized that “Alliance security must also take account of the global context” and that “Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage.”⁶ NATO repeated the point in its 1999 Strategic Concept, this time moving “acts of terrorism” to the top of the list of “other risks.”⁷ At Prague, Alliance leaders will need to make vividly clear that NATO is about more than the traditional defense of its borders. This is not to say that any act of terrorism or threat to energy supplies must be treated as an Article 5 contingency for which all Allies are obliged to contribute troops. It does mean, however, that all allies recognize that their common interests and values can be threatened by global developments, a point made dramatically clear by the attacks on Washington and New York. Even if invocations of Article 5 will no longer necessarily mean a formal NATO operation under NATO command, the concept that “an armed attack” from anywhere abroad must trigger solidarity among the member states is an important principle that should be reinforced.

Second, NATO needs to put real substance behind this political commitment by developing its political and organizational capacity to deal with global security threats, including the specific issue of terrorism. European allies who worry about giving the Alliance too great a “global” role have long resisted such new missions. European leaders have been very reluctant to put their countries in a position where-

by their soldiers could be dragged off by the United States to fight beyond Europe’s borders, particularly since there has traditionally been a good deal of transatlantic disagreement over out-of-area issues. Ironically, today the resistance to expanding NATO’s potential mission comes more from the United States, where many in the present administration fear being constrained politically by allies whom they believe have little to contribute militarily.

The United States, however, has every interest in having European allies better prepared to join it on potential global missions. While it is hard to see NATO countries agreeing to use the Alliance for such anti-terrorist matters as law enforcement, immigration, financial control, and domestic intelligence anytime soon, the Alliance should begin immediately to adapt its military structures to contribute more effectively to the war on terrorism. NATO should significantly reform and streamline its command structures to remove redundant and wasteful headquarters, replacing them with a leaner and more efficient structure based on military functions rather than geographical orientation. It should develop a new Force Projection Command specifically responsible for planning out-of-area operations, and increase the number and capability of its rapid reaction forces so that NATO member-states can project forces to distant parts of the world on short notice. Allies should share more information about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles, and develop emergency civil defense and consequence management teams that could assist allies subjected to biological, chemical or nuclear weapons attack. NATO

⁶*The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept*, North Atlantic Council in Rome, November 7–8, 1991, para. 12.

⁷*The Alliance’s Strategic Concept*, North Atlantic Council in Washington, DC, April 23–24, 1999, para. 24.

should also coordinate the development of joint theater missile defense systems that could protect allies in Europe (including, possibly, Russia) that face a growing ballistic missile and WMD threat.

Finally on this score, NATO should commit itself to a program to coordinate and train various member-state special forces, whose role in the anti-terrorism campaign will be critical. During the Cold War, few could have imagined the need for American and European special forces to travel out-of-area to execute coordinated attacks, but that is now a very real requirement. While NATO was not used for the military response to an attack on the United States, it is unfortunately not difficult to imagine a major terrorist attack on a European city for which a NATO response would be appropriate. The very preparation of new missions for NATO—even if the Alliance is never called upon to conduct them—would be a major contribution in the effort to get European allies and their militaries focused on the new security challenges of the day, most of which are beyond Europe's borders. Such preparation might also buy at least a measure of deterrence against such attacks.

A third and related necessity is for NATO's European allies to accelerate the process of adapting their military capabilities for the most likely new types of missions. At NATO's April 1999 summit, the Allies adopted a Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) designed to improve allied forces' deployability, mobility, sustainability, survivability and effectiveness.⁸ The DCI process identified 58 areas in which the Allies were asked to make concrete improvements in their forces to fill specific capabilities gaps. But the DCI process never really had political support and few of its goals have been fulfilled. At Prague, European NATO members should reduce this long list to five or six critical categories—to include secure communications, air- and sea-lift capabilities, electronic war-

fare, precision-guided munitions, defense against weapons of mass destruction, and in-flight refueling—and make real commitments to fulfilling their goals. Not only do the Europeans need to make serious improvements in capabilities if they want to join effectively with the United States in the anti-terrorism campaign, the EU decision process needs to be better integrated with NATO's. If it isn't, current problems with interoperability will only get worse. A division of labor among the Allies, whereby the Americans concentrate mainly on high-end military operations and most Europeans do only peacekeeping and reconstruction, is to a certain extent inevitable and may even have certain advantages.⁹ But it should not be allowed to go too far. Dividing military roles in such a stark way would undermine political solidarity within the Alliance and contribute to the growing gap between Americans and Europeans over how and when to use force in the first place. It is a recipe for undermining the political solidarity and sense of shared risk that has been at the core of the Alliance since 1949.

Fourth, NATO should continue the process of enlargement, as a means of developing strong allies capable of contributing to common goals and of consolidating the integration of central and eastern Europe. Barring the unexpected, it now seems clear that the Alliance will take in five to seven new members at Prague: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and possibly Bulgaria and Romania as well. Some argue that such a large number of new allies will dilute the Alliance and render it unusable in the

⁸See Washington Summit Communiqué, Press Communiqué NAC-S(99)64, Brussels, April 24, 1999, para. 11.

⁹See James P. Thomas, *The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions*, Adelphi Paper no. 333 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2000), chapter 3.

future. There is not, however, a fundamental difference between an Alliance at 19 and an Alliance at 24 or 26—NATO never was an alliance of equals and always depended on American leadership in the past, as it will in the future. Moreover, to the degree that NATO is being transformed from a defensive warfighting organization into a force-providing and coalition-facilitating organization, the dilution issue largely goes away.

It is in any case a myth that it is impossible to conduct effective military operations with a large number of countries—the “war by committee” charge leveled against the Kosovo campaign. As General Wesley Clark has argued, if there was a war by committee in Kosovo, the committee was within the Clinton Administration and Joint Chiefs of Staff, not among the NATO allies.¹⁰ Only those few allies actually making a major military contribution—primarily Britain and France—demanded a significant voice in the conduct of the operation. This was not an unreasonable demand, and it was arguably worth the trade-off. If NATO leaders are worried about taking in member-states whose long-term political stability or democratic credentials might be uncertain, they should consider mechanisms that would allow for the temporary suspension of an ally. But it would be a mistake to discard the principle that the Alliance has enunciated for years, that the NATO door is open to all European democracies committed to the Alliance’s common values and security interests.

Finally, the Prague summit should be used to promote greater cooperation between NATO and Russia. Significant progress has already been made in this regard, as demonstrated by the May 2002 agreement to set up a new NATO-Russia Council, which will give Russia the opportunity to interact with NATO allies as an equal partner on a range of issues—

though without the ability to veto NATO decisions. It is true, as critics of the new relationship with Russia argue, that Russia had the opportunity to cooperate with NATO already through the Permanent Joint Council, created in 1997, and chose not to do so. But the fact is that Russia under Putin has taken a very different approach; the new forum offers an excellent opportunity to advance cooperation in unprecedented ways without sacrificing NATO’s ability, when necessary, to act without Russian agreement. Areas for possible joint action could include counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, peacekeeping and crisis management, missile defense cooperation, air defense, civil defense cooperation, collaborative armaments programs and joint work on restructuring Russia’s outmoded armed forces and early-warning systems. In the wake of the tragedies of September 11, the prospect that Russia could feel that it is part of the West—rather than threatened by it—is an opportunity that should not be squandered. That NATO can be a vehicle for that opportunity is perhaps the most vivid illustration possible of its continuing utility as an alliance.

NATO IS not dead, nor is it doomed. But it needs to adjust to new realities if it is to serve useful purposes on both sides of the Atlantic. Disagreements among allies are natural; in the case of NATO, certainly, they are nothing new. But allies we remain. The challenge of adjusting the Alliance after the Cold War was already considerable before last September 11; since then it has become both more complex and more urgent. The Prague summit is an opportunity for the Alliance to make that adjustment; it is an opportunity that should not be lost. □

¹⁰Wesley Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001).

“The Independent Review is exciting.”

— JOHN DIGGINS, Professor of History, City University of New York

Transcending the all-too-common superficiality of public policy research and debate, *The INDEPENDENT REVIEW* is the widely acclaimed quarterly journal devoted to excellence in the study of political economy and the critical analysis of government policy. Edited by **Robert Higgs**, *The INDEPENDENT REVIEW* is superbly written, provocative, and based on solid peer-reviewed scholarship.

Probing the most difficult and pressing of social and economic questions, *The INDEPENDENT REVIEW* boldly challenges the politicization and bureaucratization of our world, featuring in-depth examinations of current policy questions by many of the world's outstanding scholars and policy experts. Undaunted and uncompromising, this is *the* journal that is pioneering future debate!

“The Independent Review is of great interest.”

— C. VANN WOODWARD, Pulitzer Prize-Winner, Yale University

“I really enjoy reading The Independent Review.”

— JOYCE APPLEBY, Professor of History, UCLA

“The Independent Review is distinctive in badly needed ways.”

— LELAND YEAGER, Professor of Economics, Auburn University

“The most exciting new intellectual journal in many years.”

— WILLIAM NISKANEN, Chairman, Cato Institute

“A great team, economic logic and tough analysis.”

— BRUCE YANDLE, Former Executive Director, Fed. Trade Comm.

“The Independent Review is excellent, diverse, and wide-ranging.”

— IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ, Prof. of Sociology, Rutgers University

In Recent Issues:

Science as a Market Process

— ALLAN WALSTAD

Terrorism, Interest-Group Politics, and Public Policy: Curtailing Criminal Modes of Political Speech

— ROGER D. CONGLETON

The Common Law Right to Earn a Living

— TIMOTHY SANDEFUR

A Matter of Small Consequence: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Tragedy of East Timor

— JERRY K. SWEENEY

Conservatives Are Liberal, and Liberals Are Conservative—On the Environment

— STEPHEN M. COLARELLI

Private Property Rights, Not Ideologies, Are the Crux

— JANE S. SHAW

Is the Concept of Race Illegitimate?

— MAX HOCUTT

Make Everybody Rich

— FREDERICK TURNER

Communism: A History

— RICHARD PIPES

It Didn't Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States

— SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET AND GARY MARKS



- ◆ Feature Articles
- ◆ Book Reviews
- ◆ Special Features
- ◆ Figures and Tables
- ◆ 160 Pages per Issue
- ◆ March, June, Sept. & Dec.
- ◆ Annual Index
- ◆ Plus more . . .

Individual Subscriptions:

\$28.95/1 year, \$52.95/2 year

Institutional Subscriptions:

\$83.95/1 year, \$158.95/2 year

International Orders:

Add \$28/subscription shipping

Order Toll-Free (U.S.)


800-927-8733

Phone: 510-632-1366

Fax: 510-568-6040

review@independent.org

www.independent.org



100 Swan Way, Dept. A72
Oakland, CA 94621-1428 USA

Look for *The INDEPENDENT REVIEW* on better newsstands and in bookstores!

Getting Realism

U.S. Asia (and China) Policy Reconceived

—George Gilboy & Eric Heginbotham—

SEEN historically, American grand strategy has tended to be both Eurocentric and oriented toward meeting military threats. Both characteristics are easily understood. It was only for fear of war coming to North America from the Old World, or actually during wartime in the 20th century, that the United States developed strategies for specific regions of the world. Not only was Europe the main source of such concern, but cultural contiguity and a good bit of history, going back to the origins of the American polity, gave Europe pride of place in American thinking. Even today we have an easier confidence in our ability to understand the major factors at play in Europe than we do with regard to Asia. As a result, America's Asia policy seems conceptually less mature and, in practical terms, more fragmented, with individual countries or particular functional issues like trade or weapons proliferation tending to drive policy as a whole.

The Clinton Administration's Asia policy exemplified the fragmented approach. In its early years, the administration tried to recast relations with nearly every major country in the region, aggressively pursuing a broad array of issues from human rights to strategic trade—fre-

quently without establishing priorities. It subsequently narrowed its Asia policy focus mostly to China, but the U.S.-China relationship was itself blown by the prevailing winds of discrete issues as they arose. The Bush Administration, pre-September 11, developed a more focused approach—but it was wrongly focused. Given the rising influence of the Defense Department and other national security organizations on foreign policy, and the prevalence of structural realist ideas among civilian practitioners, the United States is perhaps prone to define its international interests in narrow military terms. The Bush Administration has reinforced these trends: prior to September 11, 2001, the United States pursued a neo-Bismarckian Asia strategy aimed at isolating China. Not surprisingly, the administration's initiative to revive the U.S.-Japanese partnership and to improve relations with India both emphasized military initiatives. The expression of support for Taiwan, too, came in the coin of arms sales and declarations to "do what it takes" to protect the island from Chinese use of force. Since September 11, U.S. Asia policy has become an adjunct to America's war on terrorism, but the essential elements of the pre-September 11 approach remain.¹

George Gilboy and Eric Heginbotham are doctoral candidates in the political science department at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

¹This continuity is illustrated by two recent government reports that emphasize the potential military and economic "threat" from China. See

An Asia policy that focuses exclusively on political-military issues—particularly in terms centered overwhelmingly on China—is flawed. America needs an Asia policy that is conceptually the reverse of what is developing today: rather than focus on military issues alone, it needs to be connected as well to political and economic realities. Rather than focus on a potential great power in the making, China, it needs to pay more attention to the wider Asian context—one that is generating underappreciated opportunities to influence political outcomes, as well as creating non-traditional security challenges. As China contemplates political reform in response to the vast social and economic changes underway there, the health and increasing stability of market economies and democratic regimes elsewhere in Asia will have a profound impact on its direction. Thus, the quality of U.S. relations with Japan, Korea, India, the Philippines, Indonesia and other Asian states will strongly affect China's diplomatic and military options.

A wise U.S. Asia policy would therefore concentrate on bolstering the most prominent and generally positive feature of the region's current political landscape: the transition of the majority of Asian states toward political pluralism and market economics. There have been unprecedented gains for economic and political liberalism since the end of the Cold War, but rapid domestic change combined with global economic integration can be profoundly disruptive. Many Asian states are now finely poised between progressive stability and widespread unrest. While preventing all forms of unrest is impossible, and while some upheaval is often an unavoidable by-product of social and economic progress, there is nothing inevitable about failed states, collapsing societies and large-scale communal violence during periods of transition. America has a huge stake in ensuring the maximum feasible

number of positive Asian outcomes, and U.S. policy choices can make a difference.

America's interest in sustainable progress toward liberal institutions in Asia is not merely ideological. Increased economic and political liberalization makes America more prosperous and secure. It gives all Asian states a greater stake in the evolving global system, which is one that favors America's values and interests. A U.S. Asia policy that fails to support these developments—or worse, that inadvertently undermines them—could turn the Asian democratic “Third Wave” of the 1980s and 1990s into an anti-liberal rip-tide in the first decades of the 21st century.

That is why America's security interests in Asia are best served by a broad policy of *strategic engagement* that emphasizes two goals: consolidating the political and economic liberalization of late 20th-century Asia; and cautiously promoting further victories for liberalism in key transition states while guarding against fragmentation and collapse. Such a policy would of necessity accord non-military means pride of place. Its strategic nature nevertheless derives from its ends (to promote American security); its means (the flexible but steady employment of America's comprehensive power); and its pragmatism (a commitment to deal with states that cannot yet meet all the demands of Western idealists from either the Left or the Right). We now turn to the Asian realities that should shape a new American regional strategy, after which we elaborate the elements of a policy of strategic engagement.

U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China*, Washington, DC, July 12, 2002; and U.S.-China Security Review Commission, *Annual Report to Congress: The National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship Between the United States and China*, Washington, DC, July 15, 2002.

ASIAN STATES are undergoing a fundamental shift toward economic and political liberalism. Although the *absolute* balance of power between state and society differs greatly from case to case, the reforms that are taking place in every state in the region are causing a dramatic *relative* strengthening of society in each of them.

The last 16 years have produced five new democratic governments in East Asia: the Philippines (1986), South Korea (1987–88), Thailand (1988), Taiwan (1996), and Indonesia (1999). While national elections in these countries provide dramatic proof of progress, those elections are best understood as the culmination of a transformation process one or more decades in the making. In other words, Asia's new democracies were liberalizing before they were liberal.

In some cases, the leaders of Asia's authoritarian states have themselves initiated liberalizing reforms. General Prem Tinsulanonda in Thailand (prime minister from 1980–88) and General Roh Tae Woo in South Korea (president from 1988–93) both presided over civil and political institution building, eventually ceding power to civilian officials. In Taiwan, strongman Chiang Ching-kuo (prime minister 1972–78, president 1978–88) acquiesced to legislative and institutional reforms that eventually facilitated direct national elections called by Lee Teng-hui in 1996. Even where rulers have been intent on maintaining power rather than laying the groundwork for transition, the rationalization of authority in response to economic reform and global integration has created multiple power centers that weaken authoritarian rule. Most importantly, the increasing prosperity that once legitimated authoritarian rule has created new social classes with an interest in political representation and the

means to demand it. Even many of Asia's remaining authoritarian states, such as China, Malaysia and Singapore, have opened their trade, investment and financial markets, strengthened their legal systems, and relaxed some restrictions on the press and social organization.

The progress of liberalism, however, has not been linear in any of these states. In many states—including Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and China—bitter and often violent ethnic and religious rivalries further complicate the task. Thus the fundamentally liberal transformations in Asia—liberal here understood in its socio-economic sense—have brought new opportunities and freedoms for most, but they have also created new vulnerabilities for many individuals as well as the state. The transition process therefore remains exposed to multiple threats: social instability caused by economic dislocation, opposition from entrenched elites, political gridlock, and shocks from increased exposure to volatile global markets.

All of this puts at risk recent gains for economic openness, rule of law, and participatory politics. A 1991 coup d'état in Thailand, for example, temporarily restored military rule. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed reasserted personal control over Malaysian politics in 1998, arranging the imprisonment of his chief political rival and cracking down on the media in the process. Even in those states that have made the transition to democracy, weak political and civil institutions make the task of consolidating reform more difficult. The ambiguity of new constitutional arrangements; the absence of effective civilian control over powerful militaries; the lack of recognized and accepted precedents; a penchant for scandal-mongering rather than healthy opposition; widespread corruption; and the immaturity of political parties and legal institutions—all have contributed to extended periods of political gridlock in

several transitional states. In 2001, elected leaders in both Indonesia (Abdurrahman Wahid) and the Philippines (Joseph Estrada) were forced from office after investigations into official corruption. In both cases, constitutional issues were ambiguous and the military played a major role in deciding the outcomes, leaving bitter feelings among many supporters of the ousted presidents. In Thailand, Senate elections in 2000 were complicated by allegations of vote buying and took four rounds and five months before being resolved. In Taiwan, President Chen Shui-bian operated under the threat of impeachment during late 2000 and early 2001. In South Korea, the chief opposition party, the Grand National Party, boycotted parliament several times in 2000 and 2001. In one case (mid-2000), it remained out for several months, delaying or blocking the passage of more than one hundred bills.

Conservative military actors still play a powerful role in some of these states, and are occasionally willing to exploit both social unrest and government weakness for self-serving ends. Opposition from the Thai army (including a public relations effort conducted through army-owned radio stations) has helped block adoption of a system of elections for provincial governors, who are currently appointed by the interior ministry. The army has also resisted civilian efforts to gain greater control over key military appointments and the allocation of Thailand's military budgets among the services (which currently gives the army significantly more money than the other services put together). In Indonesia, the military has stonewalled efforts to phase out its territorial commands, where its units remain involved in local politics. Many Indonesians, too, suspect some elements of the army (especially its Special Forces) of selectively destabilizing the provinces in order to influence specific

political decisions.

Global economic integration has brought many benefits for Asia, but it has also introduced a greater degree of dependence on volatile global markets. The 1997–98 Asian financial crisis was only the latest and largest in a series of destabilizing waves of job creation and job destruction, capital influx and capital flight, and shifting balances of wealth and power. Personal wealth proved acutely vulnerable to exchange rate fluctuations, which cut overnight the purchasing power of savings and incomes by as much as half. And capital flight led to increased unemployment and the disruption of integrated regional production networks.

These difficulties ensure that even where economic and political liberalization in Asia has been successful, it has also been painful. Though the long-term trends clearly show progress, in many individual cases there remains a substantial risk of reversal. Nowhere is this more evident than in China.

SOME AMERICAN officials see China as the great exception in liberalizing Asia and as the nation most likely to challenge American interests there. Certainly China's size and potential power make it a unique concern. A closer look, however, reveals a nation that remains focused on its daunting domestic agenda. China is neither as powerful nor as threatening as some believe. In many respects, its dilemma resembles that of other Asian states that preceded it on the path to liberalization.

China is in the midst of a momentous domestic transformation. Two decades of economic dynamism and political stasis have produced deep and pervasive inequality, dislocation and conflict in Chinese society. A 2001 study by the prestigious Chinese Academy of Social Sciences found that both China's index of social order (including crime

and corruption) and index of social stability (including inflation, unemployment and income disparities) have steadily declined since reforms began—and that decline has accelerated dramatically in the 1990s.² The political status quo is unsustainable.

While the regime's first priority remains self-preservation, momentum is gathering for political reform. In a recent survey of "rising star" Communist Party cadres performed by the elite Central Party School, political reform ranked as the most important reform agenda item—more important than state enterprise reform, employment policy, income disparities and taxation.³ In August 2001, the current leadership re-oriented fundamental tenets of Communist Party ideology in ways that could ease the party's peaceful evolution to a social democratic party.⁴ Beijing has also revised China's constitution to protect private firms, placing them on the same legal basis as state-owned enterprises. Other key elements of state-society relations are under review: scholars and political leaders are discussing rural reform, including the strengthening of village autonomy through greater accountability of local officials as well as greater land and tax reform. Even the structure of government and politics at the national level is now openly debated. Over the past year, official delegations—including several of the top two dozen elite leaders—have been dispatched to study the transition of east-central European socialist parties to social democratic ones. The party has also analyzed the causes of regime collapse; one high-profile study concludes that Moscow's failure to reform its own Communist Party and state-society relationship was a key factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union.

None of this holds out the prospect for a sudden shift to democracy, or even the rapid rise of civil society as it is under-

stood in the West. Indeed, while Beijing has moderated its policy toward street protests, especially by laid-off workers, it remains determined to coerce and jail the leaders of any organized opposition. Nevertheless, the legal and institutional reforms underway (and those being considered) offer the potential for greater conciliation between the state and Chinese society. They are designed to gradually open the party to greater input from social groups. If sustained, such actions could constitute the first steps along China's path to join the Third Wave.

Should these measures succeed, the potential payoff for Asia and America will be enormous. Political reform will promote domestic stability and guaran-

²Zhu Qingfang, "Gaige Kaifang Yilai (1979–1999) *Shehui Jingji Xietiao De Zonghe Pingjia*" ("Comprehensive Appraisal of Socio-Economic Adjustment in the Reform Period, 1979–1999"), in Ru Xin *et al.*, *Shehui Lanpi Shu: 2001 Zhongguo Shehui Xingshi Fenxi Yu Yuce* (2001 Social Blue Book: Analysis and Forecast of China's Social Conditions) (Beijing: Social Sciences Documentation Publishing House, 2001).

³Xie Zhiqiang, "Dang Zheng Lingdao Ganbu Dui 2001–2002 Nian Shehui Xingshi De Jiben Kanfa" ("Government Cadres' Basic Outlook on Social Conditions, 2001–2002"), in Xin *et al.*, *Shenhui Lanpi Shu* (2002 edition).

⁴President Jiang Zemin announced that the "Party must change with the times"—*yu shi ju jin*. The call to strengthen intra-party democracy and recast state-society relations—even while preserving one-party rule—is reinforced by a report from the powerful Communist Party Organization Department, "Zhongguo Diaocha Baogao 2000–2001: Xin Xingshi Xia Renmin Neibu Maodun Yanjiu", ("China Investigation Report 2000–2001: Research on Contradictions Among the People Under New Conditions") (Beijing: Central Compilation and Translation Press, 2001).

tee the gains of twenty years of economic progress in China. A deepening of Chinese reforms will also help expand the zone of liberal trade and investment in Asia. For example, a recent Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry document referred to China's successful use of foreign direct investment in calling for the further opening of Japan's own markets.⁵ In addition, the editors of Japan's foremost journal of international politics, *Chuo Koron*, recently noted that Chinese reform and economic performance should spur Japan's own much needed reforms.⁶ If political reforms falter or fail, however, the result will be economic crisis and social turmoil—perhaps even the collapse of the Chinese regime. In such case, both Asia and America could face unprecedented challenges, not least the further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, border and ethnic conflicts, massive waves of refugees and increased environmental damage.

The United States has a clear interest in the success of political reform in China. U.S. policy cannot directly guarantee that success, but it can help. By reinforcing the economic, political and social transformations underway throughout the region, U.S. policy can yoke the great forces of Asia's liberal transformation to the task of ensuring that key non-democratic states such as China do join the Third Wave.

Along with encouraging liberal reform, the United States must also maintain military supremacy and the forward deployment of its forces in Asia. There is no contradiction between maintaining American power and supporting Chinese reform. But military activities should not sacrifice America's strategic interests for tactical advantage. Deployments should be calculated to maximize regional stability while minimizing the potential for undermining the domestic position of

Asian reformers. Fortunately, Asian regional developments themselves are consonant with this task.

IN THE EARLY 1990s, many analysts saw East Asia as an area ripe for international instability. Rivalries and tensions were projected to rise as the economic power and military capabilities of major Asian states increased, especially in the absence of regional cooperative institutions.⁷ Many of these arguments were logically reasoned and rightly served to draw America's attention to the importance of maintaining a presence in Asia. But Asian politics have belied the most pessimistic predictions. Excepting the Cold War legacies of confrontation across the Taiwan Straits and on the Korean peninsula, Asian international relations have proven remarkably stable. Certainly there are conflicts; but even the complex disputes in the South China Sea and the Sea of Japan never became as intense as was predicted in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. By the end of the 1990s, the importance of these con-

⁵Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, *White Paper on International Trade 2001: External Economic Policy Challenges in the 21st Century*, May 18, 2001.

⁶"*Chugoku no Bokko*", ("The Rise of China"), *Chuo Koron* (February 2002); Shiraishi Takashi and Otsuji Yoshihiro, "*Nihon-ASEAN no Kakudai SC wo Teisho Suru*" ("Supporting an Expanded FTA Between Japan and ASEAN"), *Chuo Koron* (February 2002).

⁷Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia", *International Security* (Winter 1993/1994); Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War", *International Security* (Winter 1993/1994), pp. 34–77; Kent E. Calder, *Asia's Deadly Triangle: How Arms, Energy and Growth Threaten to Destabilize Asia-Pacific* (London: Nicholas Breeley Publishing, 1996).

flicts was decreasing, not increasing.

This is because Asia's liberal transformations have had important implications for regional politics. Nearly all Asian states are intently focused on their own domestic economic and political problems. To the extent that they consider external relations, they look to political-economic variables that might be leveraged to mitigate domestic challenges. Taken together, these two circumstances suggest that most Asian states are at least open to, if not in active pursuit of, greater institutionalized economic cooperation. When matched with the concomitant strengthening of liberal political and legal institutions, such cooperation can lead to a dampening of political-military conflict, and possibly to a self-sustaining momentum for even deeper economic and political reforms within states across the region.

The evidence for this proposition is already apparent. Indeed, the focus on domestic reform has moderated the regional foreign policies of those states that have liberalized their economies without yet having made the transition to democracy (including China) as well as the true Third Wave democracies. The inward focus of all East Asian states is reflected in regional military spending trends: although greater wealth has meant greater potential military purchasing power, defense spending as a percentage of GDP in Asia, including China, has declined from 4.3 percent in 1980 to 2.9 percent in 1990, to 2.7 percent in 1999.⁸

Though recent attention has been focused on the high-profile accessions of China and Taiwan to the WTO, the development of ASEAN+3 (the ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea) provides perhaps the best example of domestic needs driving regional cooperation. The first *ad hoc* prime ministers' meeting was called in 1997 by the ASEAN states, primarily to discuss ways of dealing with

the Asian financial crisis. The following year, the ASEAN+3 states agreed to hold annual meetings. In 1999, the group expanded its discussions to include other economic, social, political and security issues and at the year 2000 meeting began discussions on an Asian Free Trade Agreement (AFTA).

ASEAN+3 remains a relatively underdeveloped organization, but it has already helped to shift each member's perception of its national interests and sparked increased subregional cooperation as a consequence. In November 2001, China, Japan and Korea agreed to annual trilateral meetings between their economic ministers, in addition to their meetings within the larger ASEAN+3 framework. China recently announced a ten-year plan with ASEAN to create the world's largest free trade bloc; Japan countered with a ten-year plan to create an even larger free trade bloc that would include ASEAN+3, Australia and New Zealand.

The economic and political promise of cooperation between East Asian states has already helped to relax the regional security environment. Sino-Japanese relations are a case in point. In 1998, the two countries conducted a path-breaking exchange of defense minister visits and agreed to maintain annual visits by their heads of state. Those visits, and the diplomatic activity that precedes them, have allowed China and Japan to address issues of concern to each, helping to prevent relatively minor problems from spiraling into larger ones. One example concerns the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea. In 2000, as economic relations between China and the ASEAN states were being strengthened, China agreed for the first time to multilateral negotiations over a South China Sea maritime code of con-

⁸Average defense spending for the ten largest economies in the East Asian region. Source: *The Military Balance* (IISS, various years).

duct. Both Chinese and ASEAN participants have already agreed to exercise restraint in the area until a formal code of conduct is approved.

Strategic Engagement and American Interests

THE Asian realities described above have had a profound impact on American interests. U.S. trade with Asia more than doubled during the 1990s, from about \$400 billion in 1993 to just over \$800 billion in 2000. In the mid-1990s the Asian region passed Europe as America's largest regional trading partner. U.S. businesses have flocked to Asia as well. Total accumulated stocks of U.S. foreign direct investment in Asia rose from \$78 billion in 1993 to \$186 billion in 1999. But American interests are not limited to the economic sphere. The spread of democracy to some states—and the continued liberalization of state-society relations in others—is a victory for core American principles. To the extent that they have been consolidated, political reforms in South Korea, Thailand and Taiwan have strengthened America's relationships in the region, even as they have stabilized those societies and made them more capable partners and allies. And since liberalization tends to dampen regional security competition, it reduces the prospects for threats to American security emerging from Asia.⁹

However, the United States is now increasingly distant from important new Asian security and economic developments. Washington has yet to respond to the rise of ASEAN+3, let alone the dramatic proposals for regional free trade agreements that have emanated from it. Overall, the construction of liberal Asian institutions is a net gain for the United States, but today these institutions are emerging without any significant U.S. participation and wholly outside of U.S.

influence. Yet there are some who would advise the current administration to continue down the path of a narrow track strategy focused on identifying and isolating one military threat. The neo-Bismarckian ideology reaches an extreme in a proposal by John Mearsheimer that the United States should not only encircle China with adversarial political-military alliances, but also attempt to reverse the process of liberalization and global integration with China because that liberalization is supporting rapid Chinese economic growth.¹⁰

A neo-Bismarckian U.S. strategy cannot succeed. Such a policy could not guarantee that China's economy would not grow, but it would guarantee China's enmity. It would at the same time jeopardize America's standing as the leader of political and economic liberalism in the world, even to the point of unraveling America's existing Asian coalitions by removing the underlying basis for extended political, economic and security cooperation. America has built strong alliances and great victories through benign leadership based on liberal principles that promote peace and prosperity for all. The commitment to these principles has also guaranteed bipartisan domestic support for U.S. foreign policy, allowing the United

⁹An important critique of the "democratic peace" argument shows that under certain conditions, states are more likely to become involved in conflict during the transition to democracy. See Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War", *International Security* (Summer 1995). Yet this same critique finds that the most dangerous situation occurs when a democratic transition fails. The United States can hardly tell Asian nations not to democratize; rather, it should seek to consolidate these transitions.

¹⁰John J. Mearsheimer, "The Future of the American Pacifier", *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2001).

States to concentrate its enormous power and wide-ranging capabilities. Pursuing a narrow, military-dominated, one-threat-at-a-time strategy will leave America isolated abroad and divided at home.

America's Asia policy should be based instead on a more subtle political realism, one that recognizes that economic, political and moral power is not only the basis for military strength, but can frequently be employed independently of, and with greater effect than, military power. This is well within the realist tradition. E.H. Carr's well-known critique of political idealism was matched by an equally trenchant critique of an impoverished realism, a realism without sustainable political and moral foundations.¹¹ A more nuanced realism that can accommodate a comprehensive understanding of American power and interests should be our guide.

Such a nuanced realism would recognize that political-economic engagement is one of the most effective weapons the United States can deploy in the struggle for prosperity and security. The advance of market economics sweeps *anciens regimes* before it.¹² Economic integration will not guarantee political convergence, but it makes it much more difficult for authoritarian regimes to survive.

Yet although unleashing the gales of creative destruction through global economic integration can destroy America's enemies, it can also disrupt our friends as easily as strengthen them. American policy can mitigate that disruption by strengthening liberal political and social institutions through structured, focused cooperation between American law enforcement, intelligence, military, regulatory, financial, industrial, labor, and civil organizations and their local and regional Asian counterparts.

To succeed, a policy of strategic engagement must be comprehensive in means, focused in ends, and pragmatic in application. Strategic engagement will

employ *comprehensive* American capabilities across a range of issues, not just political-military coalition building. It would positively influence and engage transition states, not isolate them, even as it hedges against potential threats that may emanate from them. In contrast to the "engagement policy" of the Clinton Administration, it would recognize the limits and the destabilizing effects of global economic integration, and be explicitly tied to American political and security interests.

Strategic engagement should *focus* on states according to their potential to threaten American interests. Threats to American security are diverse and do not emanate only from a potential "peer competitor." This was true before September 11, 2001; it has been starkly obvious since. But since American resources are finite, policymakers must establish criteria for deciding where those resources should be committed. We suggest a focus on those states that, first, because of their size and power, will have a particularly large impact on surrounding states; second, will be likely to fragment in the event of failure; and third, are likely—because of geography or the possession of weapons of mass destruction—to pose a serious threat to U.S. security interests. States such as China and Indonesia hold the potential to generate much greater

¹¹See E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1939), and J.D.B. Miller, "E.H. Carr: The Realist's Realist", *The National Interest* (Fall 1991).

¹²Today's foreign-policy makers would do well to recall the scale and ferocity of these transitions as they were played out in Europe. See Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944); and Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967).

threats to American security than Thailand or Vietnam.

Finally, strategic engagement must be *pragmatic* in implementation, squarely founded upon political realism. This, too, contrasts with recent American foreign policy. Liberal idealists have been unable to accept that the process of transformation in key transition states will be long, tumultuous and subject to reversal. Dealing effectively with states undergoing these transformations requires the United States to engage closely with regimes that still display authoritarian characteristics. On the other hand, many self-described realists cannot seem to accept that some states are neither allies nor enemies, and that several important Asian states, not least Indonesia and China, are “works in progress.” A truly realistic policy must deal with all actors, must expect detours and breakdowns along the path to Third Wave status, and must plan for such contingencies.

WE SUGGEST five operating guidelines for a U.S. strategic engagement policy in Asia. First, America should restore the role of the State Department in U.S. foreign policy. In recent years, State has lost influence over foreign policy to the Defense Department and the National Security Council, which are—and should be, each in their own way—focused on political-military issues. The foreign policy budget administered by State has gone from 4 percent of the Federal budget in the 1960s to 1 percent today. In an age of economic globalization and complex, non-traditional political and economic threats, the United States needs a superior and well-funded diplomatic corps, with the authority to coordinate the full range of American capabilities and apply them across a wide range of international issues. This requires a sizable and sustained increase in American overseas development assistance, to be administered by the

political, economic and area experts trained for this job. American commitments to multilateral regional institutions in Asia, such as the Asian Development Bank, should be increased, as well.

Second, the United States can help Asian states strengthen the institutions that support liberalizing markets and politics. The Federal Reserve Bank and the Securities and Exchange Commission, for example, have worked with Chinese officials to develop central banking and financial regulation institutions. Americans have also helped set up the local asset management companies that will take over China’s non-performing loans. Pragmatic Asian engagements such as these can be strengthened to include developing legal institutions, industrial organization and small business support groups, consumer and industrial credit institutions, and even support for officials and institutions currently looking for ways to develop parliamentary reform. The U.S. government need not undertake all of these activities directly—indeed, in some cases programs will be more effective if it does not. But the United States can make money available to private sector and academic institutions on both sides of the Pacific that wish to engage in institution building. There is no reason that re-inforcing liberal institutions should not enjoy bipartisan political support. Although it was the Clinton Administration that attempted to use American non-governmental organizations to build liberal institutions in Asia (only to run afoul of opposition in Congress), the original campaign to build “the infrastructure of democracy” began in the Reagan Administration in 1982.

Third, the United States should intensify, not reduce, military-to-military contact, including officer exchanges and regularized military communication with key nations, including China. But military ties should not be the central focus of America’s relationship with any coun-

try in Asia. And exchanges should be structured to reinforce the position of technical officers and central military authorities *vis-à-vis* line officers (who, in many Asian states, represent the greatest threat to liberal consolidation). If designed properly, these exchanges can support the process of professionalizing Asian militaries, remind potential adversaries of America's enormous lead in relative military capabilities, and reduce the image of a threatening America. All of this can help curb the tendency of Asian reactionaries, whether of the authoritarian conservative or the communist sort, to advocate confrontation.

Fourth, the United States should support the development of regional trade and political institutions. It must ensure, however, that these groups develop in ways that are consistent with long-term American interests. America's inflexible stance on some multilateral financial issues has given rise to proposals for alternative regional economic institutions, several of which seek to fend off American participation and influence. Washington must recognize that there is a free market for ideas on economic organization in Asia, and if the United States does not compete in this market for ideas and institutions, it cannot win. Using its voice in APEC more flexibly and creatively is one way to proceed. Tacit cooperation may also be a useful strategy at times. For example, engaging China through Asian economic institutions such as ASEAN+3 and the Asian Development Bank serves to "de-Americanize" the image of market economics and liberalization, and makes

these ideas more palatable in some Asian environments.

Fifth, American security policy in Asia should also be re-balanced. Security policy should revive inclusive, multilateral means as the norm; unilateral action should be reserved as a last resort. The United States can pursue more than one multilateral track at a time, and it can build flexible coalitions to pursue common interests on a case by case basis. Washington must recognize that most states in Asia have their own concepts of security; at least some of these views must be accommodated for coalition building to work. For example, although Japan appears unwilling to play a full partnership role in American political-military strategies, Tokyo has proved willing and able to help integrate China into liberal regional institutions, including trade groupings and security dialogues.

MUCH HAS BEEN gained in Asia's liberal transformation. Peace, prosperity and democracy have all increased. Yet throughout Asia, liberal trends that support American interests are unconsolidated and often fragile. Threats to these achievements are multiple and complex, and America must recast its engagement with Asia in a broadly pragmatic mold in order to meet them. Such a policy will enhance America's short-term military security, but more importantly, it will promote a self-sustaining cycle of liberalization in Asia, thus furthering the prospects for long-term prosperity and peace in the region. □

Mother of All Nonsense?

Fidel Castro is demonstrably stronger than Saddam Hussein in his ability to hurt the U.S.

—Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, quoted in *The Washington Post*, July 24, 2002

Our Other Korea Problem_____

—Nicholas Eberstadt_____

OVER THE past half-century, East Asia has been a virtual kaleidoscope of political and economic change, but one unchanging feature of the Asian tableau has been the security face-off in Korea. Despite the epochal evolutions in Northeast Asia over the intervening years, the security architecture in Korea today is remarkably similar to that put in place almost fifty years ago. Enormous and heavily equipped Korean armies still confront each other across an ironically named “demilitarized zone” (DMZ), and the United States still provides the essential element of deterrence in the Korean equation through its Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea (ROK), that is, democratic South Korea.

By historic standards, the current security situation in the Korean peninsula may seem relatively calm and favorable. Not far below the surface, however, lie new currents that could expose the delicate underpinnings of the peninsula’s present security arrangements. Surprisingly,

the source from which these new currents emanate is not totalitarian North Korea, but instead democratic South Korea.

Given North Korea’s distinctively quarrelsome and menacing international posture, its hypertrophied military disposition, its suffocating political system, and its catastrophic economic performance, it has not been unreasonable for observers to expect that any major reconfiguration of the international security equation in the Korean region would be precipitated by Pyongyang. By contrast, South Korea is a rapidly developing society that has already joined the OECD—the club of affluent aid-dispensing Western states—and has, over the past decade and a half, established its credentials as a genuine constitutional democracy. To the modern eye, advanced industrial democracies are not epicenters of political instability, much less potentially far-reaching international security challenges. Yet just as unaccountable autocracies have been known to miscalculate in the international arena—not least so in Korea in 1950—free peoples and their representatives are similarly capable of misjudging their own best interests. South Korea’s ongoing pursuit of its current “sunshine policy” toward the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has inadvertently set in play powerful forces that, if mishandled, could threaten the foundations of the

Nicholas Eberstadt holds the Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, DC. This essay draws upon an earlier work in *Strategic Asia 2001–02: Power and Purpose*, Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedbuerg, eds., (National Bureau of Asian Research Press, 2001).

U.S.-ROK military alliance, and with it the future of all U.S. forward force deployments in East Asia.

In this regard, South Korea's next presidential election, to be held in December, could prove a watershed event. Never have the regional security implications of a South Korean election been greater. The analysis here shows why.

"Sunshine" and its Corollaries

SINCE HIS February 1998 inauguration, ROK President Kim Dae-jung has forcefully and consistently promoted his vision for bringing reconciliation, peace and eventual reunification to the Korean peninsula. His "sunshine policy" seeks to dismantle what he calls "the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula" and to replace the 1953 military armistice agreement with a peace treaty between Seoul and Pyongyang. To date, the results of President Kim's efforts to entice the DPRK into intra-Korean cooperation have been stunning, but decidedly contradictory.

On the one hand, the policy can claim a series of spectacular diplomatic distinctions: the June 2000 Pyongyang summit between Kim Dae-jung and DPRK National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il (the only meeting between the top figures of the two Koreas since the peninsula's 1945 partition); the subsequent, also unprecedented, high-level military talks between North and South Korean delegations (and other nonmilitary high-level talks—in all, a noteworthy total of over twenty such sessions over the past two years); and the award of the 2000 Nobel Peace Prize to President Kim. On the other hand, these landmark events have not translated into any palpable reduction of North Korea's actual military arsenal. To the contrary: early last year, General Thomas Schwartz, then-Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, tes-

tified that Kim Jong-il's "military forces are *bigger, better, closer and deadlier*" [emphasis in the original] than before—and, he added, "I can prove it." Last December, the U.S. intelligence community concluded that in the mid-1990s North Korea had produced one, possibly two nuclear weapons, and warned that North Korea was still at work developing long-range ballistic missiles. And just a few months ago, CIA Director George J. Tenet stated there is "no evidence that Pyongyang had abandoned its goal of eventual reunification of the Peninsula under the North's control."

Be this as it may, a popular *perception* of significant movement toward intra-Korean reconciliation unavoidably invites the re-examination of the U.S.-ROK military alliance. Absent a compelling new rationale for its continuation, this alliance will come under mounting pressure for revision, and even termination, if the electorate in South Korea (or the United States) no longer finds the "North Korean threat" to be credible. That perception of progress is set to sharpen because President Kim, now approaching the end of his term, has defined his legacy in terms of his "engagement" with the North. The president and his party are entering an election campaign in which their own credibility rests upon the perception that their approach has substantially deflated the threat—and will deflate it still further if the South Korean electorate continues to back them. As recently as June 2002, President Kim confidently declared that "the possibility of a military confrontation is lessening" in the Korean peninsula, and that the situation was indeed "heading toward stability and peace." (Ironically, just days later, North Korean gunships sank a South Korean naval vessel in the Yellow Sea.)

If President Kim seems prey to wishful thinking, however, he is hardly alone. The South Korean public, like so many other

OECD electorates, is eager to enter into a peaceful and prosperous millennium. Irrespective of varying estimates of Pyongyang's current intentions, there is a widespread and entirely natural longing in the South to be rid of the North Korean threat and to jettison the burdens it entails. From the North Korean point of view, of course, the sight of the South Korean political system taking itself in can only be cause for surprised celebration and a determination to further its purposes. In the past, North Korea's international diplomacy has not been famously successful in persuading the unconvinced of its pacific intentions (to put it mildly). But if an objective of North Korea's tactical reorientation since 1999 has been to foster conditions conducive to a U.S. pullout from South Korea, the program looks to be progressing nicely. North Korea's new approach to dissolving the U.S.-ROK alliance looks like a waiting game—an implicit calculation that patience and self-control will reap strategic dividends. Strange as it may sound, the North Korean leadership may be betting that time is on its side—at least as far as the U.S.-ROK military alliance is concerned.

The Logic and Politics of U.S. Forward Deployment in Korea

SWEET REASON may not normally be North Korea's *métier*, but the DPRK today can pose an entirely reasonable question about a continuing American military relationship with South Korea: If the two Koreas are moving toward reconciliation, as the leadership in both capitals professes, why are American forces scheduled for indefinite residence in the Republic of Korea? North Korea's case, repeated incessantly in its official media, clearly turns on the impression that the two Koreas are making real progress toward a peaceful resolution of their differences. America's ally,

the ROK, concurs; the Kim Dae-jung administration maintains that its "sunshine policy" is paving the way to a lasting peace in the Korean peninsula.

Under the pressures of political competition in an open, multiparty system, South Korea's political leadership has at times gone even further, suggesting that peace in the Korean peninsula is now virtually at hand. Immediately upon his return from the Pyongyang summit, for example, President Kim declared: "[W]e should all regard the North as our compatriot. . . . [M]ore than anything, it is important for our citizens to believe there will no longer be war."¹ The same effusive spirit has begun to inform various aspects of official South Korean policy—including, to some degree, even its defense strategy. In March 2001, for example, the ROK Ministry of Defense divulged that it "was examining a plan to use a different expression than 'primary enemy' in the official description of South Korea's relationship with North Korea."² (When it became clear that there would be considerable opposition to the proposal, the Defense Ministry cancelled its 2002 White Paper altogether rather than designate North Korea as the main threat to South Korea's security.)

A government's words have consequences; in this case they are affecting public perception of the international security environment. Emblematic of newly emerging perceptions within the Republic of Korea was a 2001 report about an opinion poll canvassing fifth and sixth graders in the country's southeastern most province—Kyong sang-namdo, one of the country's more conservative regions. In that survey, a plurality of chil-

¹KBS TV, June 15, 2000, translated as "South President makes speech on arrival home", *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, FE/D3869/S1, June 15, 2000.

²Yonhap News Agency, March 4, 2001.

dren—42 percent—identified North Korea as “the friendliest nation toward South Korea.” (The United States came in second, with 39 percent.)³ Commenting on the results, the report remarked that “the government’s peace policy toward North Korea and reunification education for younger students has greatly affected their thinking.” One should not invest too much meaning in a single sample of youthful opinion, but the same tendencies emerge in recent surveys of adult opinion. In November 2000, a *Donga Ilbo* poll found that a majority (54 percent) still viewed the DPRK as “a militarily threatening state.” On the other hand, 55 percent of the respondents “had a good impression of Kim Jong-il”, and fully 59 percent believed “the possibility of war had almost disappeared following the North-South summit.” In this climate of perceptions, deep divisions of opinion were expressed about the future of U.S. troop deployments. Only 42 percent favored “maintaining current [U.S. force] levels”, while an equal number approved of “reductions” in U.S. troop levels; yet another 15 percent preferred “withdrawal” of U.S. forces altogether. In other words, a clear majority of South Korean adults favors re-evaluating and downgrading the American troop presence in their country.

That sentiment is freighted with history. Not a few South Koreans still blame the United States for the division of the peninsula, for infantilizing South Korean institutions with its overbearing presence, or for too long supporting non-democratic military leadership in their country. But it also speaks to the here and now: the U.S. military presence in South Korea was originally predicated on the existence of a North Korean military threat to the South. If that threat is no longer compelling, neither is the rationale for the U.S.-ROK Treaty.

Moreover, whatever the benefits of an American military presence in the

ROK may be, U.S. forward-deployed troops bring real costs to their hosts, as well. This is literally true due to “burden sharing” arrangements: this year’s ROK budgetary payment for U.S. troop support is slated at \$460 million. But it also entails less obvious costs. American military exercises have inadvertently damaged the property and allegedly caused bodily injury to civilians from South Korea. American bases are a perennial source of environmental headaches for neighboring localities. The behavior of young U.S. soldiers in South Korea—like the behavior of young men anywhere—is sometimes less than exemplary: but when these men violate local law, the Status of Forces Agreement under which American troops serve in the ROK protects them from local prosecution if the crimes alleged carry a sentence of less than three years in prison. (Such provisions will strike some as coming uncomfortably close to “extraterritoriality.”) All else equal, these are surely not costs that a free people would wish upon themselves unless there were good reason for them.

Further evidence for strains in the U.S.-ROK relationship may be gleaned from the South Korean reaction to the events of September 11, 2001. One immediate and dramatic effect of those attacks was a sudden and sincere show of solidarity by American allies across the globe. On September 12, NATO invoked Article 5 of its charter to declare that its signatories would respond to the assault on the treaty’s American member. Although the ROK and the United States are bound by an analogous clause (Article 3) in their joint military-security treaty, no such support emanated from Seoul. Instead,

³“Elementary School Students See N.K. As Friendliest Nation”, *Korean Herald*, April 27, 2001.

the Kim Dae-jung Administration announced its own initiative to cope with global terrorism: a proposed joint declaration against terrorism with Pyongyang!

Ambivalence and indecision in official quarters were mirrored in the South Korean public's response to the terror attacks. In a September 18 poll, less than 40 percent of South Koreans surveyed opined that the United States should react to the attack with military force, the distinct majority preferring that Washington address the problem in "a humane way"; if the United States did pursue military retaliation, only a razor-thin 46 percent to 42 percent plurality favored joining in the campaign. (Levels of public support for the U.S. anti-terror campaign were typically 20 to 30 percentage points higher in other countries bound to the U.S. by a military treaty.)

The contradictions in the U.S.-ROK alliance exposed by the first flash of the terror attacks have not eased over time, and President Bush's January 2002 labeling of North Korea as part of an international "axis of evil" evoked criticism in both popular and some elite political circles. According to one poll, South Koreans disapproved of Bush's formulation by a 56-36 majority. Even fairly trivial incidents seem capable of evoking anti-American outpourings. After a disputed call in the 2002 Winter Olympic Games (in which a jostled South Korean skater lost the gold medal to an American rival), a Gallup poll reported that nearly 60 percent of ROK respondents stated that they "disliked" the United States.⁴ Such is the temper of the times that South Korea's most popular "bubblegum pop" girl band—a heretofore entirely apolitical group with a reputation for extreme wholesomeness—released a harshly anti-American MTV-style video.

To the Polling Booths

NO MATTER what the South Korean public's current perception of the benefit-to-cost balance in the present military alliance with the United States, the next steps in the "sunshine policy" promise to tilt the calculus further toward the debit side of the ledger. This is because the Kim Dae-jung government has been straining to frame a "peace declaration" that Seoul and Pyongyang could sign before the December election.

President Kim has been advocating a peace declaration with North and South Korean signatories since before assuming the presidency. Under questioning from the incoming Bush Administration, he backtracked on the idea in March 2001; shortly thereafter, however, the ROK Unification Minister (a key architect of the "sunshine policy") explained that there had simply been a "misunderstanding over terminology", and since June 2001 President Kim has called for a "peace treaty" with the North. Domestic pressure has since mounted on him to seal such a deal—or at the very least, to arrange for a joint expression of peaceful intentions by divided Korea's paramount leaders. Eliciting such a dramatic gesture or seemingly friendly diplomatic response from the DPRK would now, in the latter part of his presidency, weigh heavily on any ultimate reading of his own legacy. It would likewise bear directly on the future feasibility of Kim Dae-jung-style "sunshine policy" for any successor.

From Kim Dae-jung's own standpoint, the imperative of securing a conciliatory response from the North has taken on an ever-growing importance as the

⁴*Digital Chosun Ilbo*, March 3, 2002; reprinted as "ROK Poll: 59.6 Percent of South Koreans Said to 'Dislike' US", *FBIS-CHI-2002-0305*, March 3, 2002.

President's domestic leeway for movement has been steadily narrowing. Despite his international acclaim, Kim is caught in a political straightjacket at home. His ruling coalition is no longer in charge of the country's legislative branch, having essentially lost control of the National Assembly to the ROK's main opposition party in September 2001. In practical terms, the loss of the National Assembly now prevents the President from following through on the unfinished items of his domestic agenda (health care reform, education reform, business reform and all the rest). But the National Assembly would not have switched hands if Kim's government had not already lost much of its initial luster. The South Korean electorate is today deeply dissatisfied with the country's political and economic situation. In 2000, three out of four South Koreans surveyed said the nation was "not on the right track", and last year, according to the finding of the Korea Democracy Barometer, cited by Columbia University's Samuel S. Kim, "a plurality of South Korean citizens [rated] the Kim Dae-jung government more negatively *than the past military government headed by former General Chun Doo-hwan*" [emphasis added]. Mired as he now is in his own family's corruption scandals, and increasingly perceived as a do-nothing president, Kim's popularity has plummeted to 20–30 percent—down from almost 90 percent at his inauguration.

But while President Kim may be down, he is hardly out. Previous South Korean presidents have suffered even greater ratings drops: President Kim Young-sam was down to single-digit approval ratings when he left office. And seething public dissatisfaction hardly spares Kim's political rivals; indeed, to judge by the surveys, many of Kim's opponents are held in even lower public regard than he is. In one poll, Lee Hoi-chang—*de facto* leader of the parliamen-

tary opposition and now presidential nominee for the principal opposition party (the Grand National Party or GNP)—garnered an approval rating of less than 13 percent. Furthermore, South Korean domestic politics is a highly fractured affair, with crosscutting cleavages separating voters by region, class, education and age. No candidate has ever won an absolute majority of votes in an open Korean presidential election.

Given the semi-paralytic state of his presidency, President Kim's best shot for affecting a sudden boost in his own popularity—and in support for his party's presidential nominee this election year—may therefore lie in a powerful symbolic gesture in foreign policy. Given the precarious balances and the deep, seemingly structural divisions that characterize politics in the ROK, such a gesture could end up making the difference for the "sunshine" candidate in a tight presidential race.

Thus the possibility of a visit to South Korea by Kim Jong-il, and the prospect of a North-South peace document, takes on extraordinary portent for the Kim Dae-jung administration and his ruling party. Given the importance that the current ROK government invests in such a visit and that envisioned document, the prospect of a peace proposal scripted to Pyongyang's tastes may be one of the enticements Seoul will use to lure Kim Jong-il to South Korea. (That prospect assumes more than a hypothetical possibility: former ROK General Lim Dong-won, a confidant of President Kim Dae-jung and co-architect of the "sunshine policy", went to Pyongyang in April of this year on a mission to jumpstart the "Korean peace process", and more impromptu missions may follow.) If so, President Kim would not be the first worried politician in a democracy to gamble on national security for the sake of maintaining his party in office—and the June 2002 gunboat inci-

dent, serious as it was, does not necessarily leave the possibility of an election-influencing “peace breakthrough” dead in the water. South Korean polls show that while 70 percent of the public believes Pyongyang deliberately engineered the shoot-out, nearly 60 percent nevertheless want the “sunshine policy” to continue. It is worth recalling, too, that President Kim has choreographed such “breakthroughs” to coincide with the South Korean electoral calendar before: his historic visit to Pyongyang, for example, was announced just three days before the country’s April 2000 National Assembly elections.

If Seoul and Pyongyang do sign some sort of declaration, the issue of the future of American forces in the ROK will be thrown into sharp relief. A peace deal removes the stated rationale behind the U.S.-ROK alliance—to deter a North Korean attack—and opens up the question of the future role of U.S. forces on the peninsula. Signs of such a reconsideration are already in the air. While President Kim and his top officials have been explicit in their desire for a continuing U.S. troop presence in the peninsula after reunification, they have been vague about the *nature* of that presence. Their remarks indicate that Seoul might request that American forces in the country remain not as *allies* but as *peacekeepers*: troops, in other words, with no special political relationship to their host government, but instead charged as a sort of international constabulary (much like the current U.S.-led missions in portions of the former Yugoslavia).

On its face, there may be a certain logic to the transformation of the U.S.-ROK military alliance into a Korea-based U.S. peacekeeping mission for the duration of any transition period en route either to Korean peace or, beyond that, unification. Such an arrangement might well garner broad regional acceptability. Some unnamed Chinese sources quoted

in the Western press have said that both Beijing and Pyongyang might be amenable to a continuing U.S. presence if the military alliance were disbanded and U.S. forces reconfigured as a peacekeeping operation. That proposition, however, is by no means automatically attractive to the American voting public and its representatives. To the contrary: confronted with the prospect of stationing Americans as peacekeepers in Northeast Asia—that is to say, in replicating Kosovo-style rules of billeting and engagement in a potentially much more dangerous neighborhood—Congress might decline the invitation. Thus, not only in South Korea but also in the United States, circumstances are developing that could severely challenge the justifying logic and the political sustainability of U.S. troop deployments in South Korea.

Of even greater concern, therefore, than the possibility of a Korean “October surprise” was the April nomination by President Kim Dae-jung’s ruling party (the Millennium Democratic Party) of Roh Moo-hyun as its candidate for president in the coming election. A dark-horse candidate until this spring, Mr. Roh is virtually alone in the entire constellation of contemporary South Korean political figures in having *never* visited the United States: an achievement that can at once be understood as an act of conscious will over the years (he is now 56), and as a political signal in and of itself. A former human rights activist, Roh was publicly agitating for the ouster of U.S. forces from South Korea as recently as 1990. Roh insists that he has subsequently had a change of heart, but his newfound allegiance to the U.S.-ROK security alliance remains to be tested.

At this juncture, the outcome of the presidential race is far from certain. Throughout much of the spring, Roh led his main rival (Lee Hoi-chang of the Grand National Party) by as much as

twenty points in the polls. Then, in June, what the South Korean press dubbed the “Roh wind” hit the doldrums: the ruling party was shellacked in regional (gubernatorial) elections, and Roh fell behind Lee. The ruling party was further battered in the August by-elections, losing eleven seats in the National Assembly. Yet at this writing, nearly five months before the vote, the contest is hardly over. Handicapping political contests is unusually difficult, for South Korean domestic politics are extraordinarily volatile—in part because political parties are more fragile and less institutionalized than in any other OECD country. (In South Korea, political parties often seem to enjoy the half-life of certain rare elements in the periodic table: the constant state of flux is illustrated by the fact that President Kim’s current ruling party is not the same one under which he was elected to the presidency.) Roh himself has liabilities: his (comparatively youthful) age; his habit of making off-the-cuff remarks; his associates; even his regional origins.

Indeed, any number of factors could sink Roh’s presidential hopes: an unexpected crisis with North Korea (his rival Lee is an outspoken proponent of a tougher posture toward the DPRK, and a staunch supporter of the ROK-U.S. alliance); a successful effort by his opponents to define him as “radical” (most South Korean voters today characterize themselves as moderate, or slightly conservative); or an infelicitous but memorable turn of phrase during the heat of the campaign. But Roh is electable, and even if he loses the coming election, he will not be the last major ROK presidential candidate to cast a cold eye on the United States.

There are other, deeper problems, too. Unresolved structural difficulties in the ROK economy (including, but not limited to, the rapid graying of the ROK pop-

ulation, the to-date tentative progress in desperately-needed corporate and financial reforms, the fragility of the country’s service industries, and the country’s continuing difficulties in establishing a domestic scientific-research infrastructure) promise to exacerbate economic frictions in the U.S.-ROK relationship. All else equal, and no matter which party wins in December, such frictions will prompt voters to scrutinize the U.S. military alliance more carefully than ever, and to be less deferential in criticizing the alliance’s burdens.

AN AMERICAN troop withdrawal from Korea, or the downgrading of the U.S. presence into a peacekeeping force, would generate far-reaching reverberations—though some U.S. analysts favor such a course of events.⁵ One such reverberation would concern the future of U.S. forward bases in Japan. For Japan to be the only East Asian state hosting U.S. troops, this on top of the continuing controversy in Japanese domestic politics with regard to Okinawa, might be hard to sustain for long. Thus, an American military pullout from South Korea, far from leading to a bolstering of U.S. forces elsewhere in East Asia, might trigger a major diminution of American influence in the Pacific.

The worst of all outcomes would be a politically rancorous American withdrawal from Korea at a time when a highly armed North Korean state fronting an effective charm offensive saw opportunities to further its old ambition—the reunification of the peninsula under its

⁵See, for example, Doug Bandow, *Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World* (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1996), and Selig S. Harrison, *Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).

aegis. Those particulars could all too easily set the stage for a potentially devastating conflict in Korea, with spillover potential to other major powers.

But even presuming genuine rapprochement between North and South and some measure of stability in Korea, an American withdrawal from Korea would still create a security vacuum and invite a latter-day version of the Great Game of realpolitik the Pacific powers played so roughly in the region a century ago. A U.S. military withdrawal from Korea might be welcomed in Moscow or Beijing, but, in truth, both are ambivalent about the departure of the American military presence in Korea. In public they support U.S. withdrawal, but privately they recognize that Northeast Asia would be a less stable neighborhood—and a region less disposed to economic growth—without the U.S. military presence. Although any losses—in terms of diminished economic potential and reduced national security—would be distributed unevenly in the region, all the Pacific powers and South Korea *would* lose from an end to the U.S.-ROK military alliance and the U.S.-dominated security order in East Asia. Of all the political actors in East Asia, only the

DPRK—the region's lone radical revisionist state—could reasonably expect any benefits.

Absent a convincing rationale, the Mutual Defense Treaty—and the forward deployment of U.S. forces in Korea for which it provides—cannot count on the continued support from both the South Korean and American publics that is necessary to sustain it. Since it is manifestly in the interests of Seoul and Washington to keep the U.S.-ROK military alliance in good repair, it is incumbent upon American and South Korean policymakers to elucidate that rationale.

The original rationale—premised on the risk of hostile external maneuvers against South Korea—may not yet be so *passé* as some think. If the day arrives that the North-South struggle is no more, however, a compelling rationale for a continuing ROK-U.S. alliance can still be made, based upon deterring instability in an economically important, too well-armed, and not-yet-solidly-liberal international expanse. On both sides of the Pacific, national audiences wait to be persuaded of that rationale. Statesmen who understand the value of the relationship would be well advised to devote a little more effort to the task. □

Oblivious Imperialists

Only Americans could claim that they did not wish to manipulate the politics of a country in which tens of thousands of American troops were stationed and in which the country's home army was directly under American command. And only Americans could make that claim with a measure of sincerity.

—Robert Kagan, "What Korea Teaches", *The New Republic*, March 9, 1998

The Rock Gets Rolled

—Joe Garcia—

ONE FOOT separates Gibraltar from Spain, that being the distance between the Spanish and the British frontier gates. You show your passport to the Spanish border guard and then, before you pass through, to the British guard as well. You are now leaving the Spanish town of La Linea to step upon the world's biggest pebble, the majestic Rock of Gibraltar, rising almost perpendicularly from sea level to some 1,400 feet at its highest point. This limestone rock of Jurassic age is the lasting symbol of British imperialism, and of injured Spanish pride at having lost it to the British 300 years ago. (It is also the symbol of The Prudential Insurance Company of America, of Newark, NJ; none of us here, truth to tell, has ever quite figured out what to make of that.)

Now, as the saying goes, you can feel as safe as the Rock of Gibraltar, but you begin to wonder as the London-like red double-decker bus begins its journey on the only road into downtown Gibraltar—which incredibly cuts across the airfield runway. The barrier is down and the jet-liner from London roars as its tires grip onto an airstrip resembling an oversized aircraft carrier. Beyond Winston Churchill Avenue and an old Moorish castle is the town, which nestles on the western

slopes, rising from the one-time busy naval harbor to what is now essentially a commercial and cruise ship terminal. Gibraltar is populated by 30,000 people who call it their homeland, their country.

This tiny outpost of empire is the last remaining colony in Europe, as its claimant, Spain, likes to say. It occupies just under three square miles of the Iberian peninsula, but within its minuscule dimensions it squeezes two cathedrals, four synagogues, two mosques and a Hindu temple. There are 19 banks and nearly as many companies as there are people. About 300 apes roam in the wild, as well. The homegrown Royal Gibraltar Regiment is the Rock's largest military unit; its police force is over 200-strong and is the second oldest in Britain and the Commonwealth. Gibraltar is the leading bunkering port in the Western Mediterranean and, of course, it commands the strategic Strait of Gibraltar, which separates Europe from Africa.

Just what is so important about this shining stone in the British Crown, whose intriguing past gives credence to the notion that fact can be stranger (and also more irritating) than fiction? A case can be made that its importance lies mostly in the realm of military history. But that is not how the people of Gibraltar see things today, as the British government seeks to deal away their sovereign identity and sense of repose to Spain, for equities

Joe Garcia is the editor of the Gibraltar daily *Panorama*.

having to do with the internal diplomacy of the European Union. Gibraltar is not about grand strategy and military history anymore; as its homeborn see it, it is about integrity, about right and wrong. It is less dramatic than sieges, wars and competitive espionage, yes; does that also make it less important?


Strait and Narrow

IT ALL STARTED when a Moorish leader conquered the place in 711 C.E. and gave his name to it: *Gebel Tarik*, the mountain of Tarik. Battles raged, and the land changed hands on numerous occasions between the Moors and the Spanish, until 1704 when an Anglo-Dutch fleet conquered it. Under the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 the Spanish Crown formally ceded sovereignty “in perpetuity” to the British Crown, but the Spanish were not particularly good to their word. Of the many sieges they staged over the years, pride of place goes to The Great Siege of 1779, which lasted three years, seven months and twelve days. The fortress, outnumbered four-to-one, was attacked with all manner of Spanish contraptions, including floating batteries, which gave the British the idea of setting them ablaze by firing red-hot cannon balls from vantage points along Gibraltar’s rocky promontory. After 200,000 shots rained down, the Spanish backed off, and there followed a long period of peace. British Gibraltar became an impregnable fortress.

Through war and peace, the native Gibraltarians emerged. “In this small corner of the world there lives today a people of amazingly mixed stock who represent a fusion of very many races . . . basically Genoese, but with much inter-marriage between Spaniards, Portuguese, Minorcans, Italians, persons from the British Isles, Maltese, Jews and many races of Northern Europe”, wrote then-British

Governor and Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Kenneth Anderson in 1950. Under British protection, this eclectically composed population increased by leaps and bounds. As it did, the British had the penchant of dividing the population into as many classes as they could think of: By 1777, in the 3,000-plus population, residents were known as “British Blood Native Protestant” and “British Blood Non-Native Protestant.” There were also “Alien Blood Native Roman Catholics” and a wide range of combinations. By the next century the classifications had been simplified to “British from Britain”, “British from Gibraltar” and “Aliens.” (Nowadays, we have “Gibraltarians”, “Other British” and “Non British.”) With no wars to fight, life must have been something of a bore, so the British decided in 1830 that their battle-scarred fortress would henceforth become a Crown Colony (which, unknown at the time, was to provoke a war of words with the Spanish in years to come, for Gibraltar ended up being listed at the United Nations as a colony to be decolonized). So it remained in relative peace for over a century, serving as sentry post for the British Navy over the strait and narrow separating Europe from North Africa.

World War II then brought great change and sacrifice. Military considerations helped make Gibraltar into a city-within-a-city, with tunnels being hewn inside the Rock. A self-contained, underground fortress emerged, with its own power and water supplies, even a hospital. Testimony to the scale of the operation is that there are 35 miles of subterranean roads—more roads inside than outside the Rock. As the weekly dances for military men and women proceeded, the British secret agent Donald Darling recalled that “alarming explosions from within the bowels of the Rock, where Canadian tunnelers worked day and



working here or in the firing trenches, that cattle may be grazing and people exercising horses." These were the kind of impediments General Eisenhower could do without as his aircraft touched down on Gibraltar in November 1942. He was to command Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa: the first major Anglo-American amphibious campaign and a turning point in the struggle against Nazi Germany. Eisenhower was installed in what the British called "an office in the maritime headquarters", but which his own aides described as a "cramped, damp, 8-by-8 foot cubbyhole" deep inside the Rock, and accessible only through a tunnel as dark as night.

German agents spied relentlessly on the Allied command in Gibraltar through powerful telescopes from the Spanish port of Algeciras just five miles across

the bay. The reason was clear: more than 400 aircraft lay crammed wingtip to wingtip on the airstrip, and warships kept coming in and out. But the Germans were deceived into thinking that the military build-up was intended to relieve besieged Malta, or to prepare a limited landing behind Rommel in Libya. Even before Eisenhower's arrival, however, Gibraltar's importance to the Allied cause had not escaped Hitler's attention. As early as 1940, Hitler had issued Directive No. 18, code-named "Operation Felix"—the German plan to invade the Iberian peninsula, capture Gibraltar and drive the British out of the Western Mediterranean. Hitler was offering the Spanish dictator, General

night, interrupted the syncopation of 'The Big Noise from Winetka' or the 'Anniversary Waltz.' Meanwhile, the lorries, piled high with stones blasted out by the tunnelers, were driven downhill toward the airfield, to be used for its extension into the (still) disputed waters of the bay.

The war effort led to Britain's half of the narrow, low-lying isthmus that links the Rock to mainland Spain being used initially as an emergency landing ground. The then-Governor recalled having received a proposal: "I propose, with Your Excellency's concurrence, to issue an order warning pilots that, should a forced landing be necessary, they are to bear in mind that there may be men

Francisco Franco, the prize of a Spanish Gibraltar, but Spain's demands escalated and the plan was not activated. Speaking in Nuremberg prison, Hermann Goering said that the most damaging mistake to German fortunes was Hitler's failure to march through Spain, with or without Franco's assent, "capture Gibraltar and spill into Africa. . . . [I]t would have altered the whole course of the war."¹ In February 1945, Hitler admitted: ". . . we ought to have attacked Gibraltar in the summer of 1940." Indeed, such an attack, as Churchill himself put it at the time, would have been extremely dangerous.²

The exigencies of war led to the entire population, except able-bodied men, being evacuated "for their safety" to places such as bombed-out London. Those who stayed behind initiated vociferous campaigns calling for the repatriation of their loved ones; when they returned after the war they did so all the wiser, having experienced the wider world "out there." As the population bulged after V-E Day, there were more people about to make their weight felt in a new fight for civil and political liberties. Then, suddenly it seemed, the colonial masters allowed the emergence of political parties, workers' unions and the publication of newspapers without a license from the military governor. The Gibraltarians' political emancipation was soon crowned by the visit of the Duke of Edinburgh in 1950 to inaugurate the Gibraltar legislature, the forerunner of today's 17-seat parliament.

Whether this trip irritated General Franco is not a matter of clear public record, but the visit of the recently enthroned Queen Elizabeth II, just four years later, certainly did. By the mid-1960s, Franco had explicitly renewed Spain's quest for Gibraltar. His annexation plan received support at the UN General Assembly from the Soviet bloc, whose leaders in Moscow saw it as an

opportunity to weaken the British presence in the Mediterranean and to roil NATO cohesion. In 1968, the Spanish government sealed the land frontier, suspended maritime links and cut telephone communications. Except for a daily air link with London and a ferry service across the Strait to Tangier, Gibraltar was isolated. Thus did a modern siege of Gibraltar incarcerate the Gibraltarians in their small rock of a homeland.

Although Franco insisted that Gibraltar was not worth a war, the British took no chances. The British chiefs of staff believed that Spanish military aims could range from sabotage in the airfield area to the occupation of the whole colony, and they prepared countermeasures in meticulous detail. The level and manner of British response would have depended on the action taken by the Spaniards, but if this was to occupy the whole of Gibraltar, the British planned to attack Spanish forces on Spanish soil, waters and airspace. The situation was so potentially explosive that during a visit to London by President Nixon in February 1969, the British appealed to him to dissuade Franco from engaging in military action. The British recognized the reluctance of the U.S. administration to involve itself in Anglo-Spanish problems on account of the American bases agreement with Spain, but they appealed to Nixon to "do what you can to persuade the Spaniards to adopt a policy that can get us out of our present deadlock, which is in the interest of neither country." Whatever messages were passed, Franco decided not to be rash.

¹Quoted in Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, *The Inner Circle* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959), pp. 195-6.

²Winston Churchill, *Their Finest Hour* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), pp. 530, 607.

Whose Gibraltar?

IN FEBRUARY 1985, with Franco gone and democracy restored in Spain, the blockade was lifted. However, much to the chagrin of Madrid, the British had since devolved powers to the Gibraltarians, making the Rock self-governing in internal affairs, with Britain largely responsible only for foreign affairs, defense and internal security. Any transfer of sovereignty to Spain would have to be sanctioned by the Gibraltarians themselves, as stated in the British assurance in the preamble to the 1969 Gibraltar Constitution. That would seem to render moot the fact that the Treaty of Utrecht came with the proviso that Gibraltar would revert to Spain should Britain ever abrogate the treaty. Gibraltarians have held for years that the Rock is not Spain's to claim *or* Britain's to give away—echoing a phrase coined by a former British Governor, General Sir William Jackson. “Utrecht is not worth the paper on which it was written”, chorus all five of the political parties here, meaning that such an archaic document cannot deny them the right to self-determination. Anyway, they tell you, a number of sieges by the Spanish broke the treaty, and it is so antiquated that, for example, it prohibits Jews from living here—even though many Jews who do live here can trace their ancestry back several centuries! (A prominent Jew, the late Sir Joshua Hassan, was the elected leader for forty years in what is a predominantly Roman Catholic community. In recent demonstrations, his nephew Solomon Levy, an estate agent, has been parading a placard that reads: “I was born British and I want to die British.” He warns: “If Gibraltar were to become Spanish we would start a clandestine resistance movement.”)

The assurance inscribed in the Gibraltar Constitution has now become a matter of urgent practical interest. At London's behest, Britain and Spain initi-


ed serious negotiations in July 2001 seeking to overcome all their centuries-long differences over the Rock. The proposed deal includes the retention by the Gibraltarians of British citizenship, respect for their British way of life and greater self-government, but also some yet-to-be-specified form of joint sovereignty with Spain. Gibraltarians would have the final say, promised Prime Minister Tony Blair. Said Gibraltar's opposition leader, Joe Bossano, British Foreign Minister Jack Straw has told us that “this ‘skeleton’ will be ‘fleshed out’ by Gibraltarian participation in subsequent negotiations.”

But Bossano demurs. “Our position”, he said, “is that Britain has no right to enter into such arrangements to make concessions on sovereignty.” In this he is as one with the Gibraltar chief minister, Peter Caruana, who has repeatedly accused the British Foreign Office of betrayal. “It is”, he said, “a violation of Gibraltar's political rights for the Foreign Office to do deals above our heads which stay on the table even if we reject them in referendum. The UK parliament is opposed to this, as is British public opinion.” This is true. “Sovereignty shared is sovereignty surrendered”, said Michael Ancram, the Conservative Party's foreign affairs spokesman; and a Gibraltar government advertising campaign in the British press elicited nearly 400,000 messages of support. Not surprisingly, then, Gibraltarians gave Mr. Straw a noteworthy reception when he visited Gibraltar on May 3; he was “hailed” as a traitor by rowdy British flag-waving protestors.

To put not too fine a point on it, Gibraltarians are furious that Britain has been negotiating the thorny issue of sovereignty with Spain in the full knowledge that the Gibraltarians are against it. Virtually the whole population have taken part in pro-British demonstrations to make the point as visible as possible, and to support the October 2001 “Declaration of

Unity" (by past and present members of the Gibraltar House of Assembly) which stated, *inter alia*: "The people of Gibraltar will never, ever, compromise or give up our inalienable right to self-determination . . . and our sovereignty."

Of course, the Spanish government does not agree with any of this. The question of sovereignty is a matter for Britain and



Gibraltarians rally against Anglo-Spanish negotiations, March 2002.

Spain only, said Josep Piqué before being replaced as Spanish foreign minister in a cabinet reshuffle in July. It is, as Madrid sees it, a matter of de-colonization and Spain's territorial integrity. That argument, however, may well have encouraged the Moroccan government to apply similar principles to two Spanish enclaves on its coast, Ceuta and Melilla (and the Canary Islands might be Morocco's ultimate objective, particularly if the prospect of oil wealth arises). On July 11, Morocco occupied a very small, uninhabited rock near Ceuta—called Leila ("night") by the Moroccans and Perejil ("parsley") by the Spanish. "The Moroccans are perhaps watching what Britain and Spain are doing about Gibraltar", the British Ambassador in Madrid, Peter Torry, said on Spanish radio, just as U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell was brokering a temporary solution after Spain mobilized a small armada to bloodlessly expel the Moroccans.

Spain's motives for wanting to recover Gibraltar are obvious. But why did Britain's Labor government request negotiations in the first place, and why does it persist with them in face of virtually unanimous opposition in Gibraltar? Everyone in Gibraltar agrees that Britain wants to strike a deal with Spain because London

thinks that its interests in the European Union are best served by a closer relationship with Madrid—and the Gibraltar dispute stands in the way. The Spaniards, forever clamoring for the Rock's return but without any real expectation of being taken seriously, could not believe their luck when British officials suggested to them a sovereignty deal over Gibraltar in return for an Anglo-Spanish alliance to counter the dominant Franco-German axis in the European Union. (The plot thickened when, in March, the EU offered Gibraltar what has been generally described as a "bribe" of £35 million as an inducement not to fuss if a deal is struck; "Gibraltar is not for sale", answered Mr. Caruana.) In a UK parliamentary debate in June, the British Labor government's Minister for Europe, Peter Hain, made London's motive plain enough: "Our alliance with Spain in Europe is helping us to deliver a European Union of strong nations . . . however, that relationship remains constrained by the Gibraltar dispute. . . . [W]e must fix the issue."

Given such a rationale, most observers believed that British capitulation to Spain would not take long. Such expectations, however, have not been realized. After Blair and the Spanish Prime Minister José

Maria Aznar met in London in May, they let it be known that “difficulties” had arisen. The difficulties center on three points: Spanish insistence that the door of joint sovereignty should be left open, leading possibly to full Spanish sovereignty in the future; the question of Spain’s involvement in a British military base; and Spain’s concern about a referendum being held in Gibraltar. (Madrid fears that a referendum could be interpreted as an act of self-determination and lead separatists in the Basque region to demand one for themselves.) Seeing the British in such a pliant mood, the Spanish seem to have overreached.

That difficulties have arisen tend to cheer the Gibraltarians, but they remain active in pressing their case. For example, assurances by Foreign Office officials that, in any deal, Britain would retain complete operational control of the base, have not mollified critics. Indeed, a letter sent by the UK defense secretary Geoff Hoon to Mr. Straw, subsequently leaked to the British media, suggested that British strategic interests *were* being put at risk by the planned deal, that there was “growing concern among both British and American Armed Forces that any deal could damage the operational capability of the Rock’s naval base and military airfield.” The reason is that were the base to be treated like a U.S. base in Spain, as the Spanish government favors, questions asked would have to be answered, thus impairing the absolute freedom of maneuver now enjoyed by the British and American militaries in a community that has grown up in the shadow of a fortress and sees the military as a way of life. An example: When a U.S. warship arrived at Gibraltar to mark the Fourth of July celebrations this year, it pleased Gibraltarians; but the Spanish side viewed the visit antagonistically, with charges aired that it carried nuclear armaments and hence was a clear and present danger to Spain.

The stakes, then, are not trivial. While

the great British naval base, capable of handling repairs to warships as big as aircraft carriers, is no longer, and while defense spending has dwindled over the last thirty years from representing 70 percent of the local economy to a mere 7 percent, around 150 British warships have called at Gibraltar since April 1998. There is a staging post for the Royal Air Force, which is currently undertaking an £8 million refurbishment of the airfield. About one hundred training exercises take place annually, including submarine exercises in the deep waters around the Rock. The use of nuclear berthing facilities is a key activity, as well. The Rock also continues to be the “ears and eyes” of the British—and by extension of the Americans—in an area of the world where potential trouble spots abound. The United States has communications interests here, and the Rock is used by U.S. Marines for training. (Strong Anglo-American influence in the Strait is perhaps why Al-Qaeda chose it as a terrorist target, before timely arrests this past summer in Morocco apparently foiled their plans.) American interests are quietly looked after by a solitary U.S. liaison officer, whose operational center lies deep inside a tunnel not far from where General Eisenhower commanded Operation Torch. The status of the Rock still matters, not just to the people of Gibraltar, but to the United States, as well.

IS THERE LIGHT at the end of the diplomatic tunnel for this centuries-old Anglo-Spanish confrontation? Proposals by a former chief minister, Sir Robert Peliza, to fully integrate Gibraltar with Britain were rejected by the British Government in the 1970s. The concept of Gibraltar becoming a “Royal City State” within the European Union was promoted in 1992 by the Gibraltar Liberal Party, but without success. Now, a thorough revision of the Constitution has been undertaken by an all-party committee of the mini-

parliament here to remove the remaining vestiges of colonialism and gain greater self-government within the British umbrella. But Gibraltarians do not want to boot the British off the Rock and, indeed, any proposed constitutional change will be put to London.

Meanwhile, as Britain and Spain persevere with their talks over joint sovereignty for Gibraltar, Mr. Caruana has opined that the Andorra model may be the sort of solution Gibraltarians could support. He says this not because he wants to be a prince, but because the Principality of Andorra, sandwiched between France and Spain high up in the Pyrenees (those other rocks), “represents full self-determination for the people of Andorra, with sovereignty vested in its people.” He added: “Andorra is in no sense a part of Spain nor of Spanish sov-

ereignty. It is an autonomous territory.” So what is the problem? “Unfortunately, the modern Andorra model is unacceptable to Spain”, Mr. Caruana told me in his Convent Place office. Madrid does not accept self-determination or real autonomy for Gibraltar.

Nonetheless, the Gibraltar government has decided to go it alone and organize an internationally-supervised referendum in late October. It is understood as a pre-emptive strike against the looming Anglo-Spanish deal “to make Gibraltar’s view on joint or any Spanish sovereignty absolutely clear”, as Mr. Caruana puts it. Madrid has condemned the Rock’s proposed referendum, *and so has London*. So Gibraltar and its people face yet another siege—only this time the British government is not standing like a rock on their behalf. It rather seems reduced to gravel. □

America and the Rock: Chapter One

Although the Spaniards had been thrice defeated in their attempts to recover Gibraltar, they continued to view that garrison with a jealous eye, determined, if we may judge from their late conduct to seize the first eligible opportunity of wresting it, if possible, from the dominion of Great-Britain.

The war of 1762 was too unexpended on the part of Spain, and conducted with too great success by the British minister to admit of such an enterprise as the Siege of Gibraltar. The period was not however far distant, when the contest between Great-Britain and her Colonies seemed to promise as favourable an opportunity as their warmest wishes could have anticipated particularly when, in addition to the civil war, they found hostilities taking place between Great-Britain and France. The close of the year 1777, when the news of the convention of Saratoga first arrived in Europe, was the period which they embraced to introduce themselves into this dispute. Hostilities had then been carried on for near six months between Great-Britain and France: Spain therefore judged the opportunity favourable to offer her mediation, proposing such an arrangement as she must be assured would not be agreeable to the principal belligerent powers. Great-Britain had no sooner refused her acquiescence, than the Court of Madrid espoused the part of France; and, on the 16th of June, 1779, the Spanish Ambassador, the Marquis d’Almodovar, presented to the Court of London his hostile manifesto. . . . The principal design of the Court of Madrid, in entering into this war, was evidently the recovery of Gibraltar.

—Captain John Drinkwater, *A History of the Late Siege of Gibraltar* (London, 1785)

Books



Fighting Men

Geoffrey Parker

Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 288 pp., \$25.

“THE DIFFICULTIES writers have in putting themselves in the place of a wartime political leader who bears manifold responsibilities and carries stresses that they have never borne”, writes Eliot Cohen in *Supreme Command*,

is the greatest obstacle to sound historical judgment on wartime statesmanship. Indeed, even the immediate subordinates of the man at the top only dimly understand, much less share, the acute pressures or the perspectives of a prime minister or a president.

Despite this important disclaimer, no one is better qualified than Cohen to write about political leadership in wartime. He has military experience and has taught at a service academy; he has read and written extensively about war; he is a member of the Defense Policy Board, advising the

Secretary of Defense; and he headed the team of scholars that produced the influential five-volume *Gulf War Air Power Survey* (1993). This distinguished career helps to explain the outstanding quality of this, his latest book.

Cohen begins by outlining what he calls the “normal theory of civil-military relations”, advanced by his mentor at Harvard, Samuel P. Huntington, “which holds that the healthiest and most effective form of civilian control of the military is that which maximizes professionalism by isolating soldiers from politics, and giving them as free a hand as possible in military matters.” He then devotes a chapter each to four outstanding wartime leaders who repeatedly violated this norm—Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill and David Ben-Gurion—and to those who have led the United States in war since 1965, in a chapter aptly entitled “Leadership without Genius.” His final chapter, “The Unequal Dialogue”, draws pointed conclusions for those who exercise and study wartime leadership today, with an “appendix” that refutes Huntington’s

“normal theory” in more detail. He offers “not merely an historical analysis but a study of issues that remain alive to this day”, and to illuminate them Cohen deploys an impressive range of primary and secondary sources in English, French, German and Hebrew.

A PASSAGE from John Nicholay and John Hay, secretaries to Abraham Lincoln, brings Cohen’s chapter on “the greatest of American war presidents” swiftly to its major themes:

Military writers love to fight over the campaigns of history exclusively by the rules of the professional chess-board, always subordinating, often totally ignoring, the element of politics. This is a radical error. Every war is begun, dominated, and ended by political considerations. . . . War and politics, campaign and statecraft, are Siamese twins, inseparable and interdependent; and to talk of military operations without the direction and interference of an administration is as absurd as to plan a campaign without recruits, pay, or rations.

Cohen agrees, and his detailed analysis of Lincoln’s “direction and interference” helps to explain how his administration “dominated” the war it waged. First, the President solicited advice from many quarters. He consulted junior officers and retired generals, both in writing and on his personal visits to the front. Second, he regularly spent time with his generals. (Grant passed the first week of August 1864 in Washington being briefed by the President.) Third, from March 1863 onward (if not before) Lincoln sent a confidant, Charles A. Dana (formerly assistant managing editor of the *New York Tribune* and later Assistant Secretary of War), to report regularly on the morale and command structure of selected armies. On the basis of this information, all of which he considered carefully,

Lincoln issued an endless stream of questions and suggestions to his generals. He rarely gave them direct orders, but those few left no room for disobedience or evasion. Thus on March 3, 1865 he instructed Grant to

have no conference with General Lee unless it be for the capitulation of Gen. Lee’s army, or on some minor, and purely, military matter. . . . [Y]ou are not to decide, discuss, or confer upon any political question. Such questions the president holds in his own hands; and will submit them to no military conferences or conventions.

Lincoln is the only one of Cohen’s four leaders who held supreme command for an entire war. Clemenceau became premier of France only in November 1917, after previous leaders had presided over more than three years of bloody defeat and incompetence. The battle to retain Verdun alone cost the lives of 162,000 Frenchmen, with at least 200,000 more wounded—almost three times as many casualties as the United States (with a population six times larger) lost in the entire Vietnam war. “One may think of French losses at Verdun”, in Cohen’s graphic phrase, “as the equivalent of eighteen Vietnams, suffered in one year.” Not surprisingly, when Clemenceau came to power he faced a mutinous army and a defeatist civilian population. How did he manage to preside over victory parades just one year later and go on to force a real, if fragile, peace on his enemies?

Clemenceau believed (in his own famous aphorism) that “war is too important to be left to the generals”, and he strove to keep control of making both war and peace in his own hands. Above all, despite his age (he was 76 upon becoming premier), he made regular visits to the front line a part of his style of command. His career as a doctor and a journalist had taught Clemenceau the value of detailed

personal observation, “the kind acquired not by reading reports but by looking people in the eye, observing the way they held themselves, hearing their small complaints—sharing, however briefly, the way they lived.” He spent on average one day each week talking to officers and men in the trenches, as well as to the generals safe in their *chateaux* miles behind the front. Although apparently “an inefficient use of his time in one sense”, Cohen argues that these visits “were perhaps his most powerful technique for acquiring information and influencing events.”

Clemenceau used his first-hand knowledge to outmaneuver both his Allies and his principal commander, Marshal Ferdinand Foch. During the war, the former proved the more difficult because, as Winston Churchill once remarked, coalition warfare “is a tale of the reciprocal complaints of allies.” But the elder Frenchman tolerated the costly combination of inexperience and arrogance that characterized the American commanders. “If the Americans do not permit the French to teach them [the rules of trench warfare]”, he is said to have remarked, “the Germans will do so.” With British pettiness, too, he showed infinite patience. He did not impose his choice, Marshal Foch, as Supreme Allied Commander until the desperate German offensive of March 1918 made his case irresistible. He brushed off the endless tirades of David Lloyd George with a joke: “*Ô, la, la, si je pouvais pisser comme il parle.*”

Foch became more of a problem after the fighting ended because the “generalissimo”—now a war hero—had strong views on how the defeated Germans should be treated and he expected French politicians to implement them. When Clemenceau declined to do so, Foch appealed directly to the president of the Republic (the brilliant but volatile Raymond Poincaré, no friend of the premier) and orchestrated a press campaign

(using both French and British journalists) against the policies of his own government. He denounced the Treaty of Versailles as “a surrender”, even “treason”, and threatened to resign unless it was vetted by the appropriate military experts. The premier made it clear, however, that he would accept Foch’s resignation and, as on other occasions, the generalissimo crumbled. As Clemenceau remarked late in life: “I had a wife, she abandoned me; I had children, they turned against me; I had friends, they betrayed me. I have only my claws, and I use them.” Not for nothing was his nickname “The Tiger.”

Clemenceau narrowly missed meeting Lincoln, but he did interview Ulysses S. Grant at the end of the Civil War (he liked to tell American troops in 1918 that he reached Richmond just before the Union Army) and had admired Grant’s principled submissiveness to civilian authority. He also knew Winston Churchill, who accompanied “the Tiger” on one of his visits under fire to the front line (and later published an amusing account of it: “A Day with Clemenceau”). Like Clemenceau, Churchill, despite his age (he was nearly 66 when he became prime minister in May 1940), made a point of visiting the various theaters of operations to judge for himself the problems, the morale, and the men (a point that Cohen underplays); and, like Lincoln, he became a world-class nag. He ceaselessly scrutinized the plans and assertions of his military advisers and commanders in the light of his broad experience (both military and political), reinforced by wide reading and deep reflection. Throughout the Second World War he dictated a stream of inquiries, probes and questions to all involved in the war effort; according to a member of his secretariat, Lord Normanbrook,

This stream of messages, covering so wide a

range of subjects, was like the beam of a searchlight ceaselessly swinging round and penetrating into the remote recesses of the administration—so that everyone, however humble his rank or his function, felt that one day the beam might rest on him and light up what he was doing.

Normanbrook stressed that the effect was “immediate and dramatic. . . . A new sense of purpose and of urgency was created as it came to be realized that a firm hand, guided by a strong will, was on the wheel.” Thanks to this approach, according to the secretary of the Chiefs of Staff, General Hastings Ismay, “not once in the whole war did [Churchill] overrule his military advisers on a purely military question.”

In 1946, just after Churchill relinquished power, David Ben-Gurion became the shadow defense minister of the embryonic Jewish State and, with the proclamation of the State of Israel in May 1948, he became its prime minister. Within days he found himself at war when his Arab neighbors attacked. Like Lincoln (whose complete works he owned) and Churchill (whom he admired), Ben-Gurion brought with him to supreme command limited military experience, but he possessed a very broad knowledge of public affairs amplified by voracious reading in nine languages (his personal library contained 12,000 volumes). He combined a firm strategic vision with a careful mastery of detail (“There are no general issues [in war]”, Ben-Gurion once remarked, “only details.”); and he used them to goad and energize his subordinates.

Again like Lincoln and Churchill, Ben-Gurion became a world-class nag. He needed to be: Israel’s War of Independence lasted, with two brief truces, from May 1948 until January 1949, and saw the Israel Defense Force grow from 16,000 to 92,000 soldiers—still just a fraction of the opposing forces. Amazingly, Israel secured not only almost

all the territory assigned to it by the United Nations Partition Plan, but also other areas of strategic importance. Nevertheless, as Cohen demonstrates through telling use of Ben-Gurion’s writings (mostly in Hebrew), the Old Man (as he was known) remained acutely conscious that Israel could not have and hold everything it pleased. In September 1948, just before the decisive phase of the fighting, he warned:

We can win in war and strike our enemies and smash the armies of Abdullah and Syria, and Iraq and Egypt, and drive them from the land—and we can still lose the diplomatic battle if as a result we create decisive state interests against us in the rest of the world.

Ben-Gurion understood perfectly what Carl von Clausewitz had written in the early 19th century: that, as Cohen puts it, “armies reach a culminating point of victory—a moment at which they have achieved the maximum of their potential, and beyond which they run the risk of exhaustion and defeat.” Ben-Gurion not only won his war and the peace that followed, but also conducted one of the most ruthless after-action reports known to historians. It concluded: “The most dangerous enemy to Israel’s security is the intellectual inertia of those who are responsible for security.”

THE JUXTAPOSITION of the achievement of these great statesmen with those of America’s war leaders between 1965 and 2001 could hardly be more telling. Cohen demonstrates how successive U.S. administrations adhered to the “normal” theory of civil-military relations and abandoned the conduct of war to their senior military advisers. They failed to pick the right generals (William Westmoreland would not have remained in command for four-and-a-half years under Lincoln!), failed to conduct a strategic and operational dia-

logue with them, and failed to set priorities and maintain proportion in what were, after all, secondary conflicts. They therefore lost sight of what they needed to do to prosecute a war—whether it ended in defeat (as in Vietnam, which saw a “deadly combination of inept strategy and excessively weak civilian control”), or in victory (as in the Gulf War, in which the politicians disastrously accepted the military’s narrow definition of “victory” as “success on the battlefield” rather than as “ensuring the stability of the Persian Gulf.”)

Cohen is particularly outspoken on the conduct and outcome of the Gulf War, a subject about which he possesses direct knowledge as a “subordinate.” He excoriates the Bush Administration’s abdication of responsibility for negotiating the armistice to the theater commander. Washington not only permitted General Norman Schwarzkopf to draw up the draft terms (and approved them with the change of a single word) but also to conclude a settlement relatively generous to Iraq—including permission for Saddam Hussein to use helicopters, with which he promptly massacred domestic opponents and thus preserved his rule. The contrast with Lincoln’s lapidary order to Grant in March 1865 could scarcely be more striking.

Lincoln and the other three wartime leaders studied by Cohen maintained a constant but unequal dialogue with their commanders. It was, Cohen explains, “a dialogue, in that both sides expressed their views bluntly, indeed, sometimes offensively, and not once but repeatedly—and unequal, in that the final authority of the civilian leader was unambiguous and unquestioned.” Commanders might loathe their civilian tormentors, but they still had to explain and justify their advice and actions. Sir Alan Brooke, Churchill’s chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, probably spoke for Grant, Foch and many others

when he wrote of his political master in his diary in September 1944: “Never have I admired and despised a man simultaneously to the same extent.” Churchill, who never saw this entry, would probably not have cared. As he responded to another senior officer who apologized after disagreeing “very forcibly with some proposal of his [chief]: ‘You know, in war you don’t have to be nice, you only have to be right.’”

Cohen condemns the failure of successive American political leaders to acquire the necessary detailed knowledge, to formulate the crucial questions, and to pick the correct commanders in order “to be right.” He fears that unless we return to an “unequal dialogue” between generals and their political masters of the sort imposed by his four chosen leaders, the United States will continue to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.

IF *SUPREME COMMAND* has any weakness, it is its limited geographical and chronological focus: Cohen considers only Western states, and among them only democratic leaders since 1861. Sometimes, examples from other areas, other political systems and other centuries point to different conclusions. Thus his claim that “Clemenceau spent more time on the front lines . . . than any other war leader of whom we have a record” ignores countless counter-examples, including Alexander the Great, Gustavus Adolphus and Oliver Cromwell in the West, the Manchu dynasty princes who conquered China, the Tokugawa shoguns who unified Japan, and so on. All led their armies in person. Even in the 20th century, it seems doubtful that Clemenceau’s average of one day a week at the front came close to that of, say, Mao Zedong or Fidel Castro.

Cohen might also have considered the war leadership of major figures who

have *opposed* the Western democracies. Did they too impose an “unequal dialogue” on the military that might explain their success (or at least their resilience)? Admittedly, the answer would require familiarity with different sources and different languages; but if Cohen aims, as he says, to “draw more generalized lessons for contemporary democracies”, the defenders of those democracies need to understand their enemies as well as they know themselves.

Nevertheless, given the difficulties of putting oneself “in the place of a wartime

political leader, who bears manifold responsibilities and carries stresses that [we] have never borne”, this sustained analysis by a perceptive “subordinate” who is also an outstanding historian should become required reading for statesmen and students alike. If there is any justice left in this world for writers, it will. □

Geoffrey Parker teaches history at the Ohio State University; he is the author of *The Military Revolution* (3rd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2000) and *The Grand Strategy of Philip II* (Yale University Press, 1998).

Capital Ideas

Harold James

Douglas Irwin, *The Case for Free Trade* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 288 pp., \$27.95.

Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 192 pp., \$24.95.

George Soros, *On Globalization* (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), 160 pp., \$20.

GLOBALIZATION has become a focus of widespread but on the whole quite inchoate discontent. As other writers in these pages have pointed out, it is not easy to characterize the opposition to the international mobility of factors of production in simple political or social terms.¹ Some of that opposition comes from a leftist alliance of ecologists, anti-

capitalists and elite third worlders who worry that globalization is impoverishing workers in already poor countries. Some of it comes from labor unions in rich countries concerned that unfair competition is hurting their members. Still other opposition comes from what might traditionally be conceived as the Right, but again from very diverse sources: from racists who see immigration as a threat to an idealized view of a homogenous national community, and from small businessmen who see competitive pressures eroding their advantages. Some of these opponents dislike the idea of anything that moves across long distances; but most protesters claim to want a different and better globalization.

On immigration and trade issues, the

¹See Eric Jones, “Stress Testing the Global Economy”, *The National Interest* (Spring 2002).

Right and the Left anti-globalizers present roughly similar agendas: workers' rights, the welfare state, and the insistence that the national community can only be defended by keeping out those who would introduce lower wage demands and other foreign elements into the national economy. Most of today's iconoclastic politicians in the industrial countries, sensing advantage in appealing to these various constituencies, have an anti-global touch, whether in Europe (Jörg Haider, Umberto Bossi), or in the United States (Patrick Buchanan, Ralph Nader). A recent high point of the influence of anti-globalism was when Jean-Marie Le Pen of the anti-immigrationist French National Front advanced to the second round of the French presidential election.

Most academic analysts of globalization and the backlash against it try to see the response in terms of interests badly hit by globalization. Douglas Irwin's *Free Trade Under Fire* is a first-rate book that deals in a systematic and logical way with the arguments and the myths about globalization and trade. One such argument revolves around the impact of liberalized trade on labor markets. Irwin shows that the overall effect of increased trade on employment is neutral; but it shifts workers into relatively well-rewarded jobs (producing for export markets), while industries that compete against imports tend to be low wage. Widening inequality is a consequence less of increased trade than of technology raising the demand for skilled workers. A final section examines how new issues—environmental protection and labor standards—entered the international discussion in the 1990s.

One source of constant frustration and surprise to economists is why arguments for free trade are not more widely accepted. The best rational explanation lies in terms of the logic of collective action, as explained some years ago by the late

Mancur Olson. Those who gain from the protection of particular industries have a powerful incentive to organize for protection, even though the overall costs to the national economy will exceed the benefits; less-organized consumers, who may each lose only a small amount from the additional protection, lack sufficient incentive to counter-mobilize. Indeed, this case was made in Elmer Schattschneider's classic 1935 study of the most notorious of all U.S. tariffs, the Hawley-Smoot Act of 1930.² This study had a powerful effect; it helped to solidify the case that trade policy was better left to the Executive Branch (the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act set up the fundamental mechanism empowering the Executive Branch to negotiate trade agreements; this has continued in the postwar GATT system).

It would be most agreeable if Irwin's argument had a similar effect to that of Schattschneider in building a consensus that trade issues are too important to be left to sectional interests and congressional politics. Agreeable, but unlikely. It takes a catastrophe—such as the trade contraction of the Great Depression—for political behavior to be reshaped in such a manner. But even in that case, the most likely initial outcome of the catastrophe would be more apocalyptic ideologies rather than more sober thought. Already today, after the unprecedentedly long expansion in the 1990s and then a very weak recession, there is plenty of apocalyptic analysis of economic issues.

Indeed, a great deal of the response to globalization is conducted along the lines of a morality drama. Globalization is held to be not just dangerous, but downright

²Elmer Schattschneider, *Political Pressures and the Tariff: A Study of Free Private Enterprise in Pressure Politics as Shown in the 1929-1930 Revision of the Tariff* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1935).

sinful. That is why, one suspects, it has become so appealing to recycle the title of Freud's great gloomy analysis of interwar Europe's cultural malaise (*Das Unbehagen in der Kultur*, usually translated as "Civilization and its Discontents"). Saskia Sassen a few years ago used the title *Globalization and its Discontents*, and Joseph Stiglitz now uses it too. (Perhaps there are so many books on globalization that authors are running out of good titles?) We can best understand the present feeling of moral unease if we apply a longer-term historical perspective.

As today, previous periods of greater market integration and increased long-distance trade created new opportunities and new riches. But many people felt that there was something inherently illegitimate about both, since the benefits were not equally shared. The Renaissance and the great age of European exploration were also periods of great poverty (because of population growth rather than because of the dynamism of the economy). Moralists such as the fiery Florentine friar Girolamo Savonarola or the dyspeptic German Martin Luther fulminated against luxury and long-distance trade. In the latter half of the 19th century, Karl Marx, Richard Wagner and many others excoriated the ills of luxurious and sinful capitalism. The expansion of trade had often been associated with new opportunities for greed, corruption and self-enrichment; and many commentators rapidly reached the conclusion that this was all there was to the new developments.

Most of those pre-20th century protesters thought in terms of some simple moral alternative made of theological or quasi-theological—not economic or socioeconomic—stuff. In the mid 20th century, contrarily, anti-globalizers turned to apparently simple and appealing alternative political models—offered by leaders such as Mussolini, Hitler or Stalin who saw it as their mission to formulate a

new philosophy for the state. Today's globalization, driven by financial flows and financial institutions, also offers many examples analogous to the scandals of the past. But at the moment, there is no simple and coherent, either theological or ideological, solution to the challenge posed by globalization—unless it is the radical one of some versions of Islamic fundamentalism. Can there be a modern protest rationale against the present pulse of global economic integration that is not so extreme?

MANY CLEVER people have tried to work out what might be a sensible "anti-globalization" stance. Like many of the modern protesters themselves, Joseph Stiglitz and George Soros make clear that they are not against globalization as such; they want a "globalization with a human face" in which the social and moral costs are lower. Their books are complementary, and indeed their authors are complimentary about each other. Both come with ringing mutual endorsements. Soros calls Stiglitz's tome a "penetrating, insightful book", a "seminal work that must be read by anyone who cares about the future course of world economies." Returning the favor, Stiglitz wrote a lengthy review of Soros's "brilliant, powerful book" in the May 23, 2002 *New York Review of Books*, in which he credited Soros with writing "carefully, dispassionately and calmly."

Stiglitz's critique of globalization as currently practiced relies on three major indictments: first, that globalization has produced an increase in poverty; secondly, that globalization is unstable (and its instability creates additional poverty); and thirdly, that it is managed by incompetent and malevolent international institutions (whose operations also increase poverty). Stiglitz and Soros both agree that at base the problem is "market fundamentalism",

an unreasoned belief that free-market mechanisms can solve all problems; and they both see state action as the way out of the problem. Stiglitz is more radical, and actually spells out what he sees as the model of success: above all, the People's Republic of China. In the reshaped political environment after September 11, too, Stiglitz and Soros see their program as the basis for a new international agenda, for they both see poverty as a breeding ground for terrorism (although Soros is subtle enough to insist that it is not the only cause, and that there are very rich terrorists and many poor people who passively accept their destinies).

For their indictments to hold, however, it needs to be clearly established that world poverty has in fact increased. At the beginning of his book, Stiglitz clearly states the claim: "Despite repeated promises of poverty reduction made over the last decade of the twentieth century, the actual number of people living in poverty has actually increased by almost 100 million. This occurred at the same time that total world income actually increased by an average of 2.5 percent annually." The use in a comparative sentence of absolute figures followed by a percentage from a different kind of statistic should alert an attentive reader that something odd is going on here. Indeed, it is.

The data come from a World Bank publication to which Stiglitz, in his previous capacity as chief economist of the World Bank, had written a preface. It depends on an estimate of the number of people living on a constant price purchasing power (PPP) adjusted level of \$2 a day: for 1990, the World Bank estimated this number to be 2.71 billion, and for 1998, 2.80 billion. But measured as a share of the world's population, the proportion *declined* from 51.4 percent to 47.3 percent. If the critical figure is taken as the lower level of \$1 a day (which Stiglitz later uses to show that his favorite country, China,

is quite successful), the proportion fell over this period from 24.2 percent to 20.2 percent; even the absolute numbers show a decline from 1.27 billion to 1.20 billion. The factual basis of the claim on which the book rests is thus—as Stiglitz must be aware—quite problematical. It is not at all clear, and it is certainly not demonstrated by Stiglitz, that globalization increases poverty. Indeed, there is much evidence that the opposite is true: that countries open to the world market grow more quickly and reduce poverty.³

The debate about poverty statistics should not detract, however, from one important message of the book. It is undoubtedly true that there are many poor people, and yes, we should be more concerned with their plight than most people in industrial countries seem to be. But the rest of the message, that globalization needs to be harnessed and modified if there is to be a chance of reducing poverty, is deeply misleading, for it leads Stiglitz to worry about every kind of economic opening and liberalization. Trade liberalization, for example, can destroy precarious domestic industries. The examples he chooses, however, are hardly convincing. He sets up Coca-Cola and McDonalds in a familiar way as the iconic demons of global capitalism. He tells us how "soft drink manufacturers around the world have been overwhelmed by the entrance of Coca-Cola and Pepsi into their home markets." But Stiglitz does not spell out why this should be so bad. Anyone who traveled to Eastern Europe or Russia before 1990 will remember the vile tasting and grotesquely sweetened local alternative "colas" that have been mercifully wiped from the market over the past decade. Consumers simply got a product they preferred, and one that

³See Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner, "Economic Reforms and the Process of Globalization", *Brookings Papers* 1995.

before long came to be bottled, distributed and marketed locally.

The ultimate sin of the modern world, as Stiglitz sees it, is not free trade but rather capital market liberalization. Stiglitz's most insistent point is that no one has ever demonstrated that capital mobility enhances growth. Whereas market economics ("market fundamentalism" as Stiglitz and Soros both put it) would allocate capital internationally in accordance with a price (where returns are higher because of higher growth, capital flows in), both authors point out that this generates waves of irrational flows that distort fundamentals and make for bubbles and bursts. There is some truth in this, of course. To claim, however, that there would be *more* prosperity *without* capital inflows simply defies logic: without such inflows, the chances of growth and investment would be sharply restricted.

This leads us ineluctably to the question of whether "good" and "bad" flows can be distinguished from each other, the bad prevented and the good encouraged. Unfortunately, money doesn't work like that. There isn't such a thing as a "good" or a "bad" dollar bill. A generalization that short-term investment is always bad and long-term foreign direct investment is always good inevitably evokes counterexamples. Short-term flows are essential for trade finance; long-term investments may signal the failure of local entrepreneurship.

The boldest (and surely the weakest) claim of Stiglitz's book is that it is based on a correct interpretation of the economic history of globalization over the last fifty years. "Over the past fifty years", he says, "economic science has explained why, and the conditions under which, markets work well *and when they do not*." State-guided growth, in this interpretation, did much better than is usually credited in contemporary discussions. (Those who want a nuanced and sober depiction

of the historical context of Asia's state-guided transformation would do well to read an important new book of essays by E.L. Jones entitled *The Record of Global Economic Development* [Edward Elgar, 2002]. Jones, the author of two earlier books with a unique and very long-term historical vision, has described how modern economic growth developed in Europe rather than in Asia as a result of different institutions and, above all, of the fact of competition between states.⁴ In some of the new essays, he looks at the 1997–98 Asia crisis as the crisis of state-driven growth.) But it is state-guided growth that, in Stiglitz's interpretation, produces both the most stable and the best results. What are his models of success? Above all China; under state direction, development has led to "the largest reduction in poverty in such a short time" (358 million people in 1990 had less than \$1 a day, and in 1997, 208 million). Capital controls meant that China was not caught up in the contagion of the 1997–98 Asia crisis.

In truth, however, the Chinese experience does not look quite so impressive as the overall growth figures appear to suggest. Stiglitz's own sources indicate that Chinese poverty (defined as subsistence on less than \$1 per day) increased in absolute terms in the later 1990s dur-

⁴The most recent editions are: E.L. Jones, *The European Miracle: Environments, Economics, and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) and *Growth Recurring: Economic Change in World History* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000). For more on the substantive issue of how competition among states relates to economic development, see Richard Rosecrance's review of new books by Liah Greenfeld, Niall Ferguson and Kenneth Pomeranz in "Money and Power: Pondering Economic Growth and Decline", *The National Interest* (Summer 2002).

ing the Asian crisis. Regional inequalities within China have widened enormously, as they have in India (which Stiglitz attacks for opening up too rapidly), and in Russia (which Stiglitz thinks had too much shock therapy in the 1990s, and which he condemns as a basket case, even though its purchasing power parity per capita income is more than double that of China's, and the number of homeless people in China exceeds the entire population of Russia). China still has huge problems with non-performing loans and insolvent banks, and an enormous and inefficient state sector stands as the main cause of both—and of more besides. One powerful view is that China simply postponed a crisis in 1997–98, but that its crisis, when it breaks out, will be far more dramatic (and more politically destabilizing) than what we saw in Thailand, Indonesia and elsewhere five years ago.

Since Stiglitz opposes “market fundamentalism”, it stands to reason that his analysis of transition strategies from planned to market economics would have a certain edge. It does. It is constructed around curiously chosen pairs that appear to have been arbitrarily matched in order to make political points. China is good, Russia is bad; Poland good, the Czech Republic bad. The dichotomies are crude, and the analysis behind them even more so. Poland is supposed to have been a great success in the 1990s because it explicitly rejected the Washington consensus (at least according to the highly controversial former finance minister who has just been re-appointed to that position, Grzegorz Kolodko) and did not adopt rapid privatization; while the Czech Republic was a failure because it privatized too quickly and was too enthusiastic about shock therapy. But Poland is better known as an example of very quick and dramatic reform in 1989–90 under a much better known finance minister,

Leszek Balcerowicz, who criticized the IMF's advice as being not tough enough. Telling the story of Polish reforms without mentioning Balcerowicz is rather like making a synopsis of Shakespeare's most famous play in which it is Fortinbras who restores political order to the tangled affairs of Denmark.

Stiglitz also claims that the IMF in Poland (and presumably elsewhere) did not pay enough attention to “democratic support of the reforms.” But the IMF's then Managing Director, Michel Camdessus, whom Stiglitz consistently describes with withering contempt, engaged in December 1989 in a deliberately broad range of talks with the President of Poland (General Jaruzelski, a holdover from the communist era), with reformers around Balcerowicz, with communist trade unions, Solidarity unions, and the Catholic Church in order to determine exactly this question of the democratic sustainability of reforms.

Another odd choice of countries summoned to support Stiglitz's argument involves the recovery from the 1997 Asia crisis. Korea and Malaysia both recovered quickly and effectively, and most analysts reason from this that substantial strengths in the Asian economies allowed a successful bounceback, irrespective of whether the countries rejected the IMF's advice (Malaysia) or followed it (Korea). But Stiglitz insists that both Malaysia and Korea followed very unorthodox policies, thereby denying any positive contributions by the IMF to Korea's recovery.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Stiglitz has his own quite rigid fundamentalism: that everything the IMF does is wrongheaded, and that a sensible political and economic course depends on doing precisely the opposite. He sets out the standard right-wing criticism of the IMF, that it encouraged the 1997 crisis by appearing to give a guarantee to foreign lending (the “moral hazard” argument);

and the standard left-wing criticism, that the IMF was managing the crisis in the interests of American finance capital. Just to be complete, one supposes, he also adds the middle-of-the-road Keynesian criticism, that the IMF imposed a “conditionality” that contained too savage a fiscal deflation on the crisis-ridden countries. He launches a series of *ad hominem* critiques of the IMF’s leading figures. The two most recent senior U.S. officials at the IMF are especially castigated, one for going to a position with an investment bank upon leaving the Fund, and the other for having followed market economics as chief economist of the World Bank in the 1980s. He thinks—contrary to the evidence of the past five years—that the IMF is quite incapable of modifying its approach to policy problems.

The most basic weakness of the IMF, in Stiglitz’s eyes, is that it forces high interest rates on the countries it rescues, and thus makes recovery impossible. This is an intrinsically odd claim. High interest rates in poor economies are simply an indication of a high level of uncertainty—nothing more than a high discount on a future that is risky. In many poor countries, governments try to combat the disincentive to development posed by interest rates by offering credit at especially favorable rates to particular sectors, firms or individuals (a phenomenon known technically as “interest rate repression”). Such policies, which were widely practiced at least in a mild form in many of the Asian economies held up as models by Stiglitz, make access to credit more difficult for the non-favored, who may well be the most entrepreneurial.⁵ It is correct to note that IMF programs have often tried to remove or reduce interest rate repression, with the intention of lowering the *overall* long-term rate of interest: sometimes such programs have been successful, sometimes not. In a crisis situation, IMF lending is almost inevitably *below* market

interest levels, were markets to price risk appropriately (which, however, they cannot do in the midst of a financial panic).

Why does Stiglitz think that the IMF should behave so badly on a systematic basis? He offers a simple answer: because the IMF’s “real” mandate has changed from the original beneficent vision of John Maynard Keynes of stabilizing economies and regulating (in practice preventing) capital flows, to a sinister servitude to powerful (American) interests, “serving the interest of global finance.” The IMF could only be saved by a return to the original vision, in which little room existed for capital mobility.

GEORGE SOROS agrees with much of Stiglitz’s analysis, but his is a more nuanced diagnosis and a more modest proposal. He agrees with many recent analysts that grants to poor countries are often more efficient than loans. He likes proposals for an international equivalent of bankruptcy procedures, on the lines recently proposed by the IMF’s First Deputy Managing Director, Anne Krueger (whose name Stiglitz even manages to misspell). He thinks that crisis prevention (through the pre-approval of emergency credit lines) is better than crisis management. He wants the IMF to play a more central part in the international economy, and in particular to increase the reserve position of its poorer members by allocating to them a part of a new increase in IMF money (known rather arcanelly as “Special Drawing Rights”).

Soros’s suggestions are undoubtedly more practical and more realistic than the parallel menu devised by Stiglitz, which amounts to encouraging more state action (being more like China). A

⁵A point made in Richard A. Slaughter, “Poor Kyrgyzstan”, *The National Interest* (Summer 2002), p. 62.

modest increase in the reserves of poor countries would do some good, maybe, and give some measure of additional strength in managing capital inflows. It certainly, however, would not transform the world or guarantee an absence of crises.

Soros's diagnosis, while appealing in parts, nevertheless lacks internal consistency. In particular, he grapples with the case for global institutions to manage reform. Are such institutions useful? Yes, if they manage skillfully; no, if they manage badly. On the one hand, he thinks that in the 1990s there was inadequate support to transition economies, especially in the former Soviet Union. On the other hand, he rightly notes that "international assistance given to repressive or corrupt regimes can go to reinforce those regimes."⁶ On the basis of these two observations, on the same page, it is hard to work out, for example, whether there should have been—in his view—more or less support for Boris Yeltsin's Russia in the 1990s. It needed economic help, but it was deeply corrupt.

Soros goes on to say that there should be less bureaucracy and more entrepreneurship: and, of course, one of the attractions of his book is that he has actually done much of this kind of entrepreneurial work and has really helped to rebuild post-Soviet societies. But he stops short of proposing a systemic solution involving more Soroses and less IMF. If an institution such as the IMF is to be impartial (and not bend to corrupt regimes) it has to operate, he says, according to a system of rules; but this is exactly the approach derided as the "cookie-cutter" or "one size fits all" or "bureaucratic" approach by the IMF's

critics—including, from time to time, Soros.

GLOBALIZATION produces a dilemma for people who think they can and should help in addressing the world's problems, and thus make themselves more "moral." It is exactly the feeling that true morality cannot be realized, but only limited compromises brokered, that produces the consequent perception of globalization as sin. More people—even one of the most rhetorically persuasive economists in the world (Stiglitz), or one of the most powerful financiers in the world (Soros)—seem unable to alter the course of an apparently inexorable automaton. After the Asia crisis, there was a great outpouring of papers, books, conferences and high level discussions on a new "financial architecture", but very little came of this—hence Soros's frustration with the status quo. Hence also the problem of the IMF—which is thought to be central to the stability of the world economy, and which consequently arouses expectations so great that they are inevitably disappointed. We trundle on, however, as best we are able; what choice really do we have?

One of the central figures in the drama of the IMF's troubled relations with Russia in the mid-1990s was Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. He once commented: "We hoped for the best, but things turned out as they always do." That, in the end, is why so many people feel dissatisfied with globalization as it is, and why it gets such a bad rap. It evokes the equivalent of religious passions, but the logic of capital is not sentimental. That is exactly why it produces such great discontents. □

⁶On this general point see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Hilton Root, "The Political Roots of Poverty", *The National Interest* (Summer 2002).

Harold James is a professor of history at Princeton University and author of *The End of Globalization* (Harvard University Press, 2001).

Contact

The Politics of Migration

Jeremy Black

Dirk Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact: World Migrations in the Second Millennium* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 792 pp., \$85.

WRITING IN 2002, it is all too easy to argue that terrorism is now and will remain for decades the most serious issue. This, however, is not only a very present-minded approach, but one based on a less than profound assessment of current pressures and developments. To start with the micro-picture, even in the case of American strategic interests and engagements, it is by no means clear that issues in Southwest Asia are or will be more significant than points of tension in East Asia or even in the Caribbean basin. Consideration of such issues also benefits from being located in a wider context. Over recent decades those on offer have been ideological (the Cold War and, now, the supposed culture clash with Islam) or resource-based (now presented in terms of globalization pressures). Both are noteworthy, but it is also worth drawing attention to the extent to which relatively large movements of people from country to country are having both a specific effect in particular countries and a cumulative impact on international and domestic politics.

Dirk Hoerder's new book, *Cultures in Contact*, provides a mass of information on migration patterns over the last century and beyond. Hoerder is professor of history at the University of Bremen, and his written style is naturally somewhat Germanic: lightness of touch is not a fea-

ture of his prose and there is scant humor on offer to lighten the load. Nevertheless, this is a formidable piece of work. It is of particular importance because Hoerder shows in great detail that it is necessary to move from a focus on the Atlantic migration system in order to give due weight to migration flows in Asia, Africa and the Pacific world.

Hoerder also shows the extent to which the modern range of migration phenomena was amply anticipated. Medieval migrations, too, spanned then-known worlds. Issues of economic need and opportunity co-existed with political reasons for movement then as now. Some migration was intended as temporary, other as permanent; assimilation was a serious issue for migrants and hosts; and women as well as men were expected to travel, although marriage played a greater role in their travels then.

Hoerder's cast is a fascinating one, with particular attention to peoples, such as Armenians and Jews, that have had high rates of migration, but also with due attention to others that are generally neglected, such as Central Asian peoples. There is also much here on slavery, although the balance of research ensures that Atlantic slavery receives a disproportionately large share of attention at the expense of slavery elsewhere, particularly in the Arab world.

Hoerder's arguments reflect now dominant academic assumptions that the identities of peoples were constructed as part of a process of "hierarchicalization", as nasty an academic term as one may be likely to find. He writes of "the construction of Others in ethnic or

religious terms” and that:

Across the globe, the social space inhabited by workers and employers was contested terrain. It was divided by ascription of ethnic or racial ‘characters’ and positioning according to skin color and gender. It was policed by agents of the respective state paid for by public funds in the interests of some segments of the public.

Such a statement puts us in familiar territory. Racism, linked with capitalism and Western dominance, provides the context and contents of a world with sharp inequalities that help encourage migration. This critique is linked by some writers to an attack on the state, in the specific form of the authorities that try to control migration flows. Thus, John Lonsdale has recently claimed that, in Europe,

by the mid-20th century, the imagined and then socially engineered monoglot community of the nation state appeared to have driven out other, less clearly bounded, political entities. . . . This nation-building conquest of Europe was an anomaly in world history, but became the modern norm.¹

There is not space here to contest this interpretation at length: suffice it to say that it provides an unsound basis for discussing migration and development issues in the modern world. The ascription of responsibility and guilt to Westerners in the shape of their supposed responsibility for racism, expropriation and power politics is based on a limited knowledge of world history and a seriously flawed conceptual approach. It would ascribe blame before attaining understanding. It is also ironic that critics of the state frequently turn to government as a solution for problems; and, indeed, a few of the Western states over the last century and a half have been more successful than is frequently allowed.

TO TURN TO the present, however, migration, like many other issues, does pose a challenge to conservatives. Aside from defining a coherent response, there is the question of formulating and implementing effective policies in response to the issue, and also avoiding the deleterious domestic political consequences to which they can give rise. The range of conservative responses is vast: from opposition to restrictions on immigration, variously stemming from libertarianism or a belief in the free movement of labor; to a desire to halt both immigration and, in the past, emigration, in order to preserve the ethnic identity of states or to enhance their strength. This variety is a reminder of the richness of conservatism as intellectual tradition, political culture, and set of assumptions and interests. It is also a reminder of the welcome absence of any directing ideological group or institution comparable to the dreary (and deadly) thought-policing of the Left during the last century. Yet ideological variety can also create problems if conservatives fail to appreciate its consequences.

The migration debate also showcases the various national strands of conservatism. This last is a point that tends to be underrated by ideologues committed to the notion that the world is an isotropic surface and who are unwilling to accept that the particular contours and contents of national conservatisms involve more than “cultural relativism.” For a while, the configuration of the debate appeared simple: the emphasis on ethnic constructions of nationhood and on nation-states was a dated if not an even worse aspect of a redundant racist nationalism. Instead, the emphasis fell on a melting-pot, or

¹John Lonsdale, “Globalization, Ethnicity and Democracy: A View from ‘the Hopeless Continent’ [Africa]”, A.G. Hopkins, ed., *Globalization in World History* (London: Pimlico, 2002), pp. 197–8.

mélange, approach, as in the United States or in the prospectus for the European Union. This was thought to be progressive. Maybe so, but it is also clear that older constructions of nationhood, which are frequently challenged by migration, have a capacity to elicit popular support as well. There is an analogue here to trade, although the fit is far from perfect: while free trade is desirable, protectionism enjoys a ready purchase in democratic politics, as seen in both the United States and the European Union. At the risk of pushing comparisons too far, it is also possible to bring in international relations with the problems of selling the compromises of multilateralism contrasted with the simple clarities of unilateralism.

The populist reluctance to accept immigration owes much to fear. The language is indicative: “floods” of economic migrants threaten to “swamp” indigenous cultures, “sponge off” a welfare system, and “provoke” racial tension. Tensions are certainly readily apparent. By 2000, thanks to immigration, nearly three of France’s 60 million residents were of North African origin, with another 415,000 residents from Turkey and the Middle East, and 250,000 from sub-Saharan Africa. In the case of France and many other states, hostility toward immigrants is most frequently expressed by politicians on the far Right. This has marginalized the debate, not least among mainstream conservatives, who are understandably reluctant to be associated with such politicians. On the other hand, the welcome success of the United States, a state that continues to receive large inflows of migrants, as well as the general argument in favor of labor flexibility, leaves many conservatives unable to grasp the problems that immigration does pose in political, economic and social terms.

Cultural identity is also at issue. For weak states—in other words, for most states—ethnic nationalism provides both

an identity and a *raison d’être*, helping to elicit public consent and also providing a reason to reject more powerful neighbors. Ethnic consciousness in Mongolia, for instance, induced concern about how best to sustain racial purity, leading to the expulsion of large numbers of ethnic Chinese in the 1960s; Chinese rule in Tibet and Xinjiang did prevent such a politics from emerging in those places, but it led to an ethnic imperialism that helps explain Mongolian anxieties at the time.

The orchestrated movement of ethnic Chinese into Tibet and Xinjiang serves as a reminder that some politically contentious migration occurs *within* states. In Indonesia, the 1990s brought a strengthening of ethnic tension and regional consciousness, as well as widespread violence. In Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo), since 1997 native Dayaks have fought Madurans who have been immigrating with government encouragement since the 1950s. Thinking of Indonesia as a unit, the government sought to move people from areas of overcrowding without any consultation with the population in the receiving areas. And it is not only in Indonesia that ethnic rivalry is linked to tension over resources, especially land and jobs. The same phenomena can also be seen in less violent confrontations. In the central highlands of Vietnam, for example, long-established tribesmen resisted immigration by lowlanders who cleared the land they occupied for cash crops. This is the reality of politics across much of the world in an age in which conflict is too readily discussed in terms of clashing ideologies, broad-brush cultures and states. Hoerder points out that “vast rural-urban migrations transform all Asian societies”; “challenge” would be a more accurate term.

Aside from resources of a conventional type, particularly land and water, there are also disputes, not least between

incomers and others, over resources of a more "modern" type: quotas in educational opportunities, housing, government jobs and the allocation of economic subsidies, for example. These disputes provide the lightning rod for ethnic, regional, religious and class tensions. Population growth drives these pressures, and migration is a major response to them. (A recent United Nations report, *The Arab Human Development Report 2002*, stated that a standardized poll conducted among Arab youths showed that an astonishing 51 percent expressed at least some desire to emigrate.) Although there has been a fall in population growth rates from the early 1970s, as well as a fall in annual additions to the global population from the late 1980s, the built-in pressures of demographic momentum will ensure that population will continue to rise to about 8.9 billion globally in 2050 (compared to 3 billion in 1960 and 6 billion in 1999).

Much of this growth will occur in countries whose economies are unlikely to provide desired standards of living, which will in turn produce serious problems not only for their citizens but also for those of other countries. By 2001, Iran required one million new jobs a year: a serious challenge. India's demographics pose the most significant problem. The rapid rise of its population, and the absence of birth control policies comparable to those in more authoritarian China, will ensure that India becomes the world's most populous state, on current projections, between 2045 and 2050. This will absorb India's resources, lead to a seriously degraded environment (including a major drop in artesian water levels and, as Hoerder points out, pressure to settle in illegally-deforested lands and newly irrigated dry lands), and create demands for imports—not least of which will be oil—that may not be realizable. Such tensions will probably lead both to volatile populist politics and to high rates

of emigration. Across the world, countries that currently have a high percentage of young people will be the most volatile, both politically and in terms of migration. Thus North Africa and Nigeria will continue to provide large numbers of migrants seeking to enter Europe.

Given lower birth rates in Europe and the resulting concern about the future availability of labor (not least to service the social welfare expectations of aging populations), this can be seen as benign. There are also, however, serious risks of social and political disruption, with the rise of the politics of race being a particular challenge to the Christian Democratic parties that are the mainstay of European conservatism outside Britain. It is also readily apparent that assimilationist practices are not equally welcomed by all immigrant groups: exclusion can be a two-way process. This poses problems in terms of social cohesion and also the rule of law, as seen by the unwillingness of some groups to accept, for example, that girls should receive an equal and unsegregated education.

This problem varies with the religion of the immigrant group. It is particularly acute with Muslims, and ensures that the states of the European Union will be more severely challenged in this regard than will the United States. Assimilation is more successful in the United States in part because there are no large Muslim groups comparable to France's Algerians or Britain's Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, but more generally because of the far more diverse ethnic history of America and its more inclusive (and successful) politics and economy. This, however, carries with it the risk that Americans will find it difficult to understand immigration-related tensions within other countries, allies and opponents alike. While more important factors are at work, concern about the attitude of Muslim immigrant groups plays a role in present differ-

ences over Middle Eastern policy between the United States and Europe; although, looked at differently, American policy itself is affected, in part, by the understandable concerns of its Jewish population about the security of Israel.

So varied are the composition and circumstances of immigrant groups that it is unhelpful to envisage a similar trajectory of issues and challenges in different countries. Nevertheless, two common themes are at play: Immigration offers many advantages, not least in enriching cultures and enabling individuals to find freedoms

and fulfil their potential; it also threatens to act as a spoiler in a world where the politics of access to resources and opportunities will be increasingly unsettled. Best, then, to approach this fateful topic with a practical rather than an ideological frame of mind. □

Jeremy Black is a professor of history at the University of Exeter, UK. His 49 books include *War: Past, Present and Future* (Palgrave, 2001), *The World in the Twentieth Century* (Longman, 2002), and *America as a Military Power 1775–1865* (Praeger, 2002).

Waltzing to Armageddon?

Marc Trachtenberg

Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed* (New York and London: W. W. Norton and Company, Second Edition 2002), 120 pp., \$16.70.

THE DISTINGUISHED international relations theorist Kenneth Waltz (still) thinks that the emergence of new nuclear powers is not necessarily to be regretted. In a world of many nuclear powers, in Waltz's view, a major war would be practically impossible. He therefore believes that "more may be better"—that what has come to be called "nuclear proliferation" might actually be a good thing. Scott Sagan, a professor of political science at Stanford University and a leading authority in the field of strategic studies, disagrees; in Sagan's view, "more will be worse." In

1995, Waltz and Sagan published *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate*, in which each laid out his argument and then responded to the other's argument. The discussion was spirited and often quite interesting, and the book deservedly received a good deal of attention. A revised edition, with new passages on terrorism and missile defense and a new chapter on India and Pakistan, has just been published. Its appearance provides us with a timely opportunity to confront the proliferation question yet again—a chance to get to the bottom of what is perhaps the most important international issue the world will face in the years to come.

Why does Waltz think that the spread of nuclear weapons is not necessarily to be avoided? His fundamental claim is that nuclear forces have a very powerful deterrent effect, and that nuclear states would therefore be extremely reluctant to tangle

with each other. If one such state does take aggressive action—if a nuclear Iraq invaded Kuwait, for example—other powers would find it too dangerous to use military force against the aggressor state, and would only be able to take non-military measures. If the United States at the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 “had thought that Iraq might have had a few bombs, it would have had to manage the Iraq-Kuwait crisis differently, say by employing only an embargo.” If, however, by some chance a limited war between two nuclear states did break out, that conflict would be very unlikely to escalate. Escalation that threatened an adversary’s core interests, especially an invasion of the adversary’s homeland with conventional forces, would be “too risky to contemplate.” But if a country’s core interests actually were threatened, then even that situation would scarcely lead to disaster. There would be no massive escalation. Instead nuclear weapons would be used in a very limited way. A “few judiciously delivered warheads” would in such circumstances be a very effective wake-up call, and would probably “bring rapid deescalation.”

A nuclear world, according to Waltz, is thus a world of safety nets beneath safety nets. In the unlikely event that serious problems between nuclear states developed at one level of conflict, the dangers would very probably be contained before matters escalated to the next level. The mere possession of a nuclear capability, Waltz says, induces “caution in any state” and “especially in weak ones.” A nuclear Iraq, he now writes (Libya was the state mentioned in the corresponding passage in the 1995 text), would actually be more cautious than a non-nuclear Iraq. The possession of nuclear weapons by an adversary, moreover, would have an extremely powerful deterrent effect. In Waltz’s view, “not much is required to deter.” “A low probability of carrying a

highly destructive attack home”, he believes, “is sufficient for deterrence.” A large force is not necessary for this purpose; a relatively small number of bombs would do the trick. That small force, of course, would have to be able to survive an enemy attack, but since bombs can be small and light, they are “easy to hide and to move” and delivering them, even after a surprise attack, would not be hard to do. “Bombs can be driven in by trucks from neighboring countries”, he writes. “Ports can be torpedoed by small boats lying offshore.” Even “weak and poor states”, he writes, can “easily” build small, survivable nuclear forces, and when they do, they will deter even the strongest nuclear powers. With nuclear weapons, he says, “any state will be deterred by another state’s second-strike forces.” Relative strength then no longer matters: “if no state can launch a disarming attack with high confidence, force comparisons are irrelevant.” “A minimal deterrent”, he writes, “deters as well as a maximal one.”

The atomic bomb, Waltz believes, is thus the great equalizer in international politics. It is not just that a small nuclear force is as good as a big one. He now argues (in two passages that did not appear in the 1995 text) that the presence of nuclear forces also makes disparities in conventional military power meaningless. “Nuclear weapons”, he says,

negate the advantages of conventional superiority because escalation in the use of conventional force risks receiving a nuclear strike. With nuclear weapons, not only is a small second-strike force equivalent to a large second-strike force but also small conventional forces are equivalent to large conventional forces because large forces cannot be used against a nuclear power.

In such a world, where neither the nuclear nor the conventional balance matters, the weak are as strong as the

strong. Everyone is deterred—and deterred equally. No one will dare start a war, because the risks are so immense. There is thus practically no risk of war, or at any rate of a war in which nuclear weapons are used in a major way. In a nuclear world, a general war is a virtual “impossibility”; in such a world, “only limited wars can be fought” and “the probability of major war among states having nuclear weapons approaches zero.” Nuclear weapons are thus the great bulwark of international peace; and it is because they have such a powerfully stabilizing effect that in Waltz’s view the “gradual spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feared.”

SAGAN DOES NOT think a nuclear world would be nearly as stable as Waltz makes out. Indeed, looking at South Asia, he thinks that deterrence will eventually break down—that nuclear weapons will someday be used in a conflict between India and Pakistan. For him, the root problem with Waltz’s argument is the assumption that states are under very strong pressure to behave rationally, and that one can therefore assume that states in fact will act rationally. To Sagan, nuclear weapons are controlled by “imperfect humans inside imperfect organizations”, and, given the way large organizations actually work, such a high degree of rationality simply cannot be expected. Nuclear weapons are in the hands of professional military organizations, and those organizations behave in only “boundedly rational” ways that “are likely to lead to deterrence failures and deliberate or accidental nuclear war.”

In the 1995 version of his essay, Sagan focused on three dangers resulting from the “wide-spread biases and imperfections in military organizations.” First was the problem of preventive war: when a country begins to build a nuclear force, one or more of its rivals might decide to launch

an attack on that country’s nuclear facilities before it is too late. Military officers, Sagan argues, are particularly attracted to this kind of thinking, and this, he says, can be a real source of danger, especially in countries where the armed forces are not under firm civilian control. The second problem has to do with the survivability of a nuclear force. In a crisis, vulnerable forces might invite enemy attack, and for various organizational reasons, professional militaries, if left to themselves, might not actually build invulnerable forces. The third problem has to do with the possibility of a nuclear accident; this includes the problem of unauthorized use, since such use is “accidental” from the standpoint of the central authorities. And there are limits, Sagan insists, to how accident-proof large organizations are likely to be. (Sagan is the author of an important 1993 book called *The Limits of Safety*, which lays out this argument in some detail.) The empirical record, he points out here, shows that accidents are possible. An Iraqi bomb, the UN inspectors discovered in the early 1990s, would have been “highly unstable” and might have gone off “if it fell off the edge” of a desk. Such an accident, especially if it were to take place near the front lines in a war, might well in his view lead to a major nuclear exchange.

In the new edition, Sagan also talks about a fourth problem, although it can also be viewed as an extreme form of the problem of unauthorized use. This is the problem of terrorism. If “unstable states, especially unstable Islamic states”, acquire nuclear weapons, they might fall into the hands of terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda. Since the bombs would have “no return address”, the terrorists could use those weapons “without fear of retaliation.” Deterrence would therefore not work. The best way to handle this problem is to prevent such states from developing nuclear capabilities in the first place. But this point

simply underscores the seriousness of the problem and strengthens Sagan's basic conclusion that "more will be worse."

It is hard to quarrel with most of what Sagan has to say, but there is still something odd about his position. It is as though, in his view, proliferation as such is not a problem. Sagan, it seems, would have no objection to it if it were managed properly—if forces were made invulnerable to enemy attack and secure against unauthorized use, if the weapons themselves would not go off by accident, and so on. But to take that view is in effect to concede the heart of Waltz's argument: if the weapons *were* designed and deployed the right way, then a nuclear world really would be better than a non-nuclear world. The Waltz-Sagan debate seems to melt away: Nuclear deterrence, in that case, really could serve as the basis of a very stable international order.

BUT IS THAT really so? How would a world in which a large number of countries have invulnerable nuclear forces actually work? The real issue here has to do with how political conflicts would run their course in such a world. Is there any reason to assume that that process would be more peaceful in a nuclear environment than in a non-nuclear one?

Waltz does not approach the problem this way. For him, wars are started by one side or another. There is an attacker and a defender; with nuclear weapons, the attacker is deterred and war is avoided. "Where nuclear weapons threaten to make the cost of wars immense", he asks, "who will dare to start them?" The Soviet Union would have been deterred by any state that might have been able to deliver one or two simple fission bombs on Moscow. Indeed, he argues, "with nuclear weapons, any state will be deterred by another state's second-strike forces." "A nation", he says, "will be deterred from

attacking even if it believes there is only a possibility that its adversary will retaliate." There is no doubt in Waltz's mind about this; for him, the deterrent effect is absolute: no one will start a war, and wars—at least major wars, wars in which nuclear weapons will be used—will simply not happen.

In the real world, however, wars are often not simply "started" by one side, and the distinction between defender and attacker can be very problematic. In 1914, for example, who "started" the First World War? Germany, by invading Belgium and attacking France? Or Russia, by ordering general mobilization a few days earlier, knowing full well that such action made war virtually inevitable? Who was the "defender"? Austria, supported by Germany, for trying to prevent Serbia from serving as a base for terrorist activities directed against the Habsburg Monarchy? Or Russia, supported by the Western powers, for trying to defend Serbian sovereignty and maintain its own political position in the Balkans? And if all the major powers had been armed with nuclear weapons at the time, is it clear who exactly would have been deterred? Or take the case of the coming of World War II in 1939. If both Britain and Germany had been nuclear powers at the time, again, is it clear who would have been deterred? Waltz thinks that Germany would have backed off: Hitler would not have "started" a war that would destroy the Third Reich. But Hitler did not intend to "start" a war with Britain at that point; his aim was to get Britain to back down in the confrontation over Poland. Nor did Britain intend to start a war with Germany. War broke out not because either side wanted war in late 1939, but rather because neither was willing to give way—and because each was hoping that the other would.

Once we get away from the idea that wars are simply "started" by one side and that the "attacker" can be readily identi-

fied, the whole problem appears in an entirely different light. If war is seen as the outcome of a process in which two sides interact, it makes no sense to focus simply on the calculations of just one side. Instead, the calculations of both sides, and especially their calculations about each other, have to be taken into account. Each side may be trying to deter the other—to get its way without war if it can. Each side might be afraid of escalation, but those fears are balanced by the knowledge that one's adversary is also afraid, and his fears can be exploited. In the case of a conflict between two nuclear powers, if either side believed that Waltz's analysis was correct—if either side believed that its adversary would give way rather than run any risk of nuclear attack, as long as his vital interests were not threatened—there would be no reason for that country not to take advantage of that situation. That side could threaten its adversary with nuclear attack if its demands were not met in the firm belief that its opponent was bound to give way, and that it would therefore not be running any risk itself. That belief might turn out to be correct, but if it were not—if its rival was unwilling to allow it to score such an easy victory—there could be very serious trouble indeed. And if *both* sides were convinced by Waltz's arguments, and both adopted strong deterrent strategies, the situation would be particularly dangerous. Each side would dig in its heels, convinced that when confronted with the risk of nuclear war, the other side would ultimately back down. Such a situation could quickly get out of hand. As Dean Rusk pointed out in 1961, "one of the quickest ways to have a nuclear war is to have the two sides persuaded that neither will fight."

This is an extreme case, but it illustrates the problem. In the real world, states will not be so sure that their opponent "will be deterred" by the prospect of nuclear war and that they can therefore

go as far as they like in a political dispute—say, in the Cold War case, in a dispute over Cuba or Berlin. Nor will they themselves, in all probability, be absolutely deterred by the threat of nuclear war. They would be under a certain competitive pressure to play the same game as their rivals; their rivals could not be allowed to profit so easily from a simple threat-making strategy while themselves running no real risk at all. Each side would be afraid of escalation, but each side would in the final analysis also be willing to run a certain risk. Each side would know that its adversary was also worried about what would happen if things got out of hand, and that an unwillingness to run any risk at all would remove that element of restraint and give the adversary too free a hand. Each side would know that its adversary was probably also willing to run a certain risk for the same reason, which is why each side could not be sure that its opponent would be deterred in a confrontation.

In such situations, it is impossible to say how all these calculations would sort themselves out. Deterrence cuts in more than one way, and it for this reason that in a nuclear world, no one can know how far things will go before a conflict is resolved, or whether it even can be resolved before nuclear weapons are actually used. Each side may calculate that if it is just a bit tougher, its opponent may back down. Having gone so far, wouldn't it make sense to go further still? And there is no natural end-point to that process. For Waltz, if deterrence fails, "a few judiciously delivered warheads are likely to produce sobriety in the leaders of all of the countries involved and thus bring rapid deescalation." But it is just as likely that if a few bombs are exploded, the country that had been targeted would choose to retaliate in kind. It might even choose to escalate the conflict. A political dispute can thus become a gigantic poker game, with each

side raising the stakes in the hope that its opponent, frightened by the prospect of nuclear war, will fold before things go too far.

Conflicts in such a world, as Thomas Schelling argued years ago, would become “contests in risk-taking.” The side with the greater resolve, the side more willing to run the risk of nuclear war, has the upper hand and will prevail in a showdown. In the pre-nuclear world, more or less objective factors—above all, the balance of military power—played a key role in determining how political conflicts ran their course. The weak tended to give way to the strong; in an admittedly rough and imperfect way, the military balance gave some indication as to how a dispute would be worked out. But in a world of invulnerable nuclear forces, as Waltz points out, the military balance counts for little. Subjective factors, like will and resolve, would play the key role in determining how political conflicts are worked out.

The result is that in such a world there would be a great premium on resolve, on risk-taking, and perhaps ultimately on recklessness. In international politics, as in other areas of life, what you reward is what you get. Resolve would tend to harden, and the parties involved would tend to dig in their heels. A reputation for toughness would be of fundamental importance, since one has to worry not just about the present but about the future, and this would provide further incentive to take a tough stand. And as each side hardens its position, its rival is also led by competitive pressure to do the same. Why would anyone think that a world of that sort, where political outcomes are up for grabs and victory goes to the side with the strongest nerves, would be particularly stable?

THERE IS ONE great objection to this whole line of worried argument, and it has to do with the his-

torical record. Doesn't history show that nuclear weapons *are* a force for stability? Isn't that what the history of the Cold War tells us? Waltz certainly thinks so. “Never in modern history”, he says, “have great powers enjoyed a longer period of peace than we have known since the Second World War. One can scarcely believe that the presence of nuclear weapons does not greatly help to explain this happy condition.”

Waltz makes a number of specific claims that can be tested against the historical record. He says that in a nuclearized system, leaders of major powers are extremely reluctant to run risks; they are easily deterred, and will avoid taking any action that might lead to even a few bombs falling on their homelands. It was for that reason, he thinks, that an attack on Cuba during the missile crisis had to be ruled out: even if an air strike could wipe out 90 percent of the Soviet missiles in Cuba, “retaliation by the remaining 10 percent was unacceptable to us.” The fear of retaliation from the surviving Soviet missiles in Cuba was certainly a factor making for restraint in 1962, but it is important to note that the deterrent effect was far from absolute. The Americans accepted a showdown with the Soviets over the missiles even though they knew at the outset, as Rusk put it at the time, that a crisis “could well lead to general war.” And if a settlement had not been reached, the United States probably would have invaded Cuba at the end of October, even though the U.S. government believed that some of the Soviet missiles on the island would at that time be operational.

Waltz also argues that the mere possession of nuclear weapons makes for a cautious policy; as noted above, he thinks in particular that a nuclear Iraq would be more cautious than a non-nuclear Iraq. Again, the general claim here is testable, and the most important counter-example has to do with Soviet policy in the period

after the USSR first began to develop a nuclear force. After the Soviets broke the American nuclear monopoly in late 1949, their foreign policy quickly hardened, and the winter of 1950-51 was one of the darkest periods of the Cold War. There is no doubt that these military and political developments were connected. In the nuclear age as in the pre-nuclear past, military developments cast a deep political shadow. Countries tend to avoid war when the military balance is unfavorable, but when their strategic position improves, they often feel free to take a tougher line.

A final point has to do with what Waltz says about the risk of nuclear escalation. He does not take all the talk during the Cold War about going nuclear in a crisis—about “massive retaliation” and so on—very seriously. “Did our own big words”, he asks, “or the Soviet Union’s prattling about nuclear war-fighting, ever mean anything?” He thinks not. If the Soviets had attacked Western Europe, the NATO response would have been limited: “The threat, if it failed to deter, would have been followed not by spasms of violence but by punishment administered in ways that conveyed threats of more to come.” No evidence is given to support this view; it seems to be based essentially on Waltz’s intuition about how states in a heavily nuclearized environment would have had to behave.

My own view is very different. If a war had broken out in the NATO area during the 1950s, or even as late as 1962, there was a good chance, I think, that it would have escalated to the level of a full-scale nuclear exchange. President Eisenhower’s whole philosophy was that in the event of war in Europe, the United States would have to open up with everything it had. The U.S. government, he said, would just be fooling itself if it thought it “could fight such a war without recourse to nuclear weapons.” And once a nuclear exchange began, the United States “could not stop”

until it had “finished off the enemy.” There might be no winners in such a war, he said, but “we just don’t want to lose worse than we have to.” In such circumstances, restraint was simply out of the question: “The United States would be applying a force so terrible that one simply could not be meticulous as to the methods by which the force was brought to bear.”

Kennedy also seemed to take it for granted that if a war broke out in Europe, America would “have no choice but to use nuclear weapons.” For him, as for Eisenhower, nuclear escalation was by no means ruled out. As long as the United States had the upper hand in strategic terms—as long as America, if it struck fast enough and hard enough, would not suffer really massive destruction from a Soviet retaliatory strike—a major nuclear attack on the USSR, in the event, for example, of a showdown over Berlin, might be the least bad U.S. option.

Those Kennedy and Eisenhower remarks, made in private meetings with top officials, are not to be dismissed as mere talk or as speaking for effect. Serious people really felt at the time that war was not entirely out of the question, since the United States, if push came to shove, was not going to capitulate on the core political issues despite the threat of nuclear war. And if a war did break out, it was widely assumed in high political and military circles that the country might have to do what it could to limit damage to itself—or, as Eisenhower’s military chiefs put it in a very important document, to “hold damage to nationally manageable proportions.” For Waltz, it is almost inconceivable that responsible leaders would ever be willing to accept a degree of nuclear devastation. But no matter what we think today, the attitude reflected in those Eisenhower and Kennedy comments illustrate what a responsible state might actually do if its leaders felt that fundamental political

interests were at stake.

If all this is true, however, how were we able to avoid a nuclear exchange during the Cold War period? The Soviets were able to build a small force soon after they broke the American nuclear monopoly in 1949. If that small force had been able to balance America's much larger force even during the Eisenhower period, then political disputes at that time would indeed have been "contests in risk-taking"; the side with the stronger will, the side willing to accept the greatest level of risk, would have prevailed in the end. Since there is no way to know how far such a contest would go before one side or the other gave way, a world of that sort, with each side under a certain pressure to dig in its heels, would have been a very dangerous place. But under Eisenhower, and for most of the Kennedy period as well, U.S. leaders felt they still had the upper hand in strategic terms: if war broke out, the United States might well not suffer really heavy damage, while the Soviet Union would be utterly destroyed as a functioning society. In such circumstances, the Americans felt they could in the final analysis take a strong line in a crisis, and that the Soviets would be under great pressure to give way in the end. American leaders believed that the strategic balance played a central role in determining how political conflicts would run their course. The USSR could not engage in a "contest in risk-taking" with America on equal terms. The U.S. blockade of Cuba during the missile crisis, for example, could not be answered by a Soviet counter-blockade of Berlin, and so the United States was essentially able to get its way.

By late 1963, as Kennedy was told in September of that year, clear American nuclear superiority finally had become a thing of the past. The post-1963 system of great power political relations turned out to be relatively stable, but not because the USSR had become militarily stronger

and could now stand up to the United States as an equal. The loss of clear American nuclear superiority, all else equal, could be expected to have led to a tougher Soviet policy, and thus to a more unstable international system. If that system turned out to be stable, it was because all other things were *not* equal. It was because a set of *political* understandings had been struck by late 1963 that allowed a relatively stable system to take shape. If those understandings had not been worked out, the world might well have been in for serious trouble. A Berlin crisis in a period of nuclear parity could have been a very dangerous affair.

IT IS A MISTAKE to think of nuclearization as a kind of magic wand bringing stability to what would otherwise be an unstable international system. That view is not supported by a close analysis of the Cold War historical record, which suggests that nuclearization might well be a source of instability in international affairs. This is important, because the way we think about these issues can have a real political effect. The United States, of course, is going to oppose the spread of nuclear weapons in any event, for the simple reason (as Rusk pointed out in 1963) that "it was almost in the nature of nuclear weapons that if someone had them, he did not want others to have them." Nuclearization does have a certain equalizing effect and, as other countries build nuclear forces, the U.S. power advantage is necessarily diluted. But the seriousness and intensity with which the U.S. government pursues a non-proliferation policy depends on how the problem is understood. It makes a difference whether America's policy is rooted simply in its own narrow national interests, or whether it is based as well on a concern for the interests of the international system as a whole.

The same point applies to states con-

sidering whether to build a nuclear force. A nuclear capability would certainly be a source of strength for most; it would enable them, to a certain extent, to stand up to even the greatest powers on the planet. In regional terms, the weaker of two rival powers—Pakistan, for example, in its conflict with India—is bound to favor nuclearization as a way of leveling the playing field. Once one such power goes nuclear, moreover, the rival power has good reason to follow suit. Perhaps the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable for those reasons. But if a world of many nuclear powers is to be avoided, it will only be avoided because those incentives are offset by other factors—by the cost of building a secure

and survivable nuclear force, and even more by a sense for how dangerous a nuclear world would be.

Perhaps a world of many nuclear powers will turn out to be unavoidable. But there is no point to making it more unavoidable than it would otherwise be by assuming that a fully nuclearized world would have a near rock-solid stability, and that nuclear proliferation is the path to peace. It won't, and it isn't. □

Marc Trachtenberg, a professor of political science at UCLA, is the author of *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963*. (A footnoted version of this essay is available at <http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/Sagan-Waltz.html>.)

Europe's bin Laden

Aggressive religious cults are a predictable aberration of troubled societies struggling through periods of profound change. Some human beings simply cannot deal with the sudden fracturing of their verities and the inadequacy of their long-held, cherished beliefs. Particularly for the apocalyptic terrorist, belief is all or nothing. . . .

The last time a “world” and an all-encompassing way of life failed in the West was during the early years of the Protestant Reformation. . . . As the old, monolithic structure of belief and prescribed behavior broke down—with a speed that would bewilder even today's mentally agile Americans—millions of human beings lost their bearings. Some quickly found refuge in a new mainstream of Protestant churches, while others never let go of, or quickly re-embraced, the Roman church. But many thousands could not content themselves with either the old way or the more temperate of the new ways. And they initiated the greatest outbreak of popular terror the West has ever known, the Peasants' Revolt in the Germanies in the 1520s. Bloodier than any revolutionary movement prior to the Russian Civil War, its impulses were apocalyptic in the extreme.

The Peasants' Revolt, or Peasants' Wars, is misnamed to a degree, since the rebellious leaders were extreme-radical theologians, lesser knights, and some members of a fractious, often impecunious nobility. The peasants and some disaffected townsmen provided the mass, not the minds—although some hallucinatory visionaries did emerge from the lower levels of society. . . .

The revolutionary and theologian Thomas Muentzer may have been the Western figure closest to Osama bin Laden (the practical terrorists of the Counter-Reformation and the Inquisition don't even come close). Muentzer, who led his rebels behind a blood-red cross (alternatively reported as a blood-red sword), left a trail of devastation across the middle of the Germanies that only ceased when a coalition of the nobility and knights brought him to a final, apocalyptic battle that ended with an uncompromising pursuit and massacre of the insurgents, followed by the ingenious torture and executions of their captured leaders.

—Ralph Peters, *Beyond Terror* (Stackpole, 2002)

WORLD POLICY JOURNAL

"The real intellectual competition for *Foreign Affairs*."
Columbia Journalism Review

SUMMER 2002

Maps of War, Maps of Peace:
A Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Question
David C. Unger

The Threats America Faces
John Newhouse

American Empire?
Martin Walker

Asia's New Economic Model
Patrick Smith

The Coup in Venezuela
Omar Encarnación

China's Drug Problem
Joshua Kurlantzick

PLUS . . . Jonathan Steele on Nation Building in East Timor, Mark Gilbert on Anti-Americanism in the British Press, John Miller on Malaysia's Economy, and Hugh DeSantis on the U.S. Government's "Future Studies"

TO SUBSCRIBE AND RECEIVE YOUR COMPLIMENTARY ISSUE,
GO TO WWW.WORLDPOLICY.ORG
OR CALL (800) 877-2693, EXT. 123.

Center for Peace and Security Studies

Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University



Based at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, the Center for Peace and Security Studies (CPASS – pronounced “C-Pass”) has three aims:

- to produce a new generation of scholars, analysts, and policymakers – a generation of leaders fully aware of the complexities of international peace and security problems;
- to create a new, dynamic hub of activity on international peace and security issues that bridges the academic and policy worlds;
- to generate new conceptual frameworks that will lead to the development of practical strategies for enhancing international peace and security in the 21st century.

For more information on CPASS activities, visit:
<http://cpass.georgetown.edu>



Georgetown University is delighted to announce that Women in International Security (WIIS) has moved to the Center for Peace and Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.

Founded in 1987, WIIS (pronounced “wise”) is the foremost organization in the world devoted to the academic and professional advancement of women – in government, academia, think tanks, the media, and business – in the field of security studies.

WIIS organizes more than 40 events a year on a wide range of issues, advancing the dialogue on international security while showcasing women experts.

Join more than 1200 women and men from around the world by becoming a member of WIIS. For more information, visit:
<http://wiis.georgetown.edu>



CENTER FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES
EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Earn a Master of Arts degree and prepare for the intellectual challenges and professional opportunities of the 21st century.

Attend the largest academic program in the United States devoted specifically to professional education in security studies – on a full time or part time basis.

Specialize in U.S. National Security Policy, International Security, Technology and Security, or in a customized concentration.

Draw on a tradition of excellence at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, the oldest and largest school of international affairs in the United States.

Study in Washington, D.C. – the epicenter of real-world policy debates on U.S. national security and international security issues.

Make a difference: Since the program's founding in 1977, over 1300 graduates have gone on to fill important positions in the U.S. and other governments, non-governmental and international organizations, and the private sector.

Security Studies at Georgetown

Choose from over 50 different courses in security studies, including:

Emerging Technologies and Security	Economic Development and Security
Information Operations	Population and Security
Outer Space and Technology	U.S. Homeland Security
The International Arms Trade	U.S. Intelligence Policy
Globalization and Security	U.S. Defense Budgeting
Ethnic Conflict and Civil War	Net Assessment and Strategic Planning
Peacekeeping and Peace Operations	Weapon Proliferation and Security
Political Violence and Terrorism	Energy and Security

To request a catalogue and application materials, visit:
<http://ssp.georgetown.edu>

The Impossible Imperative?

Conjuring Arab Democracy

Adam Garfinkle

SAY WHAT you will about Lyndon Johnson's imperfections, the man had a keen sense of the American character. "Our American people", he said during a November 1967 press conference, "when we get into a contest of any kind—whether it is a war, an election, a football game or whatever it is—we want it decided quickly; get in or get out." President Johnson's appreciation for Americans' lack of tolerance for ambiguities, particularly in matters of national security, bears on how we think about and deal with the problem of mass-casualty terrorism. Having to live with vulnerabilities of apocalyptic scale for an indefinite future is, for most Americans, simply inconceivable. It follows that there *must* be a way to end such vulnerabilities.

For some that way is to kill or capture terrorists everywhere they may be found, and to either overturn or intimidate into good behavior all regimes that aid them. That seemed the essential message of the original Bush Doctrine (since refined into a strategy of conjoint military and political pre-emption—of which more below). For others, the solution is a Middle East Marshall Plan, the premise being that poverty causes terrorism. But nearly everyone sees that a broad and hyperactive military approach, even a technologi-

cally stunning one, is unlikely by itself to succeed (and could incite more trouble in future than it can solve in the here and now). The poverty alleviation solution is so impractically suited to the size and urgency of the problem that few responsible people take it seriously. So a political solution, poised between military and materialist ones, has now gained pride of place: fostering Arab democracy.

Since last autumn we have come to suspect that the political culture of the Muslim world in general and the Arab world in particular operates on premises mostly antithetical to our own. Not that many Muslims or Arabs think and would act like Al-Qaeda members, but the extent of anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism in the Middle East is great, and it stems not only from particular U.S. policies but from incommensurate attitudes, long in the making, about the ideals and nature of public life. This may or may not translate into a clash of civilizations, but it certainly indicates more than a mere failure to communicate.

Soon after September 11, 2001, therefore, the key question emerged: Can we change Middle Eastern political culture? Some joined Thomas Friedman in defining the aim of the war on terrorism as "it's democracy, stupid." "Those who argue that we needn't press for democracy in Arab-Muslim states, and can rely on repressive regimes" he wrote in his

Adam Garfinkle is editor of *The National Interest*.

November 20 *New York Times* column, “have it all wrong.” Others thought such ambitions a reach too far. Michael Kelly, for example, conceded in his *Washington Post* essay the very next day that democracy is necessary for the ultimate establishment of free, tolerant and neighborly states, but “three questions remain: Are we generally capable of overthrowing undemocratic Islamic regimes (and there are a lot of them) and replacing them with free and moderate democracies? What would happen if we tried? If we succeeded?” His answers were sober ones: “By and large we are not capable of overthrowing such regimes. . . . If we tried, we would probably get *jihad* for real. If we succeeded, we would get a world of unintended consequences”, including perhaps a Talibanish regime in Saudi Arabia.

The op-ed page exchanges over this issue reflected a deep and longstanding debate among experts, most outside and a few within the Bush Administration. The question roiled its internal deliberations for months, but by June 1 it seemed resolved in favor of the more ambitious and optimistic view.¹ President Bush said at West Point:

When it comes to the common rights and needs of men and women, there is no clash of civilizations. The requirements of freedom apply fully to Africa and Latin America and the entire Islamic world. The people of the Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms and opportunities as people in every nation. . . . Mothers and fathers and children across the Islamic world, and all the world, share the same fears and aspirations. In poverty, they struggle. In tyranny, they suffer. And as we saw in Afghanistan, in liberation they celebrate.

To all appearances, then, the administration sees the creation of Arab democracy as a strategic imperative, and as a logical political accompaniment to the policy of

military pre-emption. In other words, in addition to pre-empting missiles and madmen, we will in due course pre-empt motives as well.

Political pre-emption takes three forms. First, the United States will increase significantly its foreign assistance and public diplomacy efforts, the assumption being not that poverty and disinformation cause terrorism, but that they provide terrorism with literal and psychological support structures. Second, the United States will engage in nation-building (more accurately, state-building) in cases where potential failed states are strategically situated. And third, the United States will promote democracy both for its own sake and because poverty alleviation, the nurturing of free and responsible media, and nation-building are believed ultimately futile without it. Hence, in specific terms, the administration’s acceptance that nation-building in Afghanistan is unavoidable, the linkage of Palestinian-Israeli peace to the democratic reform of the Palestinian Authority, and the conclusion that the overthrow of the Ba’ath regime in Iraq requires that a democracy be installed in its place.

The project of exporting democracy to the Muslim and Arab worlds has become suddenly very popular. For one thing, it is a delight to speechwriters and White House political operatives, for it elevates a political vocabulary that leaves critics open to easy counterpunching. For another, it accords closely with Americans’ sense of their own global mission: “Tutors of mankind in its pilgrimage to perfection”, as Reinhold Niebuhr once described it. Whenever

¹This argument was described, possibly accurately, by Lawrence F. Kaplan in “Return Address”, *The New Republic*, June 10, 2002. (This date notwithstanding, Kaplan wrote before the President’s June 1 speech.)

Americans face a problem in the world for which there is no obvious remedy, democracy promotion—which comes down to making “them” look more like “us”—is the default solution; and it comes, almost invariably, with a condescending high-mindedness to one hand and a cache of technological doodads to the other. (America as liberal imperium is not, however, exceptional in this; similar impulses used to be called “the white man’s burden” or “*la mission civilatrice*”, which helps explain the renewed fascination, even in Washington, with Rudyard Kipling.)

Even normally circumspect commentators have rallied behind the project of exporting democracy to the Arabs. Jim Hoagland criticized the meekness of President Bush’s June 24 speech on reforming the Palestinian Authority: “The speech that Bush should have given on Monday would have addressed much more fully the ways in which the Arab world as a whole must adapt to modern political and economic democracy—and what the United States will do to help.” Urging the United States not to think small, Hoagland foresees “a greatly expanded and intrusive U.S. military presence . . . to help develop and shield new and democratic leaderships in Iraq and in a Palestinian state.” That military presence, specifically in Iraq, “will serve as a lynchpin for democratic transformation of a major Arab country that can be a model for the region.” Implementing that model, however, will require a new cast of characters: “The administration cannot rely on local leaders who show no commitment to democratic change to be the instruments of that change. . . . These leaders must be challenged rather than comforted or coddled.” Michael Kelly, reversing his earlier caution, has predicted a democratic Iraq and Palestine in “only a few years”, develop-

ments that will “revolutionize the power dynamic in the Middle East, powerfully adding to the effects of the liberation of Afghanistan to force Arab and Islamic regimes to increasingly allow democratic reforms. A majority of Arabs”, he argues, “will come to see America as the essential ally in progress toward liberty in their own lands” because the President now rejects “the entire philosophy of Middle Eastern diplomacy” wherein we have traded forbearance of Arab political misanthropies for stability and oil. Concludes Kelly, “This is radical, and it will produce radical results.” William Kristol capped the beatification of the new approach with a paean to democratic peace theory applied to the Middle East. The President’s “vision of a democratic and peaceful swath of the Middle East, from Israel through Palestine, Jordan and Iraq”, he has written, “has now become the governing objective of the Bush Administration—and ambitious though it is, it is really the only realistic path to peace in the Middle East and to victory in the war on terror.”²

To proclaim this vision “realistic” truly joins the issue, for realists have always believed that considerations of the balance of power and resolve, more than the character of regimes, produce peace in regional subsystems. If administration principals really share Kristol’s description, and the enthusiasms of Messrs. Hoagland and Kelly, then Gary Schmitt is right to argue that the debate between realists and neo-conservatives over the significance accorded to the character of states has been settled by

²See Hoagland’s *Washington Post* columns of June 26, June 30, and August 1, 2002; Kelly, “An End to Pretending”, *Washington Post*, June 26, 2002; and Kristol, “President’s Speech on the Middle East”, Project for the New American Century Memorandum, June 25, 2002.

the Bush Doctrine in favor of the latter.³ Perhaps not settled for long, though, for there are three problems with this approach that may cause its reconsideration—the first two very serious and the third even more so.

The first problem concerns the presumption that Arab democracy will equate to a “peaceful swath” in the Middle East. The truth is that semi-institutionalized populist democracies can make war more likely; that, specifically in the “transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not less.”⁴ This is particularly so in contemporary non-Western societies where democratization intersects with the recrudescence of identity politics to produce what Samuel Huntington calls the “democracy paradox”: democracy facilitates the rise to power of groups that appeal to indigenous ethnic and religious loyalties that are likely to be anti-Western and—here is the paradox—anti-democratic in the not-very-long run. We have already seen this phenomenon at work in Muslim domains like Indonesia and northern Nigeria, and one example nipped in the bud in Algeria. We know that mainstream opinion in most Arab countries is more anti-Western than that of the regimes now governing them, so why, then, if that opinion comes to drive government policy—instead of merely complicating it, as it does today—should we expect peace to break out?

The second problem is that a successful campaign to bring democracy to the domains of rogues and villains really does presuppose either a major shift in U.S. attitudes toward the undemocratic ruling classes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and others that we have long called our friends, or a permanent condition of blatant diplomatic hypocrisy. If we do suddenly begin to act as though our long-

time authoritarian allies are really enemies blocking the democratization of their countries (and with it the best guarantee of our protection from mass-casualty terrorism), we will, in effect, be *choosing* bad relations with ten mostly well-entrenched regimes, without any reasonable near-term prospect of replacing them with democratic governments. Hypocrisy, on the other hand, might not even be an option: How could we possibly isolate the impact of a democratic Iraq (and Palestine) from Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt, or from our relationships with their leaders?

The third problem is even more fundamental: Can we do it? Are Muslim, and particularly Arab, political cultures so malleable that within a generation or two we can transform most, or even some, of them into genuine liberal democracies? Perhaps we can. But perhaps in our desperation to achieve absolute security in a newly perilous world, we are distorting the social history of democracy and misreading the nature of the societies whose political virtue we mean to raise up. If this is the case, then we are in for much frustration, not to mention a misdirection of effort and resources, in the years ahead. Walter Lippmann once warned that it is a disease of the soul to be in love with impossible things, so it may repay effort to

³Schmitt, “A Case of Continuity”, p. 11 above.

Some observers profess still to be confused about the difference between realists and neo-conservatives. One reason for this is that pure types of either sort are scarce, for both sides make important and compelling arguments that often attract the other. Withal, the following definition should help: Neo-conservatives are realists for whom all utopian ideologies are anathema, except their own.

⁴Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War”, *International Security* (Summer 1995), p. 5.

look more closely at this third problem.

The Difficulty of Democracy

DEMOCRACY IS wonderful. What makes it wonderful, in part anyway, is that, like all we love or cherish, it is rare, fleeting or fragile. Genuine democracy, after all, is not a natural condition of social life but a refined achievement of it—so, clearly, believed Locke, Montesquieu and the American Founders after them. These were men who stood second to none in affirming the blessings of liberty, but they never assumed that all social and economic virtue *depended* on the adoption of a particular form of government—what Samuel Taylor Coleridge ruefully called the “talismanic influence” of government over “our virtues and our happiness.” They saw things the other way around: that a particular form of government was the *consequence* of a people’s social, moral and historical experience. As Rousseau summarized Montesquieu’s essential argument: “Liberty, not being a fruit of all climates, is not within the reach of all peoples.” Locke thought he knew why: “The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions.” But most men did not, or could not, consult reason, and so to “turn [a man] loose to an unrestrain’d Liberty, before he has Reason to guide him, is not allowing him the privilege of his Nature to be free; but to thrust him out amongst Brutes, and abandon him to a state as wretched, and as much beneath that of a man, as theirs.”

The American Founders, Jefferson in particular, were more optimistic than their European forbears about the prospects for “an empire of liberty”, but they knew that

democracy required certain dispositional prerequisites that, while theoretically universal, were in practice very scarce. They remained scarce for a long time, too. Before World War I, democracy was limited to the English-speaking world, France, and a few other developing forms in Holland, Switzerland, and Scandinavia. After 1919, democratic experiments in Germany, Italy, Japan, Poland and elsewhere proved mostly ill-fated, which explains why no one in the first part of the 20th century equated the now evocative adjective “Western” with the even more evocative adjective “democratic.” So how then, if democracy is so difficult and has obviously been so rare, do we explain the successive “waves” of democratization in the second half of the 20th century and the fact that, since the end of the Cold War, democracy has become a virtually unchallenged norm of political best-practice?

Some answer by questioning the credentials of new democracies. If one looks beyond the occasional election to empirically-grounded measures of political pluralism—such as those of Robert Dahl’s polyarchy scale—one sees mostly illiberal, marquee, or “managed” democracies, where there are no mass-based parties and where the true locus of political authority is not subject to removal by electoral means. But others argue that a larger number of societies are simply doing the difficult more often and with greater sustained success. Increased urbanization and literacy, the power of the information revolution, the growing number of democracies that work in both political and economic terms, and the magnetism of American power are factors advancing the democratic revolution far more rapidly than even Woodrow Wilson would have thought possible. Attitudes *are* changing, they argue; social preconditions *are* being met—in other words, the trends are real.

Since optimists and pessimists alike understand democracy not as a dichoto-

mous variable (i.e., that it either exists or doesn't) but a cardinal one (i.e., that it can exist to a greater or lesser extent), democracy can be both difficult and easy simultaneously: easy to desire and pursue, difficult to achieve quickly or in full. How one judges depends on the interests brought to bear on the subject—in other words, on the political context in which the argument is couched. There have been three successive layers of context in recent years.

The first of these contexts is of Cold War origin: If democracy were easy, then defeating Soviet Communism—rather than merely deterring and containing it—would be possible. Cold War idealists saw democracy expansion as a means of rollback and victory, a view embodied in the second Reagan Administration. Left-wing idealists reasoned that the relative ease of democratic development undermined the rationale for supporting “friendly tyrants”—U.S. Cold War allies of ill repute. Both wings favored “exporting” democracy, and both accepted the main predicates of democratic peace theory: that democracies make good neighbors, and that the ultimate implications of democratization for international security would be unambiguously positive.

Those who held democracy hard to do, realists in the main, tended to see the Cold War as a virtually permanent condition, one to be managed through traditional balance-of-power geopolitics and balance-of-resolve diplomacy. They regarded the export of democracy as very difficult, for they credited culture with composing a deeper layer of political inertia than idealists and liberals would admit. They wondered how universal Western political values really were or could become in a practicable timeframe. They defended most relations with friendly authoritarians as justifiable lesser evils. As to democratic peace theory, many admitted general tendencies but were skeptical of it as a law of history, particularly as

applied to non-Western cultures where too little democratic experience existed from which to form a judgment.

A second context was post-Cold War, when the central question became not how the spread of democracy might undermine communism but how it could redeem communism's terrible legacy. Did the collapse of Soviet communism presuppose that all authoritarian socialist systems would become democratic? Were we at the End of History, or would some new form of the Nietzschean will to power arise? What was the relationship between democracy and market economics? In the first post-Cold War years of globalization, economic reform took pride of place for many. (The irony of the United States taking a materialist approach to democratization in the former “second world”, after having just spent half a century battling the most wicked and dangerous form of materialism ever, should not go unremarked, but this is not the place to speak of it further.) But since democracy was not an all-or-nothing condition but a process, the progress of which often rested in the eyes of beholders, disagreement arose as to how democracy was faring in the former Soviet empire and elsewhere. As they gazed through neo-liberal, neo-conservative and realist prisms, each school saw the reflection of its own predispositions.

As a rule, however, optimists gained the upper hand in both Cold War and post-Cold War contexts. After all, superior ideas did do in the Soviet Union, didn't they? Old arguments that Confucian or *caudillo* political cultures made democracy impossible in East Asia and Latin America were proved wrong, weren't they? During the Clinton era, at least until the 1997 Asia crisis, it seemed self-evident that democracy and market economics advanced and reinforced one another without any obvious contradiction or downside. Doubters warned that democ-

racy and market economics were revolutionary ideas which always caused havoc in societies unused to them, but even as evidence mounted that this was correct, such was the Zeitgeist that a defensiveness about this claim came as naturally as the claim itself. It is largely thanks to how the Cold War ended and the general trajectory of the past dozen years that democracy optimists have carried the day in the third context: that of post-September 11, 2001.

Three Differences

THE STAKES over the arguments about democracy seemed high during the Cold War, and nearly as high in the decade that followed. But to many Americans, those stakes seem small compared to what stands before us today. In the Cold War we faced an immense Soviet nuclear weapons arsenal; but the Soviet government could be reasoned with and deterred. Now we face suicidal fanatics who, with nothing earthly to lose, may be essentially undeterrable, and who may nonetheless devise ways to kill us as effectively as Soviet H-bombs would have been. That prospect is what recommends a strategy of pre-emption, and the imperative of bringing democracy to countries that incubate terrorists or provide support and sanctuary for their work. God help us, for this will be much harder to achieve than defeating Soviet communism.

It is, of course, perilous to generalize about the large and diverse number of Muslim political cultures, and even about the smaller and somewhat less diverse number of Arab ones. They are not all the same, and it is hard, too, to separate out the theological, historical and, what for want of a better word, the anthropological strands of these cultures (for Islam is a venerable civilization, not just a religion, its historical equivalent in Western history

being not Christianity but Christendom). That said, there are few electoral democracies in the Muslim world (Turkey's is the most mature), and *absolutely none* in the Arab world. The risks of generalizing aside, can this really be a coincidence?

It isn't a coincidence. Arab societies lack certain dispositional prerequisites for democracy; let us mention just three: the belief that the proximate source of political authority is intrinsic to the society; a concept of majority rule; and the acceptance of all citizens' essential equality before the law. Without the first, the idea of pluralism—and of a “loyal opposition”—cannot exist. Without the second, a polity can be neither free nor liberal. Without the third, the idea of elections as a means to form a government is incomprehensible. These attitudes are second-nature to Americans; indeed, they help define what America is. So smoothly do these attitudes flow into our consciousness that we often assume that they are also second-nature to others. It is not so, however.

There are only two ways to conceive of the operable source of political authority: either it is intrinsic—“of the people, by the people, for the people”—or it is extrinsic (coming from God, or from some accepted imperial source outside the society in question). The first of these conceptions is the newer in human history, and for it we have Copernicus to thank. As John Donne wrote in “To the Praise of the Dead, and the Anatomie” (1611):

*And new Philosophy calls all in doubt,
The Element of fire is quite put out;
The Sun is lost, and th'earth, and no mans wit
Can well direct him where to look for it. . . .
'Tis all in peeces, all cohaerence gone;
All just supply, and all Relation:
Prince, Subject, Father, Sonne, are things forgot.*

It was not long after that the Glorious

Revolution ensued, and that Thomas Hobbes and his successors took the final measure of the divine right of kings, dispatching it as they launched forth the era of modern social contract politics.

Not so within Islamic civilization, which has never recognized any intrinsic source of political authority. Islam is a radically monadic religion of divine revelation, and Islamic political culture has developed over more than 1,300 years wholly true to that principle. Divine, extrinsic authority cannot be disputed, so there is no logic to political pluralism as a permanent or ideal condition. Tolerance for any other set of social and political first principles amounts to heresy; tolerance of other private religious beliefs is conceived as virtuous forbearance, not as a recognition that truth might really be in dispute. A Saudi professor of Islamic law thus explained tolerance to a visiting journalist in these terms: "Well, of course I hate you because you are a Christian, but that doesn't mean I want to kill you."⁵

A particular concept of political leadership flows from these predicates. A leader is someone who enunciates and spreads God's law. It follows that since there is only one God and He has only one law, there should only be one political structure (the caliphate) and one leader of it. Accountability is not democratic in the Western procedural sense, but organic in a religious communal will. Government is legitimate when it accords with *a priori* religious truth. This is why, as Bernard Lewis relates, the first Muslim jurists to observe the House of Commons at work at the end of the 18th century felt sorry for the British when they learned that the purpose of that large, noisy assemblage of "common" people was to make laws. The English, they later explained to their readers, "had not accepted a divine law and so were reduced to the expedient of making their own laws."⁶

This model of leadership is still rele-

vant to the more secular context of our own day. The explicit content of *a priori* truth may have changed (or not, as in Saudi Arabia), but the form remains the same. As William Brown, a former U.S. diplomat and Arabist, sums it up:

According to the liberal democratic norms of the West, political institutions are dedicated to enacting the wishes of a tolerant majority. In the Middle East the purpose of political institutions is to facilitate the constant unfolding or revelation of a popular consensus. . . . The Arab perceives a single community of faith and language that contrasts sharply with our emphasis on competing but mutually adjusting political factions. In the West, politics has a flavor of controlled conflict that the Arab regards as destructive to community.⁷

Which brings us directly to the matter of majority rule.

If truth is intrinsic to a society and men are fallible, then political life must amount to trial-and-error attempts to find the best way to govern. If no one can invoke the authority of unquestioned truth, it follows that the majority should decide which path to follow, and which leaders to trust, until it comes time to take stock, vote again, and perhaps try another approach. We regard this as simple common sense, but most Arabs do not—and the reason is not obscure.

For thousands of years, most people—certainly most Middle Easterners—lived in villages of several dozen to per-

⁵Quoted in the *New York Times*, July 12, 2002.

⁶Bernard Lewis, "Islam and Liberal Democracy: A Historical Overview", *Journal of Democracy* (April 1996), p. 57.

⁷William R. Brown, *The Last Crusade* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1980), pp. 8, 10. Also insightful—and often withering—on these and other points is Fatema Mernissi, *Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World* (Cambridge, MA: Perseus, 2002).

haps a few hundred people whose organizing principle was usually that of the clan or tribe. They also lived, more often than not, in an insecure world where the dangers posed by other tribes, and the prospect of natural disaster and epidemic disease, were very real. This put a huge premium on preventing serious rifts within village society. While the variety of decision-making procedures in traditional societies is manifest in the literature of cultural anthropology, they all boil down to governance through consensus-building. Leadership was usually centralized and hereditary, but that did not necessarily make it despotic. A leader engaged in open-ended negotiation with the dominant, usually elder, males representing the main branches of the clan; problems were talked out, compromises and understandings reached, and in return all swore personal loyalty to the leader (*bay'a* in Arabic—a still current and meaningful term). This methodology of governance was absorbed into and sanctified by Islam, wherein a leader comes to his position through a consensus of elders (*ijma*) and remains in power through the acquiescence of the community (*umma*). A leader who breaks faith, it is assumed, will be rejected by the *umma* and replaced by a new standard bearer who will reconstitute a social consensus.

Now consider in this light the idea that a contender who wins 54 percent of the vote in an election should be given 100 percent of the power, while the person who wins 46 percent should end up with none. This strikes people used to consensus decision-making as not only illogical and unfair, but dangerous—an open invitation to civil strife should society come under pressure. This is why, by the way, when Hosni Mubarak or Bashir Asad wins 95 percent of the vote in an election—which we usually interpret as an empty act of egomaniacal perversity—it does not strike a typical Egyptian or

Syrian as odd. It also helps to explain the result of a recent UN Development Program report on the Arab world, which shows that the Arab region “has the lowest value of all regions in the world for voice and accountability”—UN-speak for political participation and democracy.

Finally, equality before the law, which we commonly summarize as one man (and woman), one vote. This fundamental principle establishes the equality of all citizens as far as basic social status and political rights are concerned. Like nearly all traditional authority templates, however, Islam mandates inequality and hierarchy. Men are inherently “more equal” than women, the educated more than the illiterate, the noble or Sherifian more than the commoner, the pious more than the reprobate, the elder more than the youth. Theology aside, social custom in the Arab world is such that most people find offensive and absurd the idea that the vote of a 19-year old illiterate peasant woman should be equal to that of a respected 70-year old *qadi*. The presumption of natural hierarchy in society is neither a parochial nor a ridiculous view, merely a pre-modern one; it was, after all, true of typical Westerners only an historically short time ago.

The advancement of the social equality of women has special resonance in the Arab world. The emancipation of women, in legal and broader psychological terms, is the most revolutionary social change afoot in the Arab and broader Muslim world. Though its progress has been uneven within and among societies, it frightens many a male, for it threatens his social status and self-esteem like nothing else—and to these fears has recently been added a totally unexpected economic edge. In societies as different as those of Egypt and Malaysia, men’s school curricula still stress religion, literature, law and the “old” engineering tracks; women, because they are considered too feeble-minded or otherwise vulnerable for such

pursuits, have for decades been “shunted” into medicine, business administration and computer technology—imagined by men to be just glorified clerking, since it involves a typewriter keyboard. Guess what has happened? Exactly: as the world economy has become more integrated, the relative market value of female labor in most of these countries has soared, women have moved increasingly into the work force, and the structure of home life has been altered in consequence. It is difficult to describe to someone who has never studied such societies the magnitude of social stress these changes are causing. The last thing that most educationally inferior, insecure Muslim Arab males want is “democracy”, which they associate with utterly frightening changes in the status of women. Rather, such fears have tended to drive many into the fold of traditional or fundamentalist religion, and no doubt these stresses also help explain the troubling rise in “honor” killings in recent decades.

Not only are liberal democratic attitudes toward pluralism, majority rule and equality before the law mostly absent from the Arab world, that world counterposes entrenched attitudes that are their antitheses: concepts of monadic political authority, consensus forms of decision-making and natural social hierarchy. We know that attitudes acquired and reinforced over centuries maintain a grip on the patterns of any group’s social relations, for better or for worse, even long after the conditions that spawned them have disappeared; so it seems indeed a reach too far to expect Arab societies to become liberal democracies anytime soon—certainly not soon enough to supply us with help for the problem of apocalyptic terrorism. And though we certainly wish them well, there is little that even the best efforts of the National Endowment for Democracy, of the new White House Office of Global Communications, of Charlotte Beers mar-

keting Uncle Sam as a brand name from the State Department, and of U.S. government-sponsored Radio Sawa, pumping out news in Arabic along with Jennifer Lopez and Lionel Ritchie music, can do about it.

These efforts, after all, are unlikely to change the contemporary Arab view of liberal democracy as an alien Western idea at a time when Arab societies are struggling to cope with Western-wrought modernity. They cannot erase the fact that most Arab societies tried but failed during the late 19th and 20th centuries to adopt Western ways to achieve wealth, power and respect, or erase the legacy of simultaneous envy and resentment created by that failure (explaining why many Arab youths who in the morning declare their enmity for the West in the afternoon express a desire to emigrate there). They cannot change the reality that societies which undervalue scientific education, restrict the flow of information, simultaneously educate and oppress women, maintain bloated public bureaucracies, avoid real privatization and free trade, and base economic relations on primordial affiliations of ethnic or religious identity will never be able to compete with the West, the states of East Asia or—most frustrating for them—Israel. Nor can these efforts stem the rise of identity politics that is reducing the appeal of liberal democracy in much of the Arab world, or persuade the rentier elites who own and run that world to take an interest in resisting that trend. To put it mildly, then, Arab antipathy toward the West and Western ways, including democracy, is *not* mainly a public relations problem.

Does this mean that Arab democracy is an oxymoron? Of course not. Other cultures need not become Western in order to become democratic; it is vapid historicism to point to the cultural particularity of the Reformation and the Renaissance and then wave one’s hands in

despair over the supposed authoritarian fate of others. There is nothing “wrong” with Arabs, either cognitively or morally, and there is nothing indelibly “wrong” with Islam. There certainly *are* theological and cultural predicates for democracy within Islam—and they are neither minor nor obscure—should anyone wish to use them.⁸ Some do: there *are* genuine Arab democrats, and they deserve our support. The problem is that there are too few of them and, in the end, there must be widespread indigenous interest in democracy for help from abroad to “take.”⁹ Unfortunately, one will do best looking for such interest in self-exiled communities of Arabs in Europe and North America—or in Egyptian jails—for it is uncomfortable these days to be a democrat in Araby.

Forcing the Issue

SO WHERE does this leave us? Our attitude toward promoting Arab democracy should be likened to playing the lottery: it’s no sin to wager, but it’s unwise to rely for one’s future on winning the jackpot. Meanwhile, the materialist approach—poverty alleviation—is a double-edged sword. Reducing poverty may help drain the proverbial swamp of terrorism’s sympathizers, but it may simultaneously increase the number of apocalyptically-minded terrorists as the angry and upwardly mobile seek out means of personal empowerment and expression.

The same double-edge goes, potentially, for military action. A protracted and sporadically very bloody use of American force, particularly to the extent that it appears to be unilateral, may well generate more resentment and terror attacks over time. That some people still discount the potential for the counterproductive use of American military power is dismaying; such innocent bloody-mindedness ignores

Raymond Aron’s famous warning that “there are ways of conquering that can quickly transform victory into defeat.” But it is *even worse* to use force without a commitment to victory within pragmatically defined limits. When the United States uses military power, as it must under current circumstances, it invariably elicits resentment and the chance of consequent violent reaction; all the more reason, therefore, to use force ruthlessly and conclusively, to kill or disable the vast majority of those who have conspired to murder Americans and are plotting to murder still more.

It bears special emphasis in this regard that definitions of “ruthless” and “conclusive” are not ours to make, but our enemy’s. Westerners were much impressed with the technological virtuosity of the campaign in Afghanistan, but Al-Qaeda members and their sympathizers, most of whom lack the capacity even to understand the technical feats we achieved, were not. What they understand is that most of Al-Qaeda’s leadership survived. They “understand”, too, that the U.S. military used proxies to fight in Afghanistan because it feared direct engagement. They think this explains why the U.S. military does not attack Al-Qaeda strongholds in Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere. They “understand” that streams of bellicose public statements about Iraq, accompanied by no action, shows American timidity. So, they understand, does first denying and then apologizing for civilian casualties in Afghanistan. And in this fashion, too, they understand the American effort to restrain India from attacking jihadists in Kashmir, and its willingness to watch the Al-Qaeda-Hizballah liaison come to

⁸See Lewis, “Islam and Liberal Democracy”, pp. 53–6.

⁹Note Owen Harries, “‘Exporting Democracy’—and Getting it Wrong”, *The National Interest* (Fall 1988).

maturity in the Beka Valley.

Now, it is true, as many argue, that a hallmark of successful great power diplomacy is the knack for creating common security goods for one's allies, thereby to gather friends, forestall balancing coalitions and, in present circumstances, to maximize critical intelligence and police cooperation in the war against terrorism. It is less often remarked that another such hallmark, especially in wartime, is a capacity to inspire awe in one's adversaries. The Bush Administration has been widely criti-

cized for its deficiencies on the first point—maybe too much so. It has not been criticized enough on the second. A more ruthless and time-compressed use of force, within a tightly circumscribed target set, would have served better over the past year than the so far inconclusive approach to a wide but ill-defined “enemy”—an abstract noun, no less—that we have followed instead. While the administration works to turn Arab countries into democracies, it will have plenty of time to make the appropriate adjustments. □

West Point, 1802-2002


We took the steamboat down the North River towards New York, but stopped, some four hours' journey short of it, at West Point. . . . In this beautiful place: the fairest among the fair and lovely Highlands of the North River: shut in by deep green heights and ruined forts, and looking down upon the distant town of Newburgh, along a glittering path of sunlit water, with here and there a skiff, whose white sail often bends on some new tack as sudden flaws of wind come down upon her from the gullies in the hills: hemmed in, besides, all round with memories of Washington, and events of the revolutionary war: is the Military School of America.

It could not stand on more appropriate ground, and any ground more beautiful can hardly be. The course of education is severe, but well devised, and manly. Through June, July, and August, the young men encamp upon the spacious plain whereon the college stands; and all the year their military exercises are performed there, daily. The term of study at this institution, which the State requires from all cadets, is four years; but, whether it be from the rigid nature of the discipline, or the national impatience of restraint, or both causes combined, not more than half the number who begin their studies here, ever remain to finish them. . . .

The dwellings of the various Professors are beautifully situated; and there is a most excellent hotel for strangers, though it has the two drawbacks of being a total abstinence house (wines and spirits being forbidden to the students), and of serving the public meals at rather uncomfortable hours: to wit, breakfast at seven, dinner at one, and supper at sunset.

—Charles Dickens, *American Notes* (1842)

New from The Nixon Center & The Brookings Institution Press



Hardcover, \$22.95
203 pages / 0-8157-4498-6

THE NEW RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY

By Igor S. Ivanov
*Foreign Minister of the Russian
Federation*

"Unusually frank for a sitting government official . . . Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov provides a useful and intriguing assessment of the principal objectives of Russian foreign policy at the beginning of the twenty-first century."

**From the Foreword by
Henry A. Kissinger**

In this frank and engaging book, Foreign Minister Igor S. Ivanov describes the evolution of Russian foreign policy since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Drawing on Russia's long diplomatic history, Ivanov analyzes the complex process through which a newly democratic Russia has redefined its foreign policy during a volatile transformation over the last decade.

The New Russian Diplomacy was originally published in Russia, where it received very favorable reviews. This volume is a special edition for American readers with a new introduction and an expanded and updated discussion of the U.S.-Russian relationship.

TO ORDER

Contact the Brookings Institution Press
Phone: 1-800-275-1447 Fax: 202-797-2960
www.brookings.edu/bipress

For more information on Nixon Center publications and events,
please visit the Center's website at www.nixoncenter.org.

SIR MICHAEL HOWARD hails **"One of the most important books
on international relations published in the last 50 years"**

THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES

Philip Bobbitt a historian of nuclear strategy who has served in the White House, the Senate, and the National Security Council, brilliantly addresses the transformation of the nature of war and, with it, developing changes in statecraft as profound as history has yet seen.

**"Magisterial in its
scope and ambition"
says Edward Rothenstein
in the New York Times**

...His evolutionary map of warfare's impact on the state foreshadows the kind of events still unfolding."

**"Argumentative,
opinionated, brilliant"
says William Shawcross**

**"A triumph...original in concept,
provocative, consistently absorbing."
—David McCullough**

Published by Knopf  www.aaknopf.com

INTERNSHIP OPPORTUNITIES AT THE NIXON CENTER FALL 2002

The Nixon Center is currently recruiting energetic undergraduate and graduate students interested in international affairs for volunteer intern positions at its Washington, DC office. An internship at *The Nixon Center* is an excellent way to learn about international affairs and the foreign policy process. It can also provide important opportunities to meet influential people in government, think tanks, and the media. Current vacancies include:

Chinese Studies
Immigration Policy
Middle East & Caspian Basin

National Security
Strategic Studies
U.S.–Russian Relations

Duties generally include research, writing, and administrative support. Interns typically work 15-20 hours per week; scheduling is flexible within normal office hours (9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.). For further information, please contact Jennifer Roque at 202-887-1000. To apply, please send a résumé and cover letter specifying the program(s) of your interest to Ms. Roque by email to jroque@nixoncenter.org, by fax to 202-887-5222, or by mail to *The Nixon Center*, 1615 L Street, NW, Suite 1250, Washington, DC 20036.

“MORAL JUDGMENTS are intrinsic to all historical understanding.”

—*Martin Malia*

“THE WORLD’S loss of confidence in the benign purview of American power might well turn out to be the principal legacy of the war on terror.”

—*Robert Tucker*

“THE POST-SIXTIES school defies both Charles Darwin and Andy Warhol: Its thinking seems helpless to adapt to change, and it refuses to relinquish its 15 minutes of fame.”

—*John Patrick Diggins*

“AMERICA IS NO predator going a-conquering like yesterday’s hegemons, but by the intermittent growl of his voice and swipe of his mighty paw, this beast tells the rest: ‘I am the king; go along, or I go it alone.’”

—*Josef Joffe*

“GIBRALTAR AND its people face yet another siege—only this time the British government is not standing like a rock on their behalf. It rather seems reduced to gravel.”

—*Joe Garcia*

“THE PROMULGATION of the Bush Doctrine means that the debate between conservative realists and neo-conservatives over the priority given to the character of states (‘regimes’) has been settled in favor of the latter.”

—*Gary Schmitt*